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| Sunday, 24 October 2004 |
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Gamini developed non-chauvinist perspective on ethnic problem by N. Ram, Editor-in-Chief 'The Hindu' This is an Indian journalist's appraisal of Gamini Dissanayake in an article in the book "50: A Beginning", published for his 50th Birthday reproduced on the occasion of his tenth death anniversary
I met Gamini Dissanayake for the first time in his Colombo home at a sensitive juncture laden with socio-political tension and uncertainty. I recall that what impressed me, at a personal level, was the depth and profundity of his concern over the deteriorating situation and the fact that he seemed so cool about it. Sri Lanka was by then well launched into a time of troubles brought on by many factors and processes, but chiefly by the intensification of the ethnic conflict, which had turned malignant at some point in the 80s. Relations between Sri Lanka and its giant neighbour, India, had come under unaccustomed, indeed unprecedented, strain. This was essentially on account of India's experience and interaction, post-1983, with the island's ethnic conflict focused on the status and future of the North. The crisis - which was as much a crisis of good neighbourly relations as anything else - cried out for a constructive and far-sighted response located within a historical perspective and promised on a willingness to brave the odds, rise above the vicissitudes, suspicions, fears and temptations of the moment, and take major risks to turn the situation around. Gamini, standing steadfastly behind President J. R. Jayewardene in this crisis, was widely identified in India with this courageous response. Bilateral ties Historically and culturally, and above all at the people-to-people level, there was a great deal working in favour of Indo-Sri Lankan friendship and in favour of ruling out anything that detracted from, or threatened, it. In more recent times, the perspectives and broad policy parameters worked out by two outstanding national leaders of a new type, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in Ceylon, had proved most beneficial to bilateral ties. It is well-known that for many years now, public and political opinion in India has held Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the former Prime Minister, in high regard - as a politician who placed a real value on friendly bilateral relations and made solid contributions. Her personal closeness to Indira Gandhi was clearly a plus point for Indo-Sri Lanka relations. Many of us in India also followed with fascination the evolution of President Jayewardene's perspective, views and practical attitudes on this front. At the time I met him he had, for many years, been regarded as South Asia's senior statesman. Early in his political career he seemed to have pursued the theme of special friendship with, and closeness towards, democratic India with an intensity all his own; in the final chapter of his exceptionally long public career, he made the business of turning Indo-Sri Lanka relations around the focus of this endeavour. President J.R. I had met an interviewed President J.R. a full year before I met Gamini for the first time, in February 1987. I was familiar with the long historical perspective and agonizing over what precisely needed to be done to resolve the Tamil question (or the ethnic conflict), and also to place Sri Lanka India relations, first, on an even keel and, then, on an unshakeable friendly footing. But it was Gamini who persuaded me by informing me, in depth, about the new thinking at the top in Colombo. The very fact that he had snatched so much time from his arduous Ministerial and organizational responsibilities to make this the strategic priority of his political and intellectual being, at this sensitive juncture was most persuasive. It was akin to a historical adventure which was certainly not one sided, because Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and several others in the Indian political spectrum seemed fully ready to participate whole-heartedly in it. It was equally a socio-political and moral challenge. It was this combined historical, socio-political and moral weight of the challenge, I think, that attracted me so strongly to Sri Lanka and to the problematical and challenging area of Indo-Sri Lanka relations, including of course, India's relations with the Tamil component of Sri Lanka. Living and working in Madras as a journalist, I was powerfully influenced by the human and political aspects of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict which had spilt over, in a big way, into South India and which, in turn, had worsened steadily on account of the variety of inputs made by (what can only be characterized today as) India's schizoid policy. War or peace Today, when it is clear that whether it is war or peace in the island, India's leverage over the ethnic question is a thing of the past, honest and self-critical political opinion recognizes the policy as schizoid and deeply flawed in the following sense. On the one hand, the basic political objective of India's post-1983 Sri Lanka policy was to help carve out security and justice for the Tamils within the unity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. On the other hand, even as it ruled out (for obvious reasons) any political truck with the secessionist and extremist demand for Eelam, the policy sought to build up the armed militants, including and, at times especially the LTTE, militarily. This was realpolitik. This was democratic India's way of putting pressure on the political negotiating process. Among other things, it involved the old-fashioned dilemma of ends vs means. Today, the political consensus or near-consensus in India appears to be that this schizoid policy proved disastrously counter productive for both countries. By early 1987, I knew very-well the thinking of the T.U.L.F. leaders, especially my good friends - A. Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran, who were, eventually, both treacherously gunned down by LTTE hit men in their well-secured Colombo home. I knew something about the extremist thinking and military methods of the leaders of the various militant Tamil groups headquartered in Madras (after the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983). In particular, I knew something of the strategic mind and ways of V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE Supremo, although the Tigers' tactics kept up guessing all the time. Initially, as a journalist seeking to specialize on the Tamil question in Sri Lanka and on Indo-Sri Lanka relations, I attached a great deal of importance to the T.U.L.F. as a political force. However, from 1985 onwards, it became clear to me that Prabhakaran and his close lieutenants were central figures on one side of this tragic drama and that any attempted denouement must factor them in as an inescapable part of the problem, and its solution. Interestingly, realistic policy making in New Delhi came to recognize this as the central aspect of the challenge. In this tangle, it quickly became apparent that Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran's 'expertise' on the LTTE, and Sri Lankan Tamil question was essentially emotional and collaborative. This was next to useless as a policy-making resource, when it came to crafting a solution. What I know, on the strength of directly gained personal knowledge, is that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, other members of the Indian foreign policy and political establishment, and those who supported the basic frame work of the attempted moderate solution, greatly valued what President Jayewardene and Mr. Gamini Dissanayake did at this sensitive juncture to find a lasting solution to the malignant crisis. They admired these Sri Lankan statesmen for their guts, for the big political an personal risks they were willing to take in the interest of the sane, democratic future. I observed, from close quarters, Rajiv's rapport with Gamini during the latter's visits to India in 1988 to solve the difficulties that had arisen in the implementation. I even carried a sensitive message to Colombo from Rajiv in mid-1988-at the height of the Bofors payoff controversy which I was actively engaged in investigating and exposing as a journalist and came deeply to appreciate Gamini's constructive and far-sighted attitude, his loyalty to the peace process, which you could depend on through thick and thin. No illusions about LTTE One thing that I noted about Gamini's attitude or perspective was that he had no illusions whatever about the character of the LTTE. Providing any kind of arms or assistance, in some clandestine fashion, to the LTTE to fight the Indian army for any other purpose was instantly clear to him as treachery to the peace process. By the same token, Gamini Dissanayake