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| Sunday, 24 August 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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LTTE to push Thimpu principles? Peace process: towards phase two By Kumar Rupesinghe The temporary suspension of talks has given the Sri Lanka Government, the LTTE, the Norwegian facilitators and the international community the opportunity to reflect and rectify shortcomings in the negotiations process so as to strengthen the process. I assume that all parties have done their homework before approaching the second phase. There is still sufficient time for such a reflection since I do not think that the talks will begin until mid October. I have argued elsewhere that Phase Two of the negotiations should be qualitatively different to Phase One which would involve substantial re-design and a review of the architecture that govern the negotiations process. Review The first phase of negotiations was characterized by the foundation laid by the Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed on February 22nd 2002. The Ceasefire agreement provided the basis for a cessation of hostilities. The parameters for signing the Ceasefire Agreement were based on the understanding that there was parity of military power between the government and the LTTE. It was recognized that the LTTE had a conventional army, a navy, control over territory and an administration governing their areas of control. The Ceasefire agreement also established the Norwegian government as the facilitator of talks and adopted the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission to monitor the ceasefire agreement. The main characteristic of the peace negotiations was that they were conducted according to a 'problem solving' approach. The negotiating parties were primarily interested in confidence building measures to ensure normalization of relations between the Government and the LTTE. Since the unilateral declaration of a truce in December 2001 the Government took steps to remove roadblocks, withdraw troops occupying houses and property belonging to Tamil people in the North and the East and to relax the embargo on the provision of commodities allowed to the uncleared areas. The first phase was characterized by the uneasy and capricious cohabitation between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. It was also characterized by the volatility and fragmentation of the Muslim polity. One of the most significant gains under Phase I of the negotiating process was the LTTE's willingness to declare a cessation of hostilities. The subsequent signing of the Ceasefire Agreement provided a blood-transfusion for the business community in Sri Lanka and an improvement of the country's economic growth. Further the LTTE pronounced during negotiations in Sattahip, Thailand that they were prepared to consider internal self-determination for the Tamil People and in talks held in Oslo they declared a commitment to explore terms of a federal structure. Another significant achievement was the ability of the United National Front government to mobilize and gain unprecedented commitment from the international community to provide an umbrella of support for the peace process. Failures A significant loss that occurred during Phase I of the negotiations was the inability of the Government to secure LTTE participation at the Tokyo Donor meeting which has resulted in disenchantment and a loss of commitment by the international community to provide substantial aid until and unless there is a negotiated solution. The government, it would seem, was not involved in preparing the administration to transform the highly centralized state structure of the country. Finally the government whilst relying heavily on the Peace Process has neglected to focus on the country's economy, social issues and other matters demanding urgent attention. The LTTE's decision to suspend its participation in the peace negotiations on April 21st 2003 brought to light some fundamental weaknesses of the negotiations process. These weaknesses can be categorized under the following points: * There were no follow up mechanisms for decisions taken at the peace negotiations which meant that assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation was delayed. * Suspension of committees on de-escalation meant that problems of High Security Zones and other security issues could not be handled through a problem solving approach. The situation was substituted by positional bargaining and attrition on the High Security Zones and other matters dealing with security. * The negotiations also failed to develop mechanisms for supplying development assistance to the North and the East and the instruments developed for this purpose such as the Joint Task Force (JTF) and SIHRN were found inadequate in addressing the situation at hand. * There developed over time asymmetry between the two parties. Whilst the Ceasefire Agreement recognized equality between the parties the LTTE perceived a growing imbalance in the relations governing the two parties. The LTTE perceived the international community as imposing unwarranted conditions and imposing its will on the organization's political project. Third party interventions from the United States and Japan were misinterpreted by the LTTE and the benchmarks, developed by the international community were seen by the LTTE as a peace trap carefully laid out by the Government. The so-called 'conditionality school' that influenced this thinking assumed that the role of the international community was to impose such conditions that would eventually persuade the LTTE to resume negotiations through a carrot and stick policy. It was believed that a quick disbursement of foreign aid would be sufficient to ensure that the LTTE would comply with human rights, democratic principles and agree to a state of pluralism. This line of thinking however was defeated when the LTTE refused to participate in such a normative framework. The organization took a strategic decision to withdraw from talks to restore symmetry between the parties. This ensured that partnership with the LTTE meant equality and symmetry in the relations governing the negotiations process. Federalism The suspension of talks was followed by a discussion on the Interim Administration. The government has already sent several draft proposals to the LTTE, two of which have been rejected by them. The argument put forward by the LTTE was that the proposals were too little and too late and that they did not adequately satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil people. The third Interim Administration proposal of the Government, which is currently under study, is itself presented as a document for discussion. What is characteristic of all three drafts presented to date is the failure to understand the political dimensions and the aspirations of the Tamil national struggle. The draft proposal is bereft of politics, lacks vision and does not provide a goal post that both sides could reach out to. The roadmap of the peace process must be clear to the parties and the Interim Administration solution must have a clear direction. The word 'federalism' hardly enters this discourse. The fact that an Interim Administration has to substantially change the balance of power and transform the state from a unitary state to shared power is not alluded to. Further, the third proposal also underwent a metamorphosis when the actual text sent to the LTTE had fundamental changes made to it such as the deletion of the Muslim participation in the negotiations, which had already been agreed upon by the Prime Minister and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. Phase II The second phase of the peace process will be qualitatively different from the first phase of the peace process. The LTTE Leader Velupillai Pripaharan has taken personal control of the negotiations process. Anton Balasingham, the principal negotiator has, due to his illness and other reasons, been replaced by a formidable team of political and intellectual personalities who will be meeting