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by Jehan Perera

The opening up of the LTTE-held Wanni to a group of over 40 journalists last week confirms the rapid progress of the peace process. The Wanni has been out of bounds to almost all local journalists and only a few foreign journalists have entered it in the past decade and more. This restriction on the freedom of the media helped to make the Wanni a sort of "heart of darkness". The sunlight that the media can provide will undoubtedly help to increase the awareness and open up the hearts of people in the rest of the country regarding the humanitarian importance of the peace process.

One of the main messages to emanate out of this visit has been the statement of LTTE political wing leader S. P. Tamilchelvan that the ban on the organisation should be lifted prior to peace talks. This has been an LTTE demand for the past two years. There is a logic to this demand, both in terms of the LTTE's self-perception of itself as representing the Tamil people and the recent verdict of the December general election at which the Tamil people of the north-east voted overwhelmingly for Tamil political parties that endorsed the LTTE's claim.

But in making its demands, and setting pre-conditions for peace talks (which it prefers to call pre-requisites), the LTTE presents difficulties to those on the other side of the divide with whom it is dealing with. In regular military strategy, putting the opposite side into a difficult situation is advantageous. It is their unilateral destruction that is sought. But in the case of political negotiations, putting the other side into difficulties may be counterproductive, and reduce the capacity of the negotiations to go forward to the mutual benefit of both sides.

To its credit, the new government has proceeded very fast on the peace track. Everyone acknowledges this, and no one disputes it. But the government's concessions need to be matched by concessions by the LTTE, or else the perception will grow that to the LTTE the peace process is one way traffic only. It is important that the LTTE realises that in democratic societies, flawed though they be, the ground has to be built for concessions to be made. Or else there is the grave risk that sooner or later there will be rejection.

Indian host

An example would be the LTTE proposal that India should play host to forthcoming peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. This proposal, from out of the blue as it were, has met with a strong objection particularly by the virtual chief minister of Tamil Nadu state, Ms Jayalalitha. The LTTE has made its case in terms of a humanitarian issue, being that of its chief negotiator Dr Anton Balasingham's poor health condition and requirement of the best hospital attention. The LTTE believes that it is only the hospital facilities available in India that could keep Dr Balasingham alive and well during the protracted negotiation process that would require him to keep in direct contact with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni.

The LTTE's present unexpected proposal that India should play willing or unwilling host brings a key LTTE characteristic into focus. It reveals an LTTE frame of mind that is highly innovative but is also manipulative. Time and again the LTTE has caught its opponents by surprise, catching them in ambushes at the most unexpected time, and has stood it in good stead militarily. But this is not the path to success in negotiations.

There is much to be appreciated in Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's approach which has been markedly different, especially with regard to India. His first major foreign policy initiative after being elected to office was to visit India on a relationship building exercise. It was clear that he wished to inform his counterparts in New Delhi about his proposed plan of action to rescue the country from the grave peril it is in. There were to be no surprises.

Military combat in which the unilateral destruction of the opponent is sought is very different from political negotiations in which the willing participation of the other is necessary. Putting the opponent on the spot, or publicly embarrassing them into conforming to one's own agenda, is not the way forward, but is only likely to evoke further mistrust and hostility. It is clear that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has acted according to the principles of good negotiation. The LTTE would do well to learn this lesson.

In order to strengthen its proposal that India should play host to the peace talks, the LTTE has made the point that the Indian government of having armed and trained the Tamil militant organisations in the past, thereby incurring an obligation to put itself out for them in the present. By exposing India in this manner, and making it look bad internationally, the LTTE is only likely to incur further Indian displeasure and a more adamant attitude against it. However, there are two further reasons for India to be unlikely to oblige the LTTE.

First is that mainstream political opinion in Tamil Nadu has been opposed to an LTTE re-entry into the state. The underground activities of the LTTE, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the state and the war with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka have lost the LTTE much of the sympathy they once enjoyed in Tamil Nadu. It is also likely that the political leadership of Tamil Nadu is not keen to host a rival claimant for the leadership of the world Tamil movement. The Indian government is likely to be deferential to Tamil Nadu's political leadership when it decides on the LTTE's proposal.

Earning credibility

India was the first country to ban the LTTE in 1992, a year after the assassination of its former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his comeback trail in Tamil Nadu. India has a second reason to view the LTTE in an unfavourable light, which is the reverse of what the LTTE argues. The organisation that India once nurtured and provided sanctuary to turned on it with fury in 1987 after the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord, and battled the Indian army for two years to a standstill. Individuals may practice the politics of forgiveness as Pope John Paul exhorted in his new year message on peace. But governments and governmental institutions which are worldly creations are less forgiving.

