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| Sunday, 16 March 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Mullaitivu and LTTE re-supply : Politics and the Navy's new vigilance Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA The sinking of an LTTE-owned ship by Sri Lankan naval action on the high seas on Monday, March 10, seems to have imposed the biggest strain on the current ceasefire after just over a year of suspended hostilities between the Tamil secessionist movement and the Sri Lankan State. The most obvious and immediate reaction to the "Mullaitivu incident" as it is known, although it occurred between 180 to 200 kilometres (depending on the Government or the LTTE interpretation) into the Indian Ocean only vaguely opposite Mullaitivu, was the concern that it would precipitate a breakdown of negotiations that, in turn, could provoke a collapse of the ceasefire itself. But already, despite angry noises emanating from the Vanni and hints by the LTTE's international spokesperson, Anton Balasingham, that the talks process could slow down, both the LTTE nor the Government have made it clear that they do not have any intention of allowing the overall peace process and the ceasefire to collapse. Control of territory The real-politik of the current strategic balance between State and anti-State (secessionist) forces is such that both sides have too much to gain from the ceasefire. The LTTE has achieved far more, in terms of control of territory and populace, from this ceasefire and ensuing peace process than ever before; no previous peace initiative having gone this far in terms of actual political and social implementation. The Sri Lankan State and the Sinhala-dominated ruling social class has also equally gained, in terms of regaining the stability of the State and the economy, which is the basis of the continuity of the current Sri Lankan polity and social order in which that class, the capitalist class, is the hegemonic social group. Thus, neither side sees any benefit in going to war. As the sage Kautilya observed two thousand years ago: "When the benefit accruing to kings under a treaty, irrespective of their status as the weaker, equal or stronger party, is fair to each one, peace by agreement shall be the preferred course of action..." (Arthashaastra 7:8.34). But while no one expects (or desires, except for a few Sinhala ultra-nationalist war mongers) the peace process to collapse, severity of the tensions arising from the Mullaitivu incident point to the severity of the on-going problematic dynamics that surround the peace process. On the one hand there is the issue of military re-supply of the LTTE, as one of the two military forces that are now in stand-off in this ceasefire. As one top diplomat privately observed (on being pressed on the issue, since no representative of any State likes to acknowledge the rights of a non-State entity) last week, the LTTE is an armed force maintaining a balance of power and therefore, that balance of power has to be maintained by a necessary re-supply on both sides of the war front. However, the peace process could only be maintained, that diplomat acknowledged, by both sides ensuring that their re-supply is for maintaining the status quo and is not for aggressive intent. Non-State entities While this issue is an un-clarified one as far as the letter of the ceasefire agreement is concerned, the LTTE is at a disadvantage given the international and local ideological and legal bias against non-State entities, especially armed ones. And this bias recently got worse with the dominant Western powers taking advantage of the shock effects of the suicide guerrilla strikes on the United States to launch global counter-insurgency operations. Thus, while the LTTE continues to, quite justifiably (in both moral and political terms), re-supply clandestinely, the State armed forces, especially the Navy, continues to attempt to interdict Tiger supply vessels. And it is in this persistent hostile action by the Navy that another of the problematic dynamics that surrounds the peace process also reveals itself. The Mullaitivu incident itself strongly hints at this problematic. The Mullaitivu incident is notable in that, for the first time, it is unclear whether the LTTE supply vessel was actually within Sri Lankan waters (technically: within the 200-mile radius maritime economic zone), and therefore in violation of the current loose interpretation of the Ceasefire Agreement, or, whether it was in international waters, in which case it would be the Navy that would be in violation. The very ambiguity of the location in which the Navy has chosen to attack the vessel indicates the risks to the peace process the Navy seems prepared to take in maintaining its "vigilance" against the LTTE. Ambiguity of the location If one links the Navy's risky behaviour to the orders it has regularly been given in recent months by the President, in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to strictly protect the integrity and sovereignty of the Sri Lankan State, one can see a possible motive to compel the Navy to take such risks. It may appear that the 'risks' being taken by the Navy are risks to the peace process and not the kind of military risks it faced and rarely took on when, during the war, the Sea Tigers were on the offensive. Undeniably, given the ideologically dogmatic military policy of emphasising land warfare and control of territory, the Navy has never been adequately equipped to play what should have been its central role of cutting the Tamil armed movement's maritime umbilical cord. That is all the more reason to question why, when in the crucial time of war, the strategy of interdiction of maritime re-supply was not pursued, it is suddenly being emphasised now, when hostilities have been suspended and the ceasefire needs to be handled as delicately as possible. It is no secret