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Towards a MoU between UNF and the PA

by Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe

 

A proposal for a Memorandum of Understanding between the UNF and the PA

Preamble

The establishment of peace in Sri Lanka is the highest aspiration of the two principal political parties in Sri Lanka. These two parties have over the years strived to end the civil war by a negotiated settlement. Both parties recognize that the outcome of the general election of December last year has created an unprecedented constitutional situation.

If the will of the people is to be respected and constitutional governance is to be undertaken, then the situation demands a new relationship of positive cohabitation and cooperation between the Presidency and the new Government. It is in respect of taking forward the Norwegian facilitated peace process that this new relationship becomes more significant.

A Memorandum of Understanding and a code of practice should be helpful in defining and working-out this new relationship.

Recognizing that the progress of the peace process depends on a bipartisan approach, the parties agree to the following code of practice: 

1. On general matters concerning the strategy to be adopted, both parties will consult each other and agree on the modalities governing the peace process.

2. Parties will not engage in public disagreement in respect of decisions made following proper consultations and discussions. Both parties will not engage in public criticism of the peace process or each other.

3. Both parties will endeavour to restrain their own members from personal attacks in the media and ensure respect for the offices of the President and the Prime Minister.

4. Prior discussions shall take place in respect of all matters concerning the peace process that requires discussion and/or decisions at the level of the President, Prime Minister, Cabinet or Ministers.

5. The parties will meet regularly as a matter of course with a set agenda to review and evaluate the progress of the peace process and all affairs pertaining to good order.

6. Both parties will institutionalize the principles of cohabitation by forming a series of committees, which requires the co-operation of both parties.

7. Noting that there are complaints of alleged politically motivated arrests, steps will be taken to expedite any legal cases relating to the arrest and incarceration of the members of the P.A. and the UNP.

8. Noting that the frequent threats of a possible impeachment of the President is contributing to political instability, the Prime Minister will confirm in writing the assurance that no impeachment proceedings will be initiated against the President.

9. The President will confirm in writing that where a political party or a coalition of political parties commanding a majority in Parliament is capable of sustaining stable Government, the power of dissolution will not be exercised arbitrarily.

Given the unprecedented support given to the cease-fire agreement, an international and national framework seems to have been created for a structured process to end the war in Sri Lanka. Most of the building blocks have been secured. What still remains is to establish positive cohabitation between the President and the Prime Minister and an institutional framework for conflict resolution between the two parties particularly on the peace process.

This article examines the possible consequences of a breakdown of the principle of cohabitation. Two scenarios are examined, one where there is cooperation between all the three constituent parties to the conflict and another where there is a breakdown of cohabitation. A draft MoU is suggested (see separate box) which could lay the basis for future cooperation.

In previous negotiations policy makers frequently ignored psychological and cultural factors in framing a negotiations process. The unofficial informal process leading up to negotiations is as important as the formal negotiations process. In our analysis of past negotiations, the unofficial and informal process, such as confidence building measures, building trust and recognitions were largely ignored.

The current initiative seeks to remedy this important element and gives priority to confidence building and trust building between the LTTE and the Government. Whilst confidence building is being pursued with the LTTE, confidence building between the two major political parties is still to be achieved.

For a protracted conflict as in Sri Lanka to be transformed all the stakeholders must be brought into a framework where peace is the only viable alternative. In Sri Lanka the primary stakeholders are the government and the LTTE but of crucial importance is the opposition. The other stakeholders are civil society institutions and the international community.

The fundamental aspect of this relationship is trust and transparency amongst all sides to the conflict. The spoilers need to be reduced to a minimum. Whilst this article is focused on the peace process we need to appreciate the economic constraints that will have an obvious impact on the peace process. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged in Parliament the dire straits of the economy. The country is on the verge of bankruptcy.

The budget will be a difficult but necessary balancing act between the demands of the IMF and the political imperatives of the government. There is again an obvious need for both parties to extend co-operation on the economic front.

