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| Sunday, 21 April 2002 |
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Is Co-habitation necessary? Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA "As long as they meet in concord, conclude their meetings in concord, and carry out their policies in concord, so long may they be expected not to decline, but to flourish," observed Lord Buddha, referring to the Vajji tribal federation in his famous discussion of governance and social order with his chief disciple, the Ven. Ananda. This discussion, recorded in the Digha Nikaya, is notable because it is one of the very few direct dealings with politics and governance by the Buddha. It is something that I have referred to often in these columns because of its continuing relevance to the crisis in governance of our society today. Lord Buddha draws our attention to the political system and political culture of the Vajji tribes. I am uncertain how much research has been done into the political system (federated tribes) and political practises (e.g. frequent assemblies) of the Vajjis. While the 'Founding Fathers' (there were no women founders) of the United States of America studied and made creative use of the federal system of governance practised by the Native American Iroquois tribes in devising the United State's political structure, the scholars, intellectuals and political leaders of South Asia do not seem to have appreciated the resources of our own socio-historical legacy. Instead, we have been content to tamely follow the 'model' of the so-called Westminster system. The operation of the Westminster system has, however, not merely failed to cope with the dynamics of our post-colonial political life but has actually contributed to the current crisis. The intellectual crisis of our contemporary society is reflected in the fact that even today there is no serious realisation of the need to consciously, creatively, transcend the fixed norms and habits of competitive party politics; to practise a politics that transcends the current flow of political energies through political party formations; to find or devise new political practices and new political formations that break through the current, unfruitful structures. At least there has arisen, in these last few years, a vague understanding that consensual politics is urgently required for a resolution of the ethnic conflict. But since this realisation is only a vague one, without an adequate understanding of the radical change of political behaviour required, little effort is being made to resist the compulsions of the existing political order. The Liam Fox Agreement did not last long. The effort of the Joint Business Forum too id not last long. And now, the situation of Co-habitation in Power falters. Those political forces who cannot see beyond their petty contests for power (on all sides of the political spectrum) are either baying for revenge or are busy devising new political symmetries in their bids for individual prominence and supremacy. So powerful seem to be the competitive compulsions of capitalist parliamentary democracy that even those who claim to oppose the capitalist system seem ensnared in its logic. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, for example, seems to be clutching at straws in their effort to cut a powerfully distinctive political profile by opposing the current peace process that has been endorsed by the two main political parties, the UNP and the PA. According to the JVP, who certainly should know better, it is the Cease-fire Agreement that has suddenly empowered the LTTE to set up State-like structures to control the territory under its control and to extend that area of control. The JVP, which has practised 'undergound' political organisation and mobilisation longer than any other political formation in the country (including the LTTE), should very well know the critical importance of parallel covert and overt command and control systems; of the need for civilian political mobilisation structures that complement the military forces; that actually, some form of civilian-political mobilisation precedes the military initiative. A larger movement for Tamil self-determination and national independence pre-existed the LTTE and the other militant groups. In fact, it still exists in the LTTE's own political organisation and in all the non-LTTE Tamil political groups and is the socio-political base that empowers the secessionist movement and its current posture of readiness to compromise on the basis of a just political settlement. Its pre-existence effectively gave the lie to those Sinhala political groups (including, at one time, both the UNP and the SLFP) who pretended that the secessionist insurgency was "terrorism" perpetrated by a "handful of terrorists". Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups This last epithet is yet the standard argument of the Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups of today who insist (a) that there is no 'ethnic problem' but rather a problem of 'terrorism' and that (b) the Tamil people do not want to secede but are being forced into this position by the LTTE 'terrorists'. These ultra-nationalists too - like the JVP - are now grabbing desperately at straws. In their bewilderment over the sudden, new political scenario presented by the Cease-fire Agreement, they are producing arguments that contradict their original position. The Sihala Urumaya's Champaka Ranawaka, in a recent TV political talk show, asserted that the LTTE was taking advantage of the Cease-Fire Agreement to beef up its forces by recruiting "thousands" of cadres to carry out a future separatist campaign. Now, if the Tamil secessionist militant movement was a mere 'handful of terrorists', how come they are recruiting "thousands"? How can a mere 'handful of terrorists' suddenly set up political offices all over the North and East? The reality is that they recruited thousands long ago. It was the succession of anti-Tamil politico-civilian pogroms launched by the Sinhalas in 1958, and in the 1970s and 1980s and the governmental repression of Tamil political dissent throughout those decades that pushed thousands of young Tamil people to form many (at one time some forty odd) militant secessionist groups. The LTTE has ended up the largest, the dominant and the most authoritarian one. If the JVP and Sihala Urumaya even partly succeed in hoodwinking some Sinhalas, it will be also due to the failure of contemporary historiography to incorporate in its annals the history of the Tamil secessionist movement. It is these thousands of LTTE cadres today and the very high level of politico-military coordination enabled by the complex command structure - including a civilian-political mobilisation - that have successfully confronted the Sri Lankan State and its Western sponsors. It is also the gradual change of political will of the bulk of the Sinhala people and other Sri Lankans that has contributed to a shift in the stance of the State away from further destructive confrontation. That political will has pushed both major Sinhala-led political parties towards peace-making, but the distance that must still be travelled is immense. The Cease-fire Agreement is something of a fait accompli presented by the Government to those opposed to a political compromise with the Tamil secessionist movement. The Sinhala ultra-nationalist groups as well as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, were all logically