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by Lakshman Gunasekara

Which country was the first to invite units of the armed forces of the United States of America on to the territory of South Asia? Pakistan, you might think, recalling Islamabad's close ties, including decades-long military co-operation (vide CENTO), with Washington. And you might also think that India would be the first to oppose any US presence in what Delhi considers to be its region of pre-eminence. You would be wrong on both counts.

It was Delhi that first offered bases and airfields on Indian soil for use by the US in the immediate aftermath of the suicide guerrilla attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, last year. This offer came days after the US identified the Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda organisation as the initiator of the attacks and announced its intention of retaliating against that organisation's installations and leadership located inside Afghanistan.

Why did India, which has for decades been seen as the principal opposition to any Western (let alone US) presence in the South Asian region, be the first to invite in the foremost, and seemingly the most domineering, of the Western powers the US - to the region that Delhi likes to consider to be its 'zone of influence'?

The answer is simple, as simple as the knee-jerk retaliatory response of the Western powers to the September 11 attacks: insurgency.

If the incipient global state, headed by the capitalist great powers, cannot tolerate the rise of a global level non-state armed dissension (personified in the Al-Qaeda), likewise, the Indian state cannot tolerate (and has not tolerated) the Kashmiri secessionist insurgency. As Kautilya warned as far back as 2,000 years ago, revolts in outlying regions of a state, or in the periphery are more likely to lead to secession than revolts at the centre (the sage has his own recipe to deal with the specific dangers of revolts at the centre).

The swift reaction of the Western powers to the very first demonstration of armed international guerrilla activity was to stamp out any such tendency that might enable an autonomy of any kind from their current hegemony over the global system.

The Kashmiri insurgency today has, as its explicit, principal, objective, secession from the Indian Union. That is not to acknowledge that there has always been a parallel, and perhaps equally strong Kashmiri movement for equality and autonomy within the Union.

If the Kashmiri revolt these past 40 years has been a major irritant for Delhi, the support given by Pakistan to the Kashmiri independence movement, including the indication of constant un-official Pakistani encouragement of the insurgency itself, is far worse than an 'irritant'. The Indo-Pak confrontation over Kashmir is, quite simply, the biggest problem in South Asia as a whole.

Hence, India's interest in Afghanistan which is, in terms of the classical Mandala theory of inter-state relations, at the 'rear' of India's principal 'enemy' Pakistan. In Delhi's perception (which mirror's Islamabad's counter-perception), Pakistan is its principal 'enemy' or oppositional State, and therefore it is logical to strategically bring pressure to bear on the enemy's rear by either building an alliance with or otherwise neutralising the State or principalities in that rear.

Islamabad had earlier pre-empted such moves (India actively supported the Soviet Union's influence over Kabul) by not only supporting the Afghan mujaheddin rebellion against the Soviet occupation, but by virtually creating the Taliban movement in an attempt to quell the chaos that followed the Soviet withdrawal. And Islamabad turned a blind eye (if not actually encouraging and facilitating) on the Taliban's subsequent support for the fundamentalist Islamic factions of the Kashmiri independence movement. In recent years, there was some evidence that non-Kashmiris - possibly Taliban and Al-Qaeda related Afghans or people of Arab origin - were active in the Kashmiri insurgency.

No wonder India was so anxious to see the end of Taliban control of Afghanistan and, if possible, a revival of Indian influence in Kabul. Its anxiety was so great that Delhi did what seemed to be the last thing any Indian government would do: invite US forces into the region.

In the event, the Washington did not need to use Indian soil for its attack on Afghanistan. It not only had access to Pakistani soil as well as base facilities in some Central Asian states (north and west of Afghanistan), it also had access to Iranian airspace (despite which President George Bush has chosen to label Iran and "evil" state). Nevertheless, Delhi has immensely benefited from the collapse of Taliban rule and is busy cultivating the new Kabul regime. Recently it sent a special flight carrying Indian traditional musical instruments to Kabul to help out in recording Afghanistan's new national anthem. Emergency musical aid is the least of what Delhi hopes to provide in its effort to extend its influence over Islamabad's rear and also to neutralise Afghani involvement in Kashmir.

This new readiness for military co-operation with the United States by Delhi must be seen also in the context of the more recent revival of military co-operation between The Philippines and the US. Already some 600 US counter-insurgency specialist personnel are on the ground in southern Philippines helping Manila deal with one wing of the Moro independence struggle - the notorious Abu Sayyaf group, one of the more irresponsible and adventuristic elements in that long-drawn-out struggle. And opinion polls indicate that most Filipinos are happy with Manila's move to bring in US troops.

What we are seeing is a new consolidation among States at a global level as they strive to deal with non-State armed challenges to their hegemony. What this means to global democracy is wholly another matter (something our own, now dormant, 'Civil Society' dares not grapple with, given its intellectual poverty).

And the co-operation between States, while varying in degrees of intensity depending on their political and ideological perceptions, is not only at the over military, legal and administrative levels. An underground war has also been launched by the US.

