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| Sunday, 22 February 2004 |
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The 'Second Coming' in Sri Lanka? Return of the Maha Sangha Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA Christian fundamentalist preachers are fond of referring to the 'end
times': what in Christian theology is called 'Eschatalogy', or the I am certain, though, that the ideologues and leaders of global Christian fundamentalism would insist that the site of the Divine intervention, the 'Second Coming', would be in either their imperial home base of the United States of America or their imperial-spiritual outpost, Israel. They would certainly reject the claim by some sections of the Maha Sangha here, in remote little Sri Lanka, that the time of the final battle (Armageddon?) has now come and that since every other avenue of justice and means of ethical-spiritual order has been exhausted, it is time for the Ecclesia, the pavidi, to take charge of human affairs, to intervene in governance. But those Western "Evangelists" (so-called, I have a different understanding of evangelism) should remember that God moves in mysterious ways. After all, part of the wonder of the Incarnation is that the Divine took human form not in some grand palace but in a lowly cattle shed. And our Resplendent Island is, in a certain global elite perspective, a 'dump', and Colombo is a 'hole', especially for those Lankans who are hurriedly departing for a better life in the Developed World, visa or no visa. So it is but right that the Divine and the Spiritual intervenes here. All strength to the defenders of Enlightement and Moksha in their 'final' endeavour, this time by means of secular governance via election to Parliament. I think it is a very positive development that Buddhist clergy are to enter our political institutions en masse, even if the immediate means of entry is through a Sinhala supremacist political organisation like the renamed Sihala Urumaya. Some western-style liberals and secularists may worry that this could result in a scenario, as in Iran right now, where a small group of clerics (just twelve) have the power to completely manipulate the outcome of parliamentary elections. Other liberals may delight in the prospect of the secularisation of the Maha Sangha - their 'corruption' as it were, by their deeper involvement in worldly affairs. Not being a Liberal, I take the middle path. For too long has the Sri Lankan Maha Sangha been, on the one side, cocooned from modern society by their life in ossified religious institutions that have not adapted to modernity. And, on the other side, for too long has the Sangha been manipulated by modern social forces via the huge breaches in the fabric of our traditional religious structures caused by (Christian) colonial devastation and postcolonial modernist malformation. The decision of some sections of the Sangha to enter conventional politics is good even if the immediate means of entry is via an ethnic supremacist political organisation. It is good for the Sangha and it is good for Sri Lankan society. In the first place, the bhikkus will be taking a major step outside the pansala and gama, their feudal ecclesiastical cocoon. With the collapse of the several Sinhala-Buddhist kingdoms that survived into the late feudal age of the 14th and 15th centuries in a large part of the island and the subsequent terrible colonial onslaught, the Sangha was one of the institutions that suffered most. The intricate institutional structures that linked pavidi and gihi that enabled the Sangha to elaborately nurture Sri Lankan society and vice versa withered away or were deliberately destroyed by the European invaders. Today a bhikku painter is a rarity and 'news', a bhikku doctor non-existent except for the very few bhikku ayurvedic healers, while a bhikku teacher is a little more common although never at any senior administrative level except within the Sasana educational institutions themselves. And relatively few are bhikku scholars of any eminence. This is in complete contrast with the social reality during the times of stable Buddhist Sinhala society in the 1,500 years of its existence in the pre-colonial period. In that society (and probably the preceding social formations), the bhikkus and yogis and svaamis were the teachers and the scholars. While the village temple was the local maha vidyalaya, the larger viharas were universities of high standing (while in Thakshaseela, Pakistan, I was struck by the remarkable similarities of functional design of the ancient pirivenas there and the ancient pirivenas in Ritigala). The study of the Sigiriya graffiti has led archeologists and historians to conclude that a high level of literacy existed among the mass of people. The Sangha had a major involvement in the sciences at the time as well as the crafts. The theras and theris played a role in design of buildings (not just daagabas), other civil engineering structures and also, of various institutional systems and procedures, including civil law (based on the Dhamma). And who were the healers? Where were the hospitals? Again, it was the Sangha that dominated medical practice as well as the ancient social health infrastructure. That was why the bhikku was so worshipped and lovingly cared for by the larger society. The village cared for the bhikkus and bhikunis and they cared for the village community: in its education, psychological, emotional and physical well-being, and its moral-spiritual coherence. At a higher level, the ruling clans benefited from the ideological justifications for their socio-political dispensation provided by the senior clergy with whom they linked up in a mutually beneficial relationship. The prelates not only endorsed kingship but also strengthened governance and order in general by their contribution to the creation of laws, conventions and social norms. In return for this intellectual/ideological resource, royalty patronised the prelates on an immense scale. That this patronage benefited not just the Sangha but also the mass of people can