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Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA

If the maritime supply route has been the umbilical cord of Tamil secessionist war, Trincomalee and the land route to that port city may be the umbilical cord of peaceful nation-building. Everyone, except those ignorant of our geography, is aware of the vast potential of Trincomalee or Tirukkonamalai as it should be known in these modern, post-colonial, times (my Anglophile audience is reassured that I will continue with the colonial name). Trincomalee has all the potential of rivalling even outstripping - Colombo as the major entrepot and metropolitan centre of Sri Lanka.

That is why, for example, India's state-owned giant Indian Oil Corporation was quick to lease out recently a large chunk of the huge oil storage complex built as part of the British colonial naval base and lying virtually un-exploited this past half-century.

The still rusting oil 'tank farm' remains a shameful reminder of the sheer myopia of the ethno-centric Sri Lankan State in its refusal to allow the build-up of economic infra-structure, industry and commerce in the North-East region. This refusal was partly pure ethnic selfishness on the part of the South-centred Sinhala majoritarian State and also the inability of generations of un-imaginative economic planners to transcend the centripetal forces of the Colombo-centred market economy.

volatile, inflammable Eastern Province

The future of Trincomalee is, thankfully, no longer in the hands of Colombo. In whose hands it will be remain a big question, although I am sure Messrs Velupillai Prabhakaran and Co. would like the 'sole' right to answer that question.

The enigma of Trincomalee, however, is only the high profile symbol of the larger problem of the volatile, inflammable Eastern Province. In fact, although I referred to "Prabhakaran & Co.", there is every indication that that "Company" is not all very companionable, with comrades from the East now beginning to insist that it was all a 'joint venture' and not merely a North-led enterprise. As a friend from the East recently sarcastically remarked to me: "If the Northerners thought that they could consolidate their political freedom and security at the expense of the East, they are going to be sadly mistaken".

In other words, even if Tamil self-determination has been militarily won and, is in the process of being consolidated in civilian-institutional terms, the victory has to be shared and there are many contenders for a share of the cake. What is more, the very process of 'self-determining' has, itself, been broadened by others - the Eastern Muslims and, possibly the Eastern Sinhalas.

incomplete 2002 Cease-fire Agreement

These columns have regularly (if monotonously) pointed out the problems arising from the incomplete nature of the 2002 Cease-fire Agreement, especially the fact that the terms of military dis-engagement and provisions for post-hostilities civilian-political activity across frontlines not only do not resolve issues of political authority, territorial control and civilian security in the areas previously under military contention, but also leave open numerous possibilities for worsening the situation in these areas.

And it is in the East, with its complex ethnic mix, that the post-hostilities conditions are most un-defined and, precisely due to the volatility of that ethnic mix, need to be adequately provided for.

In previous articles I have sounded a warning note to the Government concerning the dangers in the East. If I had previously tended to regard the post-hostilities problems as being more on the Government's and Sri Lankan State's shoulders and to the advantage of the LTTE - recent developments have shown up my own myopia.

In the first place, the Tamil-Muslim communal violence of last June, largely an anti-Muslim onslaught, was not a sign of LTTE hegemonism and ethno-centrism. Nor have more recent developments within the LTTE military formations in the East been a sign of LTTE restiveness or covert military preparations of (future) aggressive intent.

Rather, both have been actually symptoms of the fissures within the LTTE and within the Tamil nationalist movement itself. These are fissures that reveal the inner complexity of Tamil nationhood - a complexity that must inevitably be addressed and provided for if that nationhood is to be a success.

In previous columns I had urged the LTTE leadership not to wait for Colombo to address the burning issues of the Muslims and Sinhalas of the East but to negotiate directly with local community leaderships in that region and, in the process of resolving these issues, demonstrate its capacity to govern effectively and democratically. Now it seems that the LTTE leadership has to learn to effectively govern its own ethnic community first.

The June riots, while being a product of the tensions aroused by the uncertainties of the Cease-fire Agreement, were a spontaneous mob phenomenon and, if it reflected any LTTE role at all it was the un-preparedness of the high command in Kilinochchi for such incidents on the hand while on the other it was participation of local LTTE cadres in the mob violence against Muslims. The June riots were significant, therefore, not only for reminding us of the inter-ethnic tensions in the North-East, especially the Eastern Province, but also for revealing the tensions within the Tamil nation as well as the fissures within the LTTE.

These internal tensions and fissures among Sri Lankan Tamils (as distinct from Hill country Tamils) have both positive as well as negative implications.

Firstly, they affirm something which is still questioned by some both in this country and in the West : that is, the LTTE is, indeed, a popular, mass-based movement and is not a gang of 'terrorists' with little popular support as claimed by some. The extent to which the LTTE's organisational roots permeate to the mass level is indicated by the richness of the regional specificities of popular support for Tamil nationhood.

That Tamil society in the East is quite distinctive from that of the North, especially the Jaffna Peninsula and the area immediately south of it, was well known. The coalescing of these two distinctive communities in the intensity of the struggle for a common Tamil nationhood has also been noted by many observers.

driving a wedge

Indeed, one of the strategic pre-occupations of the Sinhala-dominated State has, for decades, been to "drive a wedge" (as stated by many Sinhala military planners and military-political ideologues, including those who engineered the infamous 'strategic hamlets' in Weli-Oya) between the North and East. This was as much a recognition of that Jaffna-Trincomalee-Batticaloa consensus for nationhood as it was an articulation of the fetishisation of territory in Sinhala hegemonist policy.

