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by Lakshman Gunasekara

The "core issues" or "substantive issues" are, once again, coming into focus in our political discourse.

The President has raised the matter in her recent interview (interview? To many it seemed like an attempted crucifixion) with the US-based Cable News Network. Groups of the Maha Sangha are also urging that the on-going negotiating process does not avoid the "core issues". The traditional Left parties also seem anxious that the anticipated talks in Thailand do not completely ignore these issues.

What are these "core issues" and, why are they being raised at this juncture, and who are raising them? And, why are some sections raising them while others seem to be studiously avoiding them?

The "core issues" are usually identified as those subjects that must be dealt with in coming to a long term, conclusive settlement of the ethnic conflict. These are basically two things: (a) the degree of devolution to the regions and, (b) the unit of devolution.

These two phrases, 'degree of devolution' and 'unit of devolution', are pregnant with meaning and carry a wealth of implications. They also mean different things to different groups of people.

Liberal political discourse, and by definition, mainstream nationalist discourse, would define the 'degree of devolution' as the extent of governmental power that will be devolved from the central government to the provinces or regions that are also to be agreed upon in the formula for a settlement. The Sinhala ultra-nationalist perspective would view this as the amount of State power and privilege to be reluctantly shared with the ethnic 'minority' Tamils and Muslims. These two ethnic communities, in turn, would view devolution as the quantum of political, cultural and social recognition and economic capacity that they are able to finally wrest from the currently Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan State. The Muslims would, additionally, seek to win some political, cultural, and social autonomy from the Tamils as well.

The liberal-nationalist, Sinhala ultra-nationalist and even the Muslim perspective may view that degree devolution as being limited to the confines of the existing Sri Lankan republican polity. The Tamil nationalist perspective as well as some radical political perspectives, however, would consider 'devolution' as having no limits in terms of the contours of the existing State. As far as these latter perspectives are concerned, the power of governance may be limited to these confines or may transcend them in the form of secession: that is, the existing single State on this island could be replaced with two or more independent States.

Here we begin, logically, to move on to that second 'core issue': the unit of devolution. The 'unit of devolution' is all about geo-politics within the Sri Lankan island today. It is about the demarcation of units of geographical territory to which the governmental power is to be devolved. It is about the sub-division of the Sri Lankan State into regions or provinces that are endowed with powers of self-rule that have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations.

While some simpletons may see the evolving scenario merely in terms of equal quanta of power being devolved to these regions, those aware of the complexity of the ethnic problem (thankfully, a rapidly increasing number), know that the quantum of power and self-rule must be defined by the degree of need of each region/province. The ruling United National Party must be credited with being the first major political force (other than the secessionist forces) to acknowledge the need for an asymmetrical devolution of power. Inevitably, the political force that is at the heart of the existing political reality is the most pragmatic. The 'unit' issue is about how big the regions will be, how many, and, most critically, where they will be that is, their geographical demarcation.

Thus, it is about geo-physical territory and also about the co-relation of socio-cultural group identity and demographic spaces. It is about who will get what and where. To put it quite concretely, in terms of the current ethnic politics, it is about the degree of territory various ethnic groups will get to lord it over.

If I may move to the semiological plane, it is about the land-body nexus: that is, which human-social body gets which body of geographical territory. If one were to further articulate it in terms of the symbols of the cultural under-currents, it is the link between dehaya and deshaya.

Due to my (eminently regrettable) ignorance of Tamil language and literature I cannot examine the symbolic significance of land for the Tamil nationalist body politic. While I am aware that there is a considerable corpus (how I love to play with these synonyms!) of academic study of Tamil nationalism and its territorial impetus, I am not sure how much of it has focused on the symbolic power that that territory embodies (there I go again). That there is a symbolic power I have little doubt, given the almost sacred significance that Eela Naadu possesses today.

While neither contemporary Sinhala literature nor nationalist or ultra-nationalist political discourse has explicitly linked the Sinhala (biological) body and body of people (community) with geographical territory, there is enough cultural production that implicitly does so. Song, dance, drama, prose, cinema, teledrama and music video all clearly depict the link between geography and Sinhala collective identity.

In fact music videos seem to be the best definers of the Sinhala 'homeland' today. If one were to extract a geographical profile from the visuals in Sinhala song-videos, the ultra-nationalists haven't a chance in Samsara in their attempt to claim the whole of Sri Lanka as 'Sinhala' in the contemporary sense.