By making its request of the Indian government, the LTTE may have demonstrated to its support base that it is prepared to let bygones be bygones and not nurture a grudge for too long. But from India's perspective the LTTE has done little as yet to merit it being hosted as a potential peace maker. If India does accept the LTTE's proposal it will come under pressure to take the LTTE off its list of banned terrorist organisations. This would pave the way for a renewal of the LTTE's legitimacy in the international community which has recently being taking steps to ban the LTTE. Most importantly, by involving India at a very early stage in the peace process, the LTTE may be seeking to protect its leader who is on the Indian list of wanted men and has an Indian extradition warrant to reckon with in a post-conflict scenario.

While the LTTE's request makes sense from its own perspective it neglects some of the requirements of diplomacy and might even be counter-productive in terms of restoring its relationship with India. There is a need to do a great deal of spadework before a great diplomatic prize is won. Audacity or gamesmanship in international politics is generally not appreciated. No one, and certainly not a government of India's stature, would wish to be put publicly on the spot and be coerced either materially or morally to do what it would rather not do. But Dr Balasingham's health concerns are genuine ones, and an answer needs to be found to them.

It appears that the LTTE's initial suggestion of India as a suitable venue for peace talks was not canvassed first with the India government. Rather it appears to have been first floated through the media. This accounts for the Indian position that since no formal request had been made to them, there was no need to respond with a formal government statement. If a request is made to India it might be more reasonable that hospital facilities alone be asked for Dr Balasingham, which would be a purely humanitarian request, rather than to ask India to play host to the peace talks themselves.

Indian interest

There are, however, some important reasons why India would wish to play a bigger role in the Sri Lankan peace process, with or without the LTTE's invitation to them to play host. The first would be to reaffirm India's diplomatic dominance over the South Asian region. The active diplomatic role currently being played by Norway in the Sri Lankan peace process could herald an increased western role in intervening in conflict resolution processes in South Asia as a whole. In fact due to heightened India-Pakistan tensions over the Kashmir issue, and the tragic inability of the two South Asian giants to resolve their problems by themselves, the United States is playing a conflict resolution role between those two countries.

It would be in India's longer term interests in obtaining some positive role in the Sri Lankan peace process. A Norwegian-led success in Sri Lanka would assuredly raise an interest in similar western third party initiatives to resolve India's internal and external conflicts which show little signs of abating. On the other hand, if India could claim joint ownership to a successful peace process in Sri Lanka, its credibility for conflict resolution would be enhanced within its own polity.

However, the very costly and futile Indian effort to intervene directly in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict from the period 1985 to 1989 will probably deter any further such initiatives. It is likely that a great deal more of diplomatic and tripartite relationship building will be necessary before India gets itself involved in a direct manner again. Therefore, in the present phase of the Sri Lankan peace process, it is likely that Norway will play the lead third party role, as it did with much sensitivity in the Israel-Palestine conflict also. This would include obtaining a stable ceasefire, building in humanitarian and human rights protections into the ceasefire agreement, and getting an interim council under way.

It is at the subsequent phase, which may be several years down the road, that India may wish to play a more leading role. It is likely that in the subsequent phase Norway will step aside for the greater power to come in. This is also what happened in the Israel-Palestine peace process. The Norwegians commenced it but the United States took charge of it subsequently. Of all the world's great powers it is India that has the biggest interest in Sri Lanka. Keeping out western powers from the South Asian region is only one of its interests. Another reason would be in respect of the final settlement arrived at in Sri Lanka.

There is no doubt that what happens in Sri Lanka will be closely studied in India by those who wish to forge a new polity in India. So far India has attempted to resolve all its own internal disputes within the framework of its own constitution, which offers its states a form of semi-federal autonomy. If Sri Lanka were to go further than this to resolve its own ethnic conflict, India will have reason to be concerned. The peace settlement in Sri Lanka could become proposed as a model for India itself, or at least for some of its conflicts.

For these reasons, and other reasons as well, a future Indian role in the Sri Lankan peace process can be anticipated, even if it is not forthcoming at present. Both the government and LTTE would be aware of this, and making their calculations accordingly. Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to India and the LTTE's proposal that India should play host to peace talks need to be assessed in this light. 

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