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Thailand talks :

Interim power and asymmetrical devolution

by Raj Gonsalkorale

The comprehensive survey carried out by the National Peace Council has revealed some very interesting and encouraging results. All three major power centres in Sri Lanka, namely the President, the Prime Minister, and the LTTE should take note of these findings when peace talks begin in Thailand next month.

Two very interesting findings are, the perception that the ethnic issue is now more about politics and power rather than culture, and secondly, that a majority of people are not in favour of asymmetrical devolution, not just amongst the Sinhalese but also amongst the Tamils.

These two issues are very closely linked and asymmetrical devolution is infact the outcome sought by the LTTE in their quest for power, or rather the legitimising of power they already wield, by force and through dictatorial means. This column has pointed out on several occasions that most ethnic issues which gave rise to the advent and growth of the LTTE are no longer valid and that the country has moved on from the environment that prevailed many years ago, when the argument that the Tamil community suffered from discrimination at the hands of a Sinhala majority could have been sustained to a much greater degree than today. This is not to say that there is no ethnic issue to discuss. There is and it has to be addressed if the Tamil community is to feel they are equals, and that their security will not be threatened ever again by another 1983. However, the point that has to be considered is whether the outcome desired or demanded by the LTTE is driven by a hunger for power or a genuine attempt to address the issues that have confronted the Tamil community.

It is difficult to argue that asymmetrical devolution is not about power, as it validates granting of more power, at least theoretically, to a section of one community in one area of the country over others in the same country. The emphasis on the word "theoretically" is because power is unlikely to be devolved to the people in this area of the country, but to a few individuals belonging to the LTTE, who will exercise that power, undemocratically and most likely by forceful means.

Asymmetrical devolution will not address the issue of inequality and discrimination or self determination, as the devolved unit represents only a minority of the Tamil community living in the country. In this context, asymmetrical devolution is counter productive to the corner stones of the Tamil struggle, namely, inequality, discrimination and self determination, and it may well be considered as a sell out of years of struggle and sacrifice by a majority of Tamils living in the country. However, if it is recognised that asymmetrical devolution is the answer to legitimising of LTTE power in the North and East, power that has been acquired undemocratically and by force, then it may be considered a peaceful solution to the armed conflict between the Armed Forces of a legitimately elected government and armed forces of a rebel terrorist group.

The issue before the government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, and President Chandrika Kumaratunga is whether they would accept this position and legitimise LTTE power in the North and East of the country. It is also an issue for them, as well as the LTTE and other Tamil political parties, whether the primary causes that led to the armed struggle will be addressed through the process of asymmetrical devolution. It would not be out of place therefore to ask whether the Tamil community living in the rest of the country, which happens to be the majority of Tamils, would be disenfranchised unless they relocate themselves to the asymmetrically devolved North and East. The reverse of this would be for the Tamil community who opt to live in areas other than the North and East, to either continue living in these areas and work towards ending remnants of discrimination at the hands of the Sinhalese or continue their struggle, peacefully (or armed?) to overcome inequality and discrimination, and find ways and means of achieving a form of self determination.

Asymmetrical devolution will create two classes of Tamils, some with more power than others within the same country and it is possible that they may engage in a struggle amongst themselves and create a new dimension to the conflict that has ravaged the country for so long. If this argument is to be taken to the logical conclusion, it could be concluded that asymmetrical devolution is not the answer to the problem and even devolution of any sort is really not the answer to the problem faced by the Tamil community. Other ways may have to be found to address Tamil grievances, irrespective of where they live, if the causal issues are to be addressed by all communities in the country.

Such a task would require an examination of the status of grievances as they exist today, and how they may be addressed, the checks and balances that exist, and would be required, to prevent a resurfacing of perceptions, real and imaginary, of majority tyranny which the Tamil community claim led to the armed struggle, and how lapses in security which precipitated 1983, could be prevented. It should be difficult for objective members of the Tamil community, divorced at least momentarily from the emotiveness of the LTTE led armed struggle, as it is difficult for a majority of Sinhalese people, to accept that asymmetrical devolution will address the problems faced by the Tamils. This is borne out in the survey conducted by the National Peace Council.

It has to be recognised though, that while ideological arguments exist and probably have more validity than methods being contemplated to address the issue in hand, there is reality to be faced and an immediate need to lift the country from the brink of disaster and steer it towards economic and social recovery. The reality is the military capability and presence of the LTTE, and their place amongst the Tamil community in the country. They may not love them or respect them for their methods, but they do admire them for promoting the Tamil cause to the top of the agenda, not just in Sri Lanka, but also throughout the world. However, political expediency in giving into LTTE demands, because of their military power and hold on many Tamils, should not dictate the direction that the Sri Lanka government should take in discussions with them in Thailand.

As a government representing all communities in the country, the Prime Minister and his negotiating team should argue to defend the rights of Tamils in all parts of the country, and that of the Sinhalese and Muslims in all parts of the country.

If an interim administration in the North and East is an accommodation that has to be made to placate the LTTE, it should be made conditional on non negotiable factors that guarantee that Sri Lankan citizens living in that region enjoy the same rights as others in the rest of the country. These non negotiable factors being, a pre determined life for the interim administration, the application of one rule of law throughout the country, one language policy (Sinhala, Tamil and English being official languages of the country), enshrinement of democracy and democratic governance, and acceptance of the concept of a Unitary State.

Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources

HNB-Pathum Udanaya2002

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