Whilst a facilitator was required to mediate between the Government and the LTTE we are still in need of a mediated solution between the UNF and the PA government. What is required is a change in mindsets and a transformation of attitudes and it would be fatal to ignore the grievances and perceptions of a major stakeholder. Currently within the P.A.

There is no single voice but a number of voices with different agendas. This is particularly reflected in the public utterances made by prominent members of the PA. The constituent parties have welcomed the agreement, and the Leader of the Opposition has given conditional support to the agreement. The President has expressed her reservations and continues to remain ambivalent and send mixed signals.

There are also different voices from the Government side with some Ministers calling for cohabitation and others calling for impeachment of the President. Part of this may be the usual hustlings for the local government elections. There are obvious grievances and perceptions on both sides. The UNP can produce a long list of complaints about the P.A. government and I am sure the PA about the UNF government. These grievances need to be reconciled through a mediated process.

A senior Cabinet Minister has suggested problem-solving workshops at all levels from all the constituent parties.

Let me just draw on the historic cohabitation agreement which led to a peaceful transformation in South Africa. Before the elections in South Africa nobody was certain of the outcome. Most people were predicting violence and mayhem before and after the election.

A mediated solution was reached between De Klerk and Nelson Mandela. But Buthelesi was kept out of the picture. Lord Carrington and the other mediators left South Africa in despair and predicted the worst. However, a Kenyan mediator during the last few days engaged in diplomacy to include Buthelesi into the equation.

It was achieved in the very last hour. The mediation with Buthelesi became a crucial building block for the transformation of South Africa. In Northern Ireland eventually a structured process took place where many stakeholders were actively involved in transforming the conflict. All the three political parties in the United Kingdom pursued the principle of cohabitation and active bi-partisanship. The United States provided a broad umbrella of support. The spoilers were isolated.

I am basically suggesting two scenarios. There are of course many other scenarios and there may also be combinations of the two scenarios. In each one of these scenarios we need to recognize that there will be spoilers who would try to destabilize the peace process. It matters very much who will join the spoilers. These scenarios are ideal typical but draw on previous experiences.

The first scenario

This scenario assumes a win - win position for all the parties to the conflict. Here the UNF government adopts a two-stage strategy of building confidence and trust before the formal negotiations process. The UNP has drawn lessons from the past period and given psychology and culture a prominent role in the process.

The process is as important as the end result. The local government elections provide a decisive mandate to the Prime Minister to proceed with the peace process. The International community gives overwhelming and unambiguous support for the agreement.

The President is supportive of the process whilst expressing grave reservation on some of the provisions. The Leader of the Opposition, the LSSP, the CP, and all the Tamil and Muslim parties has expressed support for the Agreement. Civil Society organizations and religious dignitaries from all communities have expressed their unequivocal support.

The International Community and Civil Society Institutions insist that the two main political parties in the South agree on a MoU. A memorandum of understanding and a code of conduct are signed between the UNF government and the PA. The memorandum is far reaching in its consequences. The MOU spells out a code of conduct for both parties. Cohabitation is institutionalized and mechanisms created to resolve disputes between the two parties.

Civil Society institutions both in the North and South are mobilized at all levels. Bridge Building exercises, all night can light vigils, mass meditation and inter religious worship. And large-scale visits of people from the South to the North take place. Visits to the North demonstrate the vast damage that has been done to infrastructure and its peoples.

The JVP launches extra parliamentary agitation but within a democratic framework. The government warns the JVP that there will be severe consequences if they encourage violence. They are unable to muster the support necessary to challenge the agreement. The monitoring committee continues to implement the peace agreement. The international community supports the work of the monitoring committee.

The US Ambassador together with the European Union and India are major stakeholders and support the implementation of the agreement. The U.S. issues a clear warning to the LTTE to abide by the agreement or that there would be grave consequences. A mechanism is created where civil society organizations monitor the implementation of the ceasefire.

The LTTE converts itself into a political force by opening offices in districts where they have a presence and organizes festivals not only in the North and East but also in Colombo, Kandy, Nuwara Eliya. The warnings of the Sihala Urumaya that these festivals would lead to anarchy are seen to be highly misplaced.

