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| Sunday, 13 June 2004 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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The dilemmas of peace by Jayatilleke de Silva The UPFA Government and the LTTE have both expressed their willingness to carry forward the peace process and resume negotiations. They have also expressed their commitment to the Ceasefire Agreement.
Several unsettled issues with regard to the modalities and the agenda of the talks remain. These are, then, the stumbling blocks. According to media reports and pronouncements by LTTE spokesmen, the LTTE is insisting that the ISGA proposals submitted by them to the former UNF government must be the basis of the talks. The Government, on the other hand, had proposed that parallel talks on the core issues should also be held with talks on an interim structure. At present both sides seem to stick to their positions. Meanwhile, the international community, including the donors has warned both sides that aid pledged at the Tokyo donor conference will not be available unless there is progress in the peace process. While the LTTE could disregard this warning for a considerable time, the Government cannot disregard it except for a short time since it desperately needs foreign aid for development purposes. Intransigence, whatever side it comes from, brings with it the danger of reverting to war. This is in spite of the reluctance of both sides to go back to war. After all, war is only a fortnight away according to the Ceasefire Agreement. Either side could withdraw from the ceasefire by giving a fortnight's notice to the Royal Norwegian government. There is no doubt that a compromise has to be made, if the peace process is to be carried forward. The government cannot refuse to discuss the ISGA proposals. Having gone into negotiations with the LTTE, it cannot ethically and politically reject a proposal put forward by them. Those who call for a total rejection of the ISGA proposals are in fact demanding an end to negotiations. The government, on its part, too should put forward its own interim proposals. Both proposals could be placed on the agenda and discussed in order to arrive at an interim agreement that could solve the immediate problems of the war weary people of the North and East. The ISGA proposals seem to be more of a maximal nature. Certainly they cannot be accommodated under the existing constitution. Incidentally, this is also one reason why the present constitution should be replaced. It may be possible through dialogue to work out arrangements to institutionalize certain proposals in the ISGA at present. Certain others will have to await complex procedures, including constitutional reforms, which take time. The important thing is to begin the process of negotiations. Since both sides have agreed upon a federal state structure earlier at Oslo, the above mentioned institutional arrangements should lead towards such a structure. The subject of constitutional reforms could also be on the agenda at some point, though not immediately. In order to arrive at possible interim structures, it is necessary to analyze why the LTTE withdrew from the talks in April 2003. They gave three reasons for their action. They were (1) marginalizing the LTTE by excluding it from the Donor conference in Washington and preparing another Conference in Tokyo without their participation (2) absence of any change in the ground situation where the displaced are unable to return to their original homes and (3) absence of a comprehensive strategy for the development of the North-East in the Regaining Sri Lanka program of the government. LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham, in his letter addressed to then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe informing of the decision to suspend talks, specifically mentioned that the LTTE is disillusioned that agreements taken at the talks regarding normalization have not being honoured. Needless to say that these concerns of the LTTE have to be addressed by the UPFA government in responding to the ISGA proposals with a proposal of its own. Another weakness of the UNF in handling the peace process was its excessive internationalization. While it has to be acknowledged that follies of past governments were responsible for the internationalization of our national question, the foreign policy of the UNF government, particularly its approval of US unilateral action in invading Iraq and its over-emphasis on relations with Washington led to serious concerns both in the north and the south that the government is merely following instructions from Washington in handling the peace process. The much talked of international security net was seen by the LTTE as a threat and as an attempt at blackmail. In the south it was viewed as preparation for a general onslaught on democratic forces to install an authoritative regime. Also much has to be done in the way of confidence building measures. The need for such measures are more given the hostile campaign carried on by the Opposition and a section of the media that the government's peace policy is a sham. These necessarily include measures to ameliorate the living conditions of the masses in the war-torn areas. Furthermore, the UPFA has to evolve a uniform approach to negotiations. The SLFP and the JVP, the two principal partners in the UPFA should work out a common strategy so that the public as well as the LTTE would have more confidence in their ability to deliver. The government seems to have relied only on the Norwegian facilitators to re-start the negotiations. There can be, however, multiple approaches to the problem. While carrying on with the Norwegian effort at Track One, many initiatives could be taken at Track Two and Track Three levels. Civil society organizations and even leading personalities commanding the respect of all communities could contribute much to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. A principal drawback of the UNF peace process was its elitist and secretive character. It was its weakness too. The UPFA has the opportunity to guide the peace process in a more open and transparent manner. It is time for the President to execute her proposal to have an apex consultative committee to deal with the peace process that is widely representative of political parties and ethnic communities. Since the talks are only between the Government and the LTTE, there is a need to innovate mechanisms through which the views of other parties could be communicated to the participants at the talks. The above-mentioned consultative body could be one such mechanism. There is nothing that could give a fillip to the peace process than mass mobilization for peace. The lull in the peace process following the LTTE withdrawal from the talks and the general elections that followed have strengthened communal and extremist elements in the south. Needless to say that major political parties too have contributed to this phenomenon by flirting with them during the elections. If these forces are not countered by mass mobilization whatever progress already made could be negated as it had often happened in the past. |
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| Editorial | Security Produced by Lake House |
Norwegians are engaged in shuttle diplomacy to bridge the gap between
the two sides concerning their perception of the way ahead.