This blinkered prioritisation of territory by the Sinhalas predominated the State's military strategy to the detriment of its ultimate goal of defeating the Tamil secessionist insurgency. What should have been the focus was that maritime umbilical cord mentioned at the beginning of this column.

That Tamil regional differences are arising today, now that the self-determination project is being consolidated, reveals the extent and depth of Tamil nationalist consciousness: the regional concerns of local political, economic, cultural, ecological and other interests are now being taken up as a clear second phase in the process of nation-building. With nationhood now presumed, the Tamil people are proceeding to elaborate on that nationhood in terms of their local specificities.

Here, the LTTE is facing its first challenge in peace-time governance. Even before it has to think of other ethnic communities in the territory it intends to dominate, it must manage affairs within its own immediate constituency. With the future of the Tamil nation already in sight, unless the LTTE recognises the plurality of the Tamil community it represents (not 'solely', though) and variety of needs and interests of sub-national groups, there will be a fight over that future. A recent discussion I attended in Colombo with Tamil students from North and East revealed those different sub-national perceptions which, in the long-term may have a bearing on the nature of the North-East polity. The students were asked about their support for a fully separate nationhood and statehood. While the Jaffna students affirmed that secession remained as a last resort for "freedom", the sole Trincomalee-based student strenuously argued in favour of a nationhood within a united Sri Lanka. These differences in perceptions represent differences in local life situations and the socio-political experience and specific cultural identities of these difference populations.

If the LTTE and the broader Tamil political leadership are sensitive to these aspects of political and social management, this very plurality within the Tamil nation will compel the elaboration of democratic political structures within the LTTE organisation and could also guide the evolution of democracy within North-East polity as a whole.

Unfortunately, however, until then, it is politico-military power that is decisive. Hence, the internal fissures within the LTTE and the trouble in the East.

The rise of sub-national concerns are now seeing the articulation of specific needs and interests by Tamils of the East. Inevitably, given the yet un-resolved situation of contestation over group interests, this articulation is being in opposition to the Muslims and Sinhala who also inhabit the East.

I have discussed some of the ecological as well as security concerns involved in this contestation in previous columns. It is this that is driving the Eastern Tamil community's hostility to the Muslims and Sinhalas in the region and this dynamic is necessarily reflected in the behaviour of the LTTE units of Eastern origin, which today, make up half the LTTE's combat strength. concerns ofLTTE high command

It was not surprising therefore to see LTTE cadres involved in the anti-Muslim strife in June. Nor was it surprising to hear of murmurs of protest and unease when the Eastern LTTE chief, Karikalan was called to Kilinochchi and reprimanded.

Even if Karikalan empathised with the larger 'national' concerns of the LTTE high command in Kilinochchi, he is unable to totally suppress the sub-national pressures that are now bubbling near the surface in the East. After all, it is the Eastern Tamils who provide his soldiers and are the base of his politico-military stature.

Even though Karikalan is supposed to have been replaced as Eastern military commander with the little known Kaushalya, there is no indication that actual political control of the East is out of his hands.

Last week's movement of two large LTTE units across the Colombo-Trincomalee highway (the A6) from the North to the East has prompted intense speculation in addition to the ritual protest note from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. It sent shockwaves through military circles in Colombo whose instant worry was the security of the vital 'MSR' (main supply route) which is what the A6 is to them.

Tiger military structure in East

Even though the initial speculation and popular perception in the South is about the LTTE's possible aggressive intentions, the truth of these deployments is as murky as the recent internal changes in the Tiger military command structure in the East.

Just as much as the internal command changes were actually a result of the internal sub-national tensions, so too the sudden shift of this large group of Tiger cadres could be a similar manifestation.

If I may draw a preliminary conclusion: it is more likely a movement back to their 'homeland' by Tiger units of Eastern origin in sympathy with Karikalan.

Even if it was not a deliberate move engineered by the Eastern Tiger chief, such a deployment will certainly strengthen his politico-military position. New conscription wave in the East, including child soldier kidnappings in seeming violation of LTTE high command's orders to respect United Nations' norms, also indicate Eastern Tamil military build-up.

Is this simply a regional, sub-national, assertion vis-…-vis Jaffna or, could it also have ramifications for the Muslim and Sinhala minorities? Could this be, for example, an anticipation of Eastern radical Muslim agitation (as political negotiations get under way in Thailand) and a preparation to crush any possible Muslim insurgency? Such possibilities are ominous in that they could lead to a breakdown of the Ceasefire itself.

Just as much the MSR is critical for the Sri Lankan state forces, so must the LTTE leadership view the East. It cannot afford to let a significant part of its future polity disintegrate into the kind of internecine war that the Sri Lankan State let itself into by its mis-governance. Mr. Prabhakaran and Co. have surely learned some lessons many of Sri Lanka's past leaders never learned.

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