likely to seize on, and oppose, any move by the Government in terms of settling the ethnic conflict, especially anything far-reaching, such as a constitutional reform-based agreement explicitly providing for power-sharing. All previous 'transparent' attempts of peace-making of this type met with hostility from these groups and attempt to whip up mass hysteria. Even if the Sinhala masses can no longer be aroused by fear-mongering, the major parties have tended to lose their nerve in the face public opposition, especially when the sensation-hungry mass media blows it up out of all proportion to its socio-political significance. That was what happened with the PA's Package. As I have noted previously, the UNP learnt from this lesson and has chosen the path of less transparent action. Unlike the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, however, the UNP, this time, has had the advantage of a longer period of failure of counter-insurgency and attrition felt by the Sinhalas both of which have led the mass of people to opt for a compromise deal with the Tamil nationalist movement. Hence, while there was significant popular alarm over the covert deal attempted in 1987, today there is widespread acquiescence over the 2002 Cease-fire Agreement. The arguments raised by the JVP and the Sihala Urumaya today are crudely designed to whip old Sinhala paranoias but they do not seem to be working. Even the crude bombastic posturing by the LTTE leadership itself in their recent media conference in Kilinochchi failed to provoke much more than some Sinhala anger arising out a sense of humiliation. A large number of Sinhalas, however, are today repentant of the happenings of the past and acknowledge the necessity of such humbling as a basis to build a new foundation of inter-ethnic relations that will enable a viable society on this island. It is this consciousness that is compelling the two major Sinhala-led parties to an acknowledgement of the need for political consensus. little outright hostility Thus, there is little outright hostility being aroused over the fact that the 2002 Cease-fire Agreement implicitly recognises an LTTE-held area outside State control, and acknowledges the LTTE as the legitimate, equal counterpart of the Government in political negotiations. Rather, the bulk of the population wants it done and over with. And an implicit recognition for the moment, at least - is better than the further humiliation of an explicit one! This hesitant movement of the mass of the Sinhalas towards a political settlement is now blocked by the continuing failure of the two major Sinhala-led political parties to collaborate in the peace effort. The compulsions of political competition cannot be totally transcended, no doubt. We have become too immersed in it for that. But what is needed is a very high level of consciousness of this compulsion and a systematic effort to overcome it by undertaking a parallel track of consensual politics in dealing with the ethnic problem. For this purpose, it is imperative that, while the parliamentary system continues to channel (and fuel) political competition, new, parallel structures or mechanisms are set up that will channel the collaborative effort between the two major parties. The build-up of a mere parliamentary majority (two thirds) suitable for major legislation is not what is required today. A parliamentary majority can be obtained by the wooing over of elements of opposition parties. This implies the splitting up of existing party formations and can only be done by engendering further political hostilities. Those party factions remaining in opposition only become more hostile to the Government and, consequently to its peace effort. Such splintered parties then become more desperate to politically survive. It is such desperation that would lead to strategies that focus purely on party survival rather than on national needs that transcend party issues. Concretely speaking, if the splitting of the parliamentary PA group and the winning over of a sizeable faction to the Government benches is feasible; if the subsequent political isolation of the Presidency may seem worth attempting; at the same time, the coalescing of large sections of the PA group remaining in opposition with the JVP is equally feasible. Also feasible is larger movement that is hostile - in an opportunistic manner no doubt to the peace effort; that could unsettle the whole process. What the Sinhala Left forces will do in such a scenario is unclear. If the parliamentary majority that is won by such divisive means is used to push through socio-economic legislation that endangers the labour movement or undermines social welfare infra-structure, we are likely to find considerable popular support for an anti-Government movement that the Left may not be able to ignore. We may then end up with a 1987-type scenario, perhaps more complicated if a newly interventionist United States decides to enter the fray. Does anyone (other than the USA) want this? I am sure that both the UNP as well as the SLFP have had enough of such an experience in the post-1987 upheavals. If Israel is a continuing example of the failure of political consensus and the repercussions on the West Asian peace process, Northern Ireland is a continuing example of the success of a firm inter-party consensus at national level that is capable of shoring up a flagging peace process weakened by the tensions at regional level. Hence, co-habitation is necessary. However, co-habitation does not merely mean a co-habitation between the Presidency and the Government. It must also mean a collaboration between the Government and the Opposition - at least the main Opposition party, the PA, that holds the Presidency. A mere relationship between the Presidency and the Government only serves to expose the peace process to the kind of capricious behaviour as that recently demonstrated by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Co-habitation, therefore, cannot be restricted by the constitutionally laid down institutional framework. Rather, new mechanisms are needed to enable this process to be successfully carried through. Perhaps, it is time again for extra-parliamentary forces to come into play. The business leadership's initiative earlier showed remarkable potential - a potential which even the JVP could not reject or ignore. Maybe it is time for the business community to revive its initiative. Group of Eminent Citizens This time however, other sections of civil society could also complement this effort. If sufficient numbers of civic organisations, representing significantly large segments of the actual political constituencies of the two major parties, come forward to complement the business community initiative, this will provide the kind of political pressure neither party could afford to ignore. Perhaps a small body of nationally respected figures - a 'Group of Eminent Citizens' - representing such a civil society movement and including powerful business figures, could function as a kind of 'umpire' or 'monitor' of a formal agreement between the UNF and the PA in their collaborative effort - a Memorandum of Understanding as proposed by Kumar Rupesinghe. If Western, modern, political ideas cannot inspire us for such innovation, perhaps we should take inspiration from the example of the ancient Vajjis and Lord Buddha's exhortation. What have we to lose other than our wealth, our society and our sanity? |
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