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by Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe

The current negotiating process is another opportunity to end the war in Sri Lanka. There have been four previous efforts at war termination. They have all failed. Lessons from these failures need to be incorporated and taken into account in the current negotiations process.

But this is not enough. A strategic framework needs to be created to ensure success in war termination. A fundamental shift in attitudes needs to take place between all the parties to the conflict. War termination is a complex and difficult operation, which requires multifaceted interventions. This is why a strategic framework is required which ensures that all the building blocks are in place.

The political situation

The current situation is predicated by several significant factors. The International situation has fundamentally changed with a global coalition working against all forms of terrorism.

The national situation is also unique in that the President and Prime Minister are engaged in a power sharing exercise unprecedented in the country's history. The LTTE has also expressed a willingness to rethink fundamentalist politics and learn from its past mistakes.

The Prime Minister has shown good management skills in conducting the pre-negotiations phase by giving his serious attention to confidence building measures. The economic situation in the country is close to bankruptcy and zero growth. All these parameters will have an effect on the peace process.

The relationship between the President and the Prime Minister is crucial in ensuring the success of the negotiations process. The President is no longer only the President of the SLFP but of all the peoples of Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister does not have a two-thirds majority in parliament and needs to co-operate with the Opposition.

The President and the Prime Minister have publicly reiterated their full commitment to the peace process. The Prime Minister has tried to reach consensus through a process of consultation with the President and the Opposition.

Relations between the President and the Prime Minister continue to improve judging by their public pronouncements. It is still not clear if these are tactical ploys or strategic shifts in attitude. Time will tell. Any mistake on this will propel the country to disaster. Both bear an awesome responsibility.

The negotiations process hangs on political stability at the centre. The numbers game in Parliament with each party trying to induce crossovers to the other side, the threat of impeachment of the President, and the possibility that the President has of dissolving Parliament in one year's time makes the process of negotiations a complex management exercise.

Like always the political stability in the South is a precondition for success. Further the Prime Minister is burdened with an enlarged Cabinet based on his need to keep his own party in line. This situation makes the management of the economy and planning more difficult.

The JVP is opposed to the Peace Process. It has a significant number of members of Parliament. They are likely to engage in a protracted agitation against the peace process.

Their purpose in this campaign would be to rally the Sinhalese community to their vote bank. This campaign will force the SLFP to take a stand. The stand that the SLFP takes will be pivotal to the success of the negotiations process.

The LTTE will also have to change the mindset which has governed their previous political stances. A separate state is no longer viable. Neither the Sinhalese, India nor the international community will accept this position. The LTTE has made public statements which show that they have shifted ground on their previous pronouncements.

They may review their position on the concept of a traditional homeland. They are keen to demonstrate to the International Community that they are not a terrorist organisation, but an organisation fighting for the rights of their people. The LTTE has fought a protracted and bloody war to achieve parity of status. They will want to translate these gains into measurable results. They have to give tangible results to their people.

The attitude and leadership of the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, is crucial to how the process will unfold in the future. He has remained as the leader of the LTTE throughout the protracted war and negotiated with the Indian and Sri Lankan governments over a span of 20 years.

He retains a personal and institutional memory of every stage of all the previous negotiations. Leaders, who have lived a long time in protracted warfare, are often reluctant to don civilian clothes and face up to democratic politics. He will measure his chances and his own personal security in the final equation.

The state of the economy will have a significant effect on the direction of the negotiations process. The Prime Minister in a recent statement talks of economic bankruptcy. There is no likelihood that it will become better in the short run. There will be price increases of essential commodities, greater privatisation and increased unemployment. This will result in a fall of expectations and provide fuel for the oppositional forces.

The skilful management of the negotiations process, the crisis in the economy and power-sharing at the centre will determine the ebb and flow of the negotiations. As the Prime Minister has himself remarked there are no short cuts, no quick fixes in the thorny road to war termination.

Key issues to be addressed

However, war termination remains the objective of the two parties to the conflict. The reasons are obvious. Sri Lanka has reached what is known as a hurting stalemate. This is a situation where the continuation of the conflict would lead to extraordinary and unacceptable losses on both sides. The primary reasons are war weariness on both sides.

The cost of war is too high for both parties. Both sides have suffered enormously. Neither party can win militarily. The overwhelming majority of the people of Sri Lanka want peace.

To achieve the objective of war termination several philosophical positions need to be examined.

The fundamental question is what is the nature of the future state in Sri Lanka which could satisfy the aspirations of all people in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese require guarantees regarding the territorial integrity of the country, the Tamils require a unit of devolution which ensures their active governance in the North and the East, and the Muslims require forms of autonomy where they are a significant minority.

There are real and significant differences between the two parties on how they envisage the nature of the future state in Sri Lanka. Creative solutions need to be arrived at which include both maximum devolution of power and power-sharing at the centre.

Power sharing at the centre may be one way of assuring the integrity of the nation. Several models have been proposed. Countless books have been published and conferences held on this vexed question. Governments have initiated various Select Committees that have presented proposals which have been unacceptable to the LTTE.

The LTTE has never presented their own proposals although intellectuals and lawyers close to them have suggested a confederated model. Both parties need to rethink and prepare a formal proposal. Both sides need to sell this to their constituencies. The Government intends to establish a Constitutional Council to gain consensus in the South.

A bipartisan agreement is vital to the current negotiations process. A bi-partisan agreement was not possible in any of the previous negotiations processes. The Jayawardene government had a five-sixths majority and could not achieve a bi-partisan agreement.

Jayawardene eventually faced extra-parliamentary agitation during and after the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. President Premadasa did not have a two-thirds majority and did not succeed in getting a bi-partisan agreement. President Kumratunga came quite close to such an agreement, but eventually the Liam Fox initiative collapsed.

The South African and the Irish Question was resolved through bi-partisan agreements. President Mandela converted revenge politics to reconciliation and De Klerk accepted the surrender of power as inevitable. In the U.K. all political parties have refrained from making Northern Ireland a political issue in their domestic politics.

In the current political situation there are two prerequisites for achieving consensus. A two-thirds majority by the ruling party or a bi-partisan solution. Acquiring a two thirds majority by one party will lead to acrimonious politics and confrontation which the Prime Minister can ill afford.

This means that an orderly and mediated process needs to evolve between the President and the Prime Minister. It is obvious that the Government has to have consensus in the South. There has to be a cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire between the parties in the South. A framework and a mediation effort need to be launched to reach consensus. Creative problem solving needs to be developed to achieve these objectives.

Both political parties need to transcend narrow partisan political objectives. Both leaders have to transcend personal animosities. A pragmatic solution of live and let live may be the best option available to the President and the Prime Minister. They need to find a form of political co-habitation for the next four years. Cohabitation could be institutionalised with different select committees working on critical issues facing the country.

The LTTE also needs to review its position and learn from its mistakes. The LTTE at some point in time will have to renounce violence as a political weapon. This will of course be a matter of timing.

An important and significant change has occurred. The majority of Tamil political parties have announced that they accept the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people. This unity of purpose is important in that the parties cannot have opposing views on the negotiations process. The other important consideration is how to create a political force from within the LTTE who can contest elections and prepare for governance.

This will become imperative if they are to govern the Provincial Councils of the North and the East. Transforming a military organisation and entering democratic politics will require significant training of their cadre and will require international support. Military objectives have to be translated to politics. Politics is the art of compromise. These are thorny questions for the LTTE.

There are other considerations which are important to the success of the negotiations process.

Often a Minister without Portfolio needs to devote his full time to this issue. It requires full time quality work backed by a secretariat. This was a reason for the success of the Northern Ireland situation where a special representative of the Prime Minister was fully engaged in the process. Both Jayawardene and Premadasa used the good offices of Foreign Minister A.C.S. Hameed who apart from his many diplomatic skills was also an able Tamil speaker.

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