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| Sunday, 13 October 2002 |
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LTTE's ideological retreat : 'Eelavar' as internal self-determination Our Civilisation by Michael Roberts
This article is composed as two connected sections, divided by the temporal moment when the segments were drafted. This distinction will underline the moving character of most social relations and more specifically the radical transformations of the ethnic conflict during the course of the last ten months. The first part was drafted in August 2002 and informed by my experiences in Sri Lankan in March this year as well as Prabhakaran's media event at Kilinochchi in April. The second part is informed by the news reports on the first round of peace negotiations in Thailand. I. Perspectives in March-August 2002 The peace negotiations and the demand for self-determination by the LTTE and many Tamils residing in Sri Lanka raise the issue of Sri Lankan identity in critical ways. Is there space for "internal self-determination" within both the territory and the idea called "Sri Lanka"? What does the concept of "internal self-determination," as distinct from the fuller sovereign status of "self-determination," mean? Does it allow for a "Tamil nation" to exist within the "Sri Lankan nation" in ways that will allow for "the dignity and self-respect" of those Tamils who wish to be part of this specific Tamil entity?
These are momentous questions. The vocabulary seems imposing. One might want to erase such weighty words and the even heavier issues they raise. You cannot do so. Most people in Sri Lanka would surely have taken note of the words of the LTTE leaders. "Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe is the prime minister elected by the people of Sri Lanka. He is the prime minister of those people. Here in Thamil Eelam Mr. Prabhakaran is both the president and the prime minister," declared Dr. Anton Balasingham, the LTTE ideologue at the famous Kilinochchi Press Conference (as reported in the Sunday Island, 13 April 2002, with the emphasis above being my addition). This statement says explicitly that the LTTE, and those Tamils who have gathered behind its umbrella, consider themselves to be outside the category "Sri Lankan." One could therefore say that the peace negotiations in the context of international pressures that deny the LTTE the possibility of a separate state of Thamileelam are concerned with the task of bringing these Ilavar (Eelamists) within the fold of Sri Lanka in ways that will be workable across both sides of the fence. I say "Eelavar" because it appears that some Tamils who favour the goal of "Thamileeelam" seem to prefer this label to that of "Eelamist" according to a purist position recently espoused by Peter Schalk, a proficient Tamil-speaker. As such, the present situation brings to mind the several voices in public forums that have stressed the need to espouse a Sri Lankan identity that is not equated with a Sinhala identity and attacked the divisive collective identities associated with Sinhala nationalism, Tamil nationalism and Islamic communitarianness (since the latter, as yet, do not seem to have mounted a sustained vocabulary of "nation"). This suggestion is well-intentioned and moved by the pain of the conflicts that have created such havoc in Sri Lankan society. It is nevertheless a hope that seems quite far-fetched in the present circumstances. In short, it is a fabulous wish because it wishes away the searing memories of war among significant elements of the population, memories that identify an ethnic "Other," whether correctly or not, as the cause of specific sufferings. No political settlement will last if people are not ready to recognise that a profound bitterness runs through the thinking of many Tamils in particular. Such memories apart, the collective sentiments associated with being Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil are deep-seated and cannot be waved away with a magic wand. This type of fabulous wand is constructed sometimes by entrepreneurs interested in pushing materialist consumerism. A similar wand is waved by rationalists of humanitarian disposition or by those who have latched unto "hybridity" and cosmopolitan dwelling-in-travel as the answer to the world's problems. Such currents, I stress, have a role to play in the current processes, but those attached to such interests are in cuckoo-land if they think that the communitarian sentiments within Sri Lanka will wither away or can be pushed aside by pious statements. Thus, those who wish to develop a Sri Lankan identity must work within such hard realities. The issue is whether we can develop a Sri Lankan identity that is overarching and encompassing. In other words, can we develop a Sri Lankan identity as a confederative concept that allows for a base of other ethnic sentiments? Can the Sri Lankan nation embrace a Tamil nation, a Sinhalese nation, a Muslim community/nation and the collective identities of the Burghers, Malays, Colombo Chetties, et cetera? Can we construct a workable plural society/state? II. Perspectives in late September, 2002 At about the same time that I drafted the section above, I wrote another essay on "The Meaning of Eelam" which drew a distinction between what I called "Adequate Eelam" and "Wholesale Eelam." My image of "Adequate Eelam" was an approximate, but simple, way of referring to "internal self-determination." It's meaning derives from it's distinction from "Wholesale Eelam," that is, the goal of a sovereign and independent state of Thamileelam. In that essay I explicitly suggested that the LTTE was pragmatic and ready to accept something less than Wholesale Eelam. I was directing this message at the Sinhala, Muslim and other peoples in Sri Lanka who had a fixed notion about the meaning of "Eelam" and who were dogmatic in their readings of the developing situation. This reading of the present situation was confirmed at Sattahip in Thailand on the 18th September when the statements by the LTTE representatives were interpreted by the BBC reporters in the caption "Tamil Tigers 'do not want independence'." (BBC News, Internet, 19 Sept.2002). Thus Anton Balasingham is quoted as saying that "Our demand for a homeland is not a demand for a separate state." The demand, it would seem, is for "regional autonomy or self-government," that is to say, internal self-determination. However, there is a "but" attached to this dilution of the LTTE's previous goals. "If our demand for regional autonomy or self-government is rejected, our people would have no other option and separation would be the last resort," said Mr Balasingham at a press conference. This is a critical proviso. Sceptics may go further and assert that this is a temporary re-adjustment of their original project with a view to its revival once global conditions allow a further step towards the unilateral declaration of independence. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the present position adopted by the LTTE at an international forum is a significant shift from the posture adopted at the Kilinochchi Press Conference, a position that was strikingly embodied in the quotation that I have presented at the outset of this article. In brief, the LTTE has given ground. The business deal initiated by the UNP leadership through informal talks and then embodied in the MoU is now blossoming and being pushed forward by it's own logic besides other external and global forces. My speculations on the reasons guiding this development in LTTE thinking will require more space than that available today and will be presented in a future article. |
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