The UNP succeeds in getting support for the establishment of a Provincial Council for the North and East. The Provincial Council, its nature and representation cause controversy. The LTTE prepares for political mobilization.

Protracted negotiations take place in an Asian country and observers from India are invited for these talks. The PA Government is kept fully informed of the proceedings. The final outcome of the Negotiations is that an Accord is signed between the parties.

The Accord is a proposal for a Federal Constitution. The rights of the Singhalese and the Muslims living in the North and East are recognized and given proper status in the Federal Constitution. India becomes a signatory to the Accord and will be a guarantor to the integrity of the country.

The government presents the Accord for a referendum proposing a Federal Constitution. The government with the support of the P.A. wins the referendum. The military withdraws from the North and the East and is supplemented by a strong police largely recruited by the LTTE. A Commission is formed for the decommissioning of weapons.

The USA, UK, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Canada and others provide a strategic umbrella of support for the Accord and an Aid Consortium is prepared to finance a mini marshal plan for the country. Civil society is mobilized and activated and forms a powerful constituency in support of the peace process. The economy has already picked up in the interim period.

The North and the East is governed by the LTTE with representatives of the Muslims and the Sinhalese, and an autonomists unit is guaranteed to the Muslims. The LTTE mobilizes massive Diaspora support for the economic reconstruction programme. The country is set for a huge dividend with an accelerated programme of economic development.

In this scenario there are bound to be problems right along the way but it assumes that the UNF and the PA and the LTTE are basically committed to a negotiated solution. It also assumes that civil society and the international community support the behaviour and activities of all the stakeholders.

It is obvious that the majority of people in Sri Lanka have voted with their hands and feet for the first scenario on several occasions. This scenario is possible by an act of will, resolute leadership and strategic focus in achieving the fundamental objective of peace.

It is an act of profound transformation and reconciliation. It requires that the victors offer their hand in friendship. It requires a multi track strategy with a clear strategic frame requiring cohabitation in the South and the active participation of all democratic forces. In the North it requires that the leadership live up to the letter of the agreement signed by the parties.

The second scenario

This is a scenario where everybody loses and the country is thrown into another spiral of violence and destruction.

The President and the Prime Minister and his cabinet are at loggerheads over many issues. Cohabitation does not work. The Prime Minister is forced to consider impeachment. Impeachment proceedings are placed in the Order Book in Parliament. The President continues to have meeting with the JVP and other Sinhalese organizations. The President makes speeches about dissolving parliament.

The budget is announced in Parliament which introduces unpopular measures demanded by the IMF. The PA and the JVP oppose these measures and tries to exploit the situation.

The LTTE is concerned about the potential destabilization in the South. It continues to rearm itself, and makes use of the political space to build a support base in the South. The LTTE demands the impeachment of the President as a condition for continued talks. The LTTE continues to mobilise support and creates a strong political base in the North and the East.

The Government in the South faces increasing attrition from the JVP who engages in extra parliamentary agitation. The President is caught in between with sections of the SLFP drawn into the extra parliamentary agitation organized by the JVP. The Buddhist clergy are increasingly brought into public agitation. The UNP decides to crack down on the JVP but the support of the army and the police are uncertain.

The Nordic Monitoring committee is forced to withdraw from the North and the East. The negotiations breakdown. The LTTE attacks the Government forces in the North and the East simultaneously. The LTTE captures the Jaffna Peninsula and many parts of the East. Agitation is encouraged in the hill country with the plantation workers are drawn into the conflict. The LTTE declares Eelam and calls for recognition.

The Government appeals to India to send troops to defend Colombo and the rest of the country from two concurrent insurgencies. The economy takes a downward spiral. The situation in the South becomes further polarized.

(Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe, currently resident in Norway, is an international consultant on conflict resolution and peace studies and earlier served as Secretary General of the London-based International Alert peace support and mediation group. He was a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Colombo, and has edited and authored several publications on Sri Lankan issues.)

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