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| Sunday, 7 December 2003 |
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A 'Sinhala Only' army? : The logic of ultra nationalist militancy Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA 'Kosadanda', is the Kautilyan term for the combination of the Treasury and the Armed Forces that make up the core resources of State power. Combining 'Kosa' (= treasury) and Danda (= force), the term Kosadanda occurs many times in the books on foreign policy and war in the sage's classic work of political economy, the Arthashaastra. Indeed, in Book 8: 2.4, Kautilya urges the ruler to keep to himself (or herself) the control of these two key elements of state. Even if she is not familiar with our own traditions of state craft, being familiar with Western traditions, Chandrika Kumaratunga certainly knew what she was doing when she took the Defence portfolio back to the control of the Presidency. Westernised or semi-westernised as they are, I doubt whether the Sinhala ultra-nationalists knew that that they were following Kautilyan tradition when they recently called for the formation of a separate 'Sinhala Army'. Perhaps they have read Clausewitz or, the newly fashionable Hsun Tzu. I doubt it though. It is more likely that the ultra nationalist groups are merely acting on instinct and their limited understanding of politics and power tactics. The sad thing is that their latest idea seems to be part of a larger logic of desperation born out of the increasingly narrowing set of options that Sinhala ultra-nationalism faces today. The Sri Lankan State is a yet unreformed, Sinhala dominated one. But the social groups at the helm of State power today are quite deliberately (albeit quite slowly, given the political party rivalries) steering the State towards major re-structuring the nature of which will assuredly dissolve the Sinhala fantasy of empire. I long ago began calling the current process 'creeping confederalism' (not to mention the other, equally valid, possibility of creeping secession), and most influential 'actors' today are actively pushing for the idea of a federal system that, I suspect, will be pretty close to a confederal set up. So: end of the road for Sinhala supremacy? Not if the ultras have anything to say, or anyone to attack or even bomb or kill, knowing the way these fanatical extremisms have gone on the Continent (to me, dear anglicised readers, 'the Continent' is our true geographical one and not what our colonial mindset points us to) and elsewhere. If the once-pure Sinhala State and its armed forces are no longer pursuing the fantasy of Sinhala supremacy over the whole island and its inhabitants, the Sinhala ultras are determined to build another army. Hence, the proposed 'Sinhala Only' army. There are two basic implications to such a development (again, I have pointed this out previously). Firstly, and most tragically, is the way the proposed Sinhala army is likely to go. Its founders, or the idealist softies among them at least, may have some vague idea of a heroic voluntary force that somehow finds the arms and the logistical capacity to march northwards (or eastwards and southeastwards?) to fight the Tamil secessionist army. They are quite likely banking on Sinhala expatriate help. After all, the main Kosa of the Sinhala ultra nationalist movement is with the Sinhala expats, just as much as the LTTE moneybags also largely come from the Tamil expats. This is where that Sinhala doctor in New York, who, in the 1980s, heroically offered to donate rocket propelled grenades and launchers to fight the Tamil militants, can make his entry again. He may need to bring a few 130 millimetre calibre long range artillery pieces and several 81 mm heavy mortars as well if the Sinhala army is to genuinely make the LTTE bat an eyelid. Even if this is the actual intention of the Sinhala army's founders, how far can it succeed? In the first place, the Sri Lankan State is hardly likely to allow this force to move into frontline areas. More importantly, the State is not likely to allow any non-State group to arm itself. Secondly, even if the new Sinhala army is able to smuggle in a few weapons (certainly not the heavy weaponry that would be essential for any force that wishes to confront the Tamil forces), these weapons may be more than enough to arm those few Sinhalas willing to join such an enterprise. That is, there is the probability, that the Sinhalas are not going to flock to join the new army. Judging from the current capacity of the Sinhala ultras to mobilise the masses even for civilian protest actions or even to obtain electoral votes, their mobilisation for war is likely to be even less successful. But from the point of view some of the founders of this Sinhala army, these small numbers may be exactly what is needed. I am referring to those among the founder warriors who may want to make this 'army' a clandestine armed group aimed at sabotaging the peace process. Even if there is no one with such intentions right now (I suspect there are), it is highly probable that the very attempt to wage what would be considered as an overt, 'honest' or 'sincere' war against Tamil secessionism would result in that Sinhala army being pitted against the (Sinhala) State. This has happened many times elsewhere and is typical of the political logic of a state that is moving away from the original base of political community that formed it while many, or some, in that community may yet adhere to that original collective consciousness. If the force thus pitted against the State remains that of a purely ultra nationalist movement, then, in all probability we may be confronted with a very small scale insurgency in the South. It is possible that such an insurgency will not be easily suppressed but its impact will be minimal and is not likely to seriously disrupt the peace process. The current inter-party rivalry is more likely to retard the peace process than the bombings and assassinations that would be the outcome of a minor Sinhala ultra insurgency. Bombings and assassinations there certainly will be, in the event of such an ultra nationalist insurgency and the victims, given the logic of the confrontation between the reforming (Sinhala) State and the private Sinhala army, will largely be ethnic Sinhalas and not of any other ethnicity. The principal targets of a Sinhala ultra nationalist insurgency will be the political leaders of the peace process and State reform movement and the civil society groups and individuals who actively support the peace process. Any lists of 'Sinhala traitors' that now exist will be put to use in this event. A worse scenario would be if the JVP or, any JVP front organisation similar to the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaapaaraya (DJV) that launched the deadly insurgency of 1987-91, was to merge with such a Sinhala ultra nationalist army on the clever pretext of fighting separatism and 'terrorism' to "save national sovereignty". It is possible that the JVP itself may maintain its current 'gentleman' image while allowing a separate organisation to merge with or launch an insurgency parallel to the new Sinhala army. The JVP's current political rhetoric against the peace process will be a very useful ideological prop for such a combined insurgency. And a Sinhala nationalist insurgency will have the destabilising effect and political propaganda value that would be just what the JVP wants to maintain its current political significance that is quite out of proportion to its electoral clout. But such a mass insurgency, while certainly seriously destabilising the South, will, in doing so, retard the peace process and could well speed up the process of Tamil secession. At the same time, however, the rise of a non-State Sinhala army will have a second basic implication. That is, it will begin to divorce militant Sinhala ultra nationalism from the State. In this sense, the setting up of a private Sinhala army is entirely counter to the very intentions of those trying to set it up. While the intention is to halt the dilution of the supremacist Sinhala State and to fight the non-Sinhala force trying to undermine it, the very formation of a non-State Sinhala army could actually expedite its dismantling. Unless, of course, those leaderships currently in State power opportunistically revert to Sinhala ultra nationalism themselves. Even in this, a brilliant move like that of the late President Premadasa could serve to help destroy the Sinhala ultra nationalist rebellion. Premadasa completely took the wind out of the DJV's ideological sails when he too made the call for the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. In a single speech he destroyed the ideological uniqueness, the very raison d'etre of the DJV-JVP rebellion. And 80,000 counter-insurgency victims later, that rebellion itself was crushed. The actual destruction of the new Southern insurgency would be a similar brutal slaughter in the true Sri Lanka tradition. Well, those who take up the sword must be prepared to die. The Tamil militant groups never complained about their casualties. The prospect of more bloodshed, this time in the South, is saddening. The illogic and stupidity of it is even more saddening. Such is our post-colonial ethos. Would that the Sinhala ultra leaders read more Kautilya. |
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