in Paris and in Germany in the next few weeks. A careful analysis of the team demonstrates that it is a more fundamentalist group which would intend to revert to the basic principles of Thimpu and reassert those principles as the guiding principles of the negotiations process. They would be submitting a draft proposal of their own which is likely to outline the parameters governing their aspirations of the Tamil national struggle. The LTTE would submit detailed proposals with guiding principles for negotiating the final solution. It would highlight the strategy of maximization stopping short of a declaration of Ealam but going further than a federal solution, i.e. the parameters governing this thinking will be a confederate model. Another feature characterizing the team is that it is led by Thamilselvan who has gained maturity and experience after spending many years on the battlefield. Several other members of the team are drawn from the military command. Necessity The debate regarding the distinction between normalization and confidence building is over. The negotiating stance of the LTTE would be positional bargaining. Positional bargaining would mean that the organization would use the opportunity to argue the principle of the 'Doctrine of Necessity', which means that the solution to the Tamil national question should be sought through extra-Constitutional measures. The principle of the Doctrine of Necessity has been used to explore how an unlawful act can be excused if the circumstances justify it. The LTTE could justify a resumption of hostilities under the Doctrine of Necessity on the basis of the incapacity of the Sri Lankan political class to resolve the Tamil national question within the existing constitutional parameters. It could use the Doctrine for international consumption. The Doctrine of Necessity was successfully adopted in several international situations. How the Doctrine of Necessity is applicable to Sri Lanka will be a matter of intense debate. Muslim Question Today the Muslim parties have formed a unified front, which must be seen as a positive factor. However there are deep-rooted fears in the Muslim community following various atrocities committed against their people in parts of the North and the East. Muslims are being killed, abducted, assaulted and their properties seized. The LTTE has been blamed for the majority of these attacks though the organization's hierarchy is adamant that normal relations be maintained with the Muslim community. The continued harassment of Muslims by the LTTE in the Eastern Province could be a reflection of the inability of the LTTE hierarchy to control its leadership and cadre in the East. These developments could be a sign of a power-struggle developing between the LTTE Supreme Command in the North and its Eastern Leadership, which seems to have taken a more complex form. Another dimension is the power struggle within the Eastern Leadership itself. Further new and more militant groups are emerging from among Tamil and Muslim youth groups, which would destabilize the situation in the East. The establishment of an LTTE base in Kurangapanchan in the Trincomalee District has led to increased tensions between the LTTE and the Government. Under the terms and conditions of the Ceasefire Agreement both the Government and the LTTE agreed to maintain a balance of forces and to refrain from expanding its military positions. The LTTE is unmoved by a ruling and a deadline issued by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission to withdraw the base signalling a breakaway from its 'Rule Bound' position in the Memorandum of Understanding. If this dispute is not resolved it could pose a serious threat to the Government's position in the South as it could undermine public support and trust in the peace effort. Challenges The challenges facing the Sri Lanka government are indeed formidable. There are rumours in the press that Minister Milinda Moragoda will be withdrawing from the Government's team of negotiators. Professor G.L. Peiris as the Chief Negotiator will face the challenge of forming an equally formidable negotiations team comprising constitutional lawyers and conflict resolution experts. The Government would have to ensure that the country does not misunderstand its strategy as an appeasement of the LTTE. It will have to be conditioned by the upcoming elections for the Provincial Councils and a fair amount of attention will be paid to winning these elections which is necessary for seeking a further mandate from the people. The design and architecture of the negotiations process should also be reviewed. The venue, agenda-setting, timing and duration of the talks should be qualitatively different. Whilst the LTTE would wish to have a change in venue for the talks so as to gain further legitimacy the Government may also have to consider whether the talks be held in Colombo or Kilinochchi. With regard to the agenda-setting and protocols governing the negotiations process, the first phase of the negotiations process allowed for free discussion on numerous subjects, which were not minuted. The second phase should receive a more rigorous agenda and minutes taken of the talks so as to ensure follow up of the decisions taken. While Phase One comprised two-day meetings with long, intermittent intervals the second phase should be characterised by longer meetings spanning one to two weeks. It would also require a set of resource persons to be available throughout the talks. The elections will take the attention of the Government away from the peace process whilst the LTTE's full and undiluted attention will be on achieving its objectives in the negotiations process. The attention of the Government will be much focused on the terms of negotiations. There will be a wide gap between the position of the Government and the LTTE with regard to the negotiations process. It will require all the efforts of the facilitators to bridge the gap in an atmosphere of incredible contention and attention in the entire country. The Joint Opposition comprising the People's Alliance and the JVP will use all its resources to undermine the Government's efforts by engaging in extra-parliamentary agitation. They will carry the slogan that the Government is on the verge of appeasing the LTTE. The Government would have to reconsider whether the current capricious cohabitation policy should be further pursued or whether a structured and sustainable process of consensus building is necessary. Peace trap The international community is, in many ways, the custodian of the peace process. The Government of Sri Lanka was able to develop a broad umbrella of support which, in comparison with the situation of many other developing countries, is a significant achievement considering there were no purely strategic reasons for doing so. The umbrella of support provided by the international community however became too one-sided where a position was developed that the balance of international support tilted in favour of the government. This made the LTTE lash out against the role of the international community, which it said had formed a safety net around the government to prevent it from falling. The LTTE accused the government of laying a 'Peace Trap' with the assistance of the international community. However the Government and the LTTE are equally dependent on the international community for its support and to some extent the international community is dependent on the success of the peace process. In Phase II of the negotiations process the international community would be more cautious and the LTTE could try to develop a realignment of forces within the international community through an alignment with the European and Scandinavian powers. (Dr. Rupesinghe, sociologist and internationally recognised conflict resolution expert, once headed the London-based International Alert, famous for its interventions to help settle civil wars, and now heads the Foundation for Co-Existence, Colombo, which is busy supporting local leaderships in participating in the peace process.) |
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