be seen in the ruins of extensive pirivena educational and hospital complexes. Thus, after a good half millennium of feudal collapse, colonial triage and postcolonial modernist dissipation, it is about time that the Maha Sangha returned to centre stage. Most immediately, however, the intervention of the Buddhist clergy may only be partially conducive to our current social wellbeing. The initial impetus of the bhikkus' participation in governance seems to be a Sinhala ultranationalist political venture. In a sense, this is inevitable and part of the greater logic of Sinhala ultranationalism. The ideology of Sinhala ultranationalism presumes an ethno-national 'purity' of identity that derives from a conjucture of language/social custom (Sinhala) and religion (Buddhism). This ideology is principally evolved in an urban middle class context and thus, the characteristics of this 'pure' identity necessarily carry the hallmarks of the socio-cultural practices and aspirations of this social group. Hence, 'Sinhala' has a certain Sinhala middle class specificity not seen in the rural and provincial dialects and patois, nor in the rural and regional social customs. Again, this is part of the logic of bourgeois nationalist homogenisation so necessary for the modern capitalist nation-state. Likewise Buddhism as envisaged in ultranationalist ideology reflects the modernist and neo-colonial aspirations of the Sinhala urban middle class. An emphasis on 'philosophy' (and even 'science') as opposed to faith, belief and cultic spirituality is a major characteristic, something with which the vast mass of rustic Sinhalas is not quite comfortable. A more recent characteristic is an individualised Buddhist spirituality and most lately there has appeared Buddhist televangelism (TV evangelism) epitomised by the late Ven. Soma Thera. The similarity with Christian 'evangelism' is remarkable. Sinhala-Buddhist exclusivism and supremacy is the final ideological defence of whatever ultranationalist momentum that is left in the Sinhala community after fifty years of postcolonial fantasy of empire have been blunted by Tamil nationalist militancy. In that sense, this is indeed the 'end times', and that is why some of the leaders of the new Jathika Hela Urumaya use that language. For them, it is the end of empire and the purest of the 'pure' have now to come forward to fight to defend it, the 'purest' being the Sinhala Sangha. But readers should not forget that the very first monk to enter institutional politics is the Ven. Baddegama Samitha who was first elected to the Southern Provincial Council and later to Parliament. A veteran human rights and social justice activist, the Ven. Samitha is quite the opposite of the new wave of political bhikkus now emerging. A member of the Marxist LSSP, he represents aspirations and ideas that are diametrically opposed to Sinhala ultranationalism. Nevertheless, the Ven. Samitha also represents this larger trend of Buddhist monks entering politics. His political activism is a useful counterpoint to that of the JHU bhikkus. The entry of even some sections of the Sangha into secular institutions of governance will expose the Sangha as a whole to the swirling winds of postcolonial Sri Lankan modernity. Once again they will become part of the mainstream of societal life, but in new ways. These are ways that did not exist in the ancient times when the Maha Sangha was genuinely and intensively active at the centre of Sri Lanka's society. If some of them do get elected to Parliament, they will be exposed to all the immense complexities and delicate nuances of political decision-making, legislation, public administration, national finance, economic management, constitutional reform, and most importantly, political negotiations to end a civil war. Everyone, both individual and political party, who has entered institutional politics, especially at national level, has undergone signficant modifications in her/his political perceptions and postures. As I pointed out last week, the JVP has begun compromising on some of its most basic political stances from socialist economics to refusal to talk with the LTTE even before it has actually entered a government. Usually such drastic changes of policy and philosophy, like N.M. Perera's economic policy compromises and Colvin R. de Silva's constitution design compromises, come after the individuals and parties come to power. But the policy modifications begin earlier, such as during the entry into institutional politics. Even if the JHU bhikkus lose the election they will still learn useful lessons and, being intellectuals, they will try to understand the dynamics that propelled them into politics as well as the dynamics of engagement with the voter constituency. They will learn that voters do not simply vote on the mere status (monkhood) of a politician but also on performance and on policy and the prospect of future performance. It is this new political engagement of the clergy that will bring a new dimension into Sri Lankan political life. We will have sections of the Maha Sangha, a segment of society that has a powerful, but waning, ideological-cultural significance, engaging with society in new ways that will certainly change the nature of that significance. While the people, especially the Buddhists will develop new perceptions of the Bhikku, the Bhikku will learn to see the gihi as voter and as political constituency. This mix of religion and politics will certainly be potent, but then, it has always been so, from the very beginnings of human society when the religious and political leaders were one and the same. Power is both spiritual and political, emancipatory and oppressive. Engagement, Being, is all. |
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doctrine of the closure of human time, the beginning of the Divine
Presence in human reality and its resumption of direct control over this
reality, as it was in the Beginning. Perhaps it is but right that this
Dharma Dveepa, this 'chosen' island of Enlightenment, should be the site
of the beginning of these 'end times'.