Much as I would love to continue this exploration, I cannot. More mundane political compulsions take me back to the politics of negotiations.

Why is attention turning to these deeply sensitive issues at this juncture? The answer may lie in the identification of the groups that are raising them and in those who are not.

Neither of the three principal protagonists in the current negotiation scenario are focusing on the core issues. Rather, the Government, the LTTE and the Norwegians are busy thrashing out the nitty-gritty of the Cease-fire regime. Right now, even the content of the proposed 'Interim Administration' seems to have been superseded by such minor issues as bus services along the A9 and, admittedly more critical, issues as the LTTE's (in my view, legitimate) right to military re-supply.

Those who are raising the core issues are those who either see the dangers of ignoring them for too long (dangers in terms of social and political order) or those who simply wish to upset the delicate momentum of the current peace process which is predicated on precisely the postponement of these core issues to a later stage.

The traditional Left as well as the Liberal political and civic groups are keenly aware that the current graduated peace process cannot proceed in too much of a simplistically graduated manner. One cannot, as the Government seems to think, simply do things one step at a time. Certain things relevant to a later stage of the process must be anticipated and preparatory work initiated now even if the primary work emphasis remains focused on the immediate stage.

This is because at least some of the things set in motion in the immediate stage (i.e. the current Cease-fire stage) are already beginning to have a significance that reaches into the future and touches on the strategic issues that is, the security of the State as it is and also on the 'core issues' that have to be negotiated in the future. All those claiming any form of responsibility for the current peace process - and the Government and the Presidency are at the centre of that responsibility must be alert to anything that may pre-determine the fate of those core issues.

Even the question of bus services on the A9 have implications for both the speed of the legitimising (and legalising) of the LTTE as well as the degree of control the Tigers exercise over a stretch of the highway. Again, the movement of Tiger cadres in and out of 'cleared' and 'un-cleared' areas pertain to both the political (and legal) status of the LTTE as well as reach of its authority and political hegemony that is, its ability to politically mobilise its constituency, the Tamil community in all parts of the island. It is also about the possibility of the gradual extension of areas of control or influence by the LTTE.

The issue of military re-supply (Tiger "arms smuggling", to use the State's and Sinhala ultra-nationalist's populist jargon) is about maintenance of military capability and hence, about the continuing ability to enforce the project of power-sharing inherent in the current peace process.

President Kumaratunga, as Head of State, must certainly be sensitive to all these issues, given their strategic bearing on the security and territorial integrity of the existing State. It is ironic that a one-time radical political activist inspired by a vision of the overthrow or transformation of this very State must now defend it even with her life, as she has bravely done. But defend it she must, not only as Head of State but also if, as leader of the SLFP and People's Alliance, she is to give leadership to the alternative political force to the currently governing political formation.

If the Government, as the initiator of the current Cease-fire Agreement must deal with the immediate, day-to-day issues of the Cease-fire regime, the President can well claim to share in the responsibility for the overall peace process by focusing on the strategic implications of these immediate issues - that is, their bearing on State security and on the core issues - as well as on preparations for a future stage of the process which will deal with the core issues.

In that sense, we may see here a very practical division of labour. But it can only be a 'practical' division of labour - that is, a process that is workable only if both the Government and the Presidency are prepared to consciously and systematically share out the workload. For this purpose there needs to systematic consultation between these two institutions.

The setting up of a consultative mechanism on the peace process between the Government and the Presidency is long overdue. No wonder, then, that Velupillai Prabhakaran can scoff at the long term value of the current peace initiative. When asked about it at his Kilinochchi media conference, the LTTE Leader quite explicitly doubted the capacity of the Ranil Wickremesinghe Government to take the current peace process towards a definitive political settlement. And the reason he gave was that there was no consensus between the President and the Government.

Surely, the Sri Lankan State and the Sri Lankan ruling class do not need their principal enemy to point out the deficiencies of their own strategy in dealing with that enemy!

A bold initiative has been taken. Now let's see some intelligent follow through for everyone's benefit, not some measly gamble for the short term benefit of a few that, as recent history has shown us in such devastating ways, in the long term, is not beneficial for even that few. Has the ruling class truly learnt the lesson of Katunayake? 

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