that President Chandrika Kumaratunga has been struggling to maintain her political relevance, unquestionably due to her, by resorting to such tactics that attempt to transcend her marginalisation from the current Government-initiated peace process. |nter-party competition The United National Party's peace initiative has seen a spectacular success, historically unprecedented. And there is no doubt that the groundwork, equally historic (indeed, visionary), laid by the previous People's Alliance government, in terms of establishing the precedent of an elaborate offer of power-sharing as well as initiating the Norwegian mediation, has been crucial to the current success. But whereas the PA bungled in its sheer un-professionalism as well as the neo-feudal power politics of its leadership, all credit must go to the UNP-led governing alliance for its systematic management of the peace process. However, both parties have continued to labour under, and to thrive on, a dynamic of the western-style system of capitalist democracy imposed on us by the departing British colonial power: the dynamic of inter-party competition which has, in turn, fuelled contests for state power and control of resources between diverse social groups at class, ethnic and caste levels. Thus, all attempts to resolve the ethnic conflict, fuelled as it has always been by the inter-party electoral contest, have, in the past floundered, in the morass of inter-party rivalry, especially between the two principal Sinhala-led parties. Ethnic suspicions But whereas in the past, such rivalry saw the party in Parliamentary Opposition blocking governing party peace initiatives by directly mobilising Sinhala ultra-nationalism and ethnic suspicions, today both parties are sharing State power and both parties are broadly and firmly committed to the same policy of power-sharing and the restructuring of the State to ensure a permanent settlement. But the current peace initiative has been taken by the UNP-led Government and the Government, naturally, in terms of the dynamic of inter-party competition, wants to take the credit for the success of its initiative. But the reality is that that 'success' has been dependent on the continuity of a strategy and policy originated by the preceding People's Alliance government and which has been implemented by the current UNF government with little initial obstruction from the PA either in Parliament or by the PA-held Presidency. However, the problematic has been the need to continue and sustain this dual-power 'cohabitation' configuration in the context of the larger structural imperative of inter-party competition. Thus, the ideal situation would have been for the UNF to bring the PA-held Presidency into the peace process in a more institutionalised manner thereby not only enabling the President and the PA to share in, at least, some of the credit, but also ensuring that the PA shares in the responsibility and, therefore, cannot attempt to resort to the traditional competitive tactic of 'spoiling' the game. The UNF Government could have absorbed the Presidency into the peace process while allowing the inter-party rivalry to continue at the Parliamentary level. In fact, if that absorption had taken place, there was the possibility of even the inter-party rivalry at Parliamentary level being reduced as well. However, this is easier said than done in the context of the in-built compulsions of competitive dynamic of European-style bourgeois democracy. One can hardly expect the UNP or its allies to behave in a radically new manner quite contrary to the structural compulsions after all these decades of rivalry as well as the pressures of their own constituencies which have been mobilised all along on these competitive lines. Hence, on the one hand, we have a tenuously established governing political alliance pursuing a highly risky and tentative peace initiative, but unable to adopt a style of inclusive politics that would help its initiative. On the other hand we have a presidency held by the rival political alliance marginalised from the peace process and using every possible tactic to regain political credibility including throwing up obstacles to the peace process itself. While the Parliamentary PA is busy, quite legitimately challenging the UNF government on the economic front, we also have the Presidency using its constitutional powers to discredit the Government by discrediting the peace process. The minor difference from the past practice of inter-party rivalry is that the Presidency has not, and cannot, resort directly to Sinhala ultra-nationalism any more. Rather, taking advantage of her constitutional powers, the President has been persistently raising the issue of 'national security' vis-…-vis the ceasefire. Old liberal pseudo-argument It is this larger 'security' emphasis by the Presidency, driven by the politics of rivalry engendered by the behaviour of both major political formations, that has seen the Navy's new found vigilance on the high seas. The old liberal pseudo-argument that a 'sovereign' State has the right to be vigilant around its shores and boundaries does not hold in the current Sri Lankan context in which this sovereign State has recognised as a suitable negotiating partner the very 'enemy' that it has fought. And it is this same inter-party rivalry that has prompted the President to dally with the JVP even though the JVP policy on the peace process is fundamentally opposed to the PA's own policy. Thus, the issue of the management of rivalries and tensions, between the State and the LTTE and also between the Government and the Presidency remains a critical challenge that has to be addressed not merely by the political parties concerned or by the other political parties, but also by other social forces in the country that desire the peace process to go forward. |
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