In fact it is only now that those naively arrogant First Worlders are discovering the immensity and power of the subterranean levels of global society: the complex meshing of the criminal Underworld, the political Underground and even the counter-culture. We, in the Third World, where, due to our physical and political deprivation and state of cultural siege, we have long lived and survived partially above ground and, when necessary, below ground (who doesn't 'jump' borders today? Who doesn't oil a palm or 'fix' a son's school entry?), know full well the usefulness of the subterranean, even if most of us only deal with some of its fringes in our survival strategies either in economic or (counter) cultural terms.

It is in this same subterranean level that the political 'Underground' also operates and, in recent years, that political underground, not necessarily the political core groups, but at least at its various extremities, has dealt increasingly closely with the criminal underground. And the Counter-Culture too deals with the Underworld on the one hand, while, on the other, provides part of the radical activist cadre of the political Underground (the anarchist elements in the Anti-Globalisation movement are the most prominent example).

We must understand that whether our children lie their way into elite schools courtesy of the (white collar) criminal underworld's bribery and forgery networks, or whether Prince Charles' son regularly enjoys banned narcotics courtesy of Britain's criminal underworld, they are all skimming the surface of that same subterranean level that is also peopled by the LTTE, the Al-Queda, Abu Sayyaf, the Mafia, Yakuza, Dawood Ibrahim, 'Maalu' Nihal, Veerappan, Tamil National Liberation Army, Khun Sa, and the Chinese Triads (to name but a few of the literally tens of thousands of groups and millions of people who populate the Subterranean).

US intelligence and police agencies now plumbing the depths are discovering the inter-connectivity of these various wings of the Subterranean and are amazed. It would not be surprising for, example, if Al-Qaeda guerrillas used LTTE safe houses and underground channels, to move across borders on their way to the US or used passports supplied (possibly unknowingly) by the Mafia or benefited from hawala type financial channels in their money transfers from East to West.

All of this kind of co-operation is done either for cash fees (or commissions), or an exchange of information or other goods or services. That the LTTE, and possibly other Eelamist groups, hired out cadres as illegal narcotics couriers to international drug networks is known. Yet unproven is the most bizarre rumour, about a year ago, that Indian counter-espionage units, in a covert operation, eliminated two LTTE suicide cadres who had been hired by Bangladeshi political underworld elements to assassinate a political personage in Dhaka.

Actually, Fact is, indeed, stranger than Fiction, as a comparison between the LTTE's extremely elaborate covert arms shipping system and that described by thriller writer Frederick Forsythe in his 'Dogs of War' decades ago demonstrates.

Thus, it is not merely the overt international political and military posture against non-State armed groups that worries the LTTE. The covert operations begun by the US with help from intelligence agencies throughout the world, is equally a pressure. In all, the LTTE today faces an immensely harsher global environment post-September 11, 2001.

It is this powerful external factor that is in play in the newly enlivened peace process now slowly progressing.

As the global military (covert and overt) effort against global insurgency gets under way, international law is being hurriedly tinkered with to evolve a all-encompassing legal stricture on non-State political agitation. The intention is to use the word 'terrorism' to encompass all acts of agitation, including the use of physical violence such as armed actions, by non-State actors.

While many are beguiled by the smooth use of media propaganda about "terrorism" into complacently acquiescing to these legal machinations, what the leaderships - or at least, the right-wing elements in those leaderships - of the world's great powers and a large number of the smaller, weaker, subject states intend is to restrict the space for dissidence against the political, social and economic status quo. That is why, for example, the definition of 'terrorism' in the new legislation in the US includes the mere hijacking of a car by an individual - something which happens all the time in that country. Of course, those definitions presently refer only to non-US citizens.

If Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups in the past anticipated Indian opposition to any Western military support in counter-insurgency against the Tamil self-determination struggle, today the picture has wholly changed. Given the new readiness of the Sri Lankan State to offer the maximum power-sharing settlement, the signal given to Minister Milinda Moragoda recently in Washington is significant.

The US, that signal seems to indicate, would be ready to provide some form of military assistance against the LTTE, in the event of the Tigers' failure to compromise and agree to a settlement that meets domestic as well as international standards of reasonableness and justice. In the light of India's hostility to the LTTE, and the precedence already set by Delhi's previous offer to facilitate a US counter-insurgency campaign in the region, there is every possibility of an actual collaboration between all three states (including Sri Lanka) in action against an un-reasonable Velupillai Prabhakaran. That the US is ready to take on a whole range of armed non-State actors all over the world is apparent by its troop commitment in The Philippines as well as its recent new military pact with the Colombian government against the FARC rebels.

The weight of this external seems to be pushing the LTTE towards a fundamental shift in its overall politico-military posture that may augur well for the Sri Lankan peace process. The possibly emerging new posture is yet to be clearly defined, though. The road to Jaffna is only partially open. The end of the road cannot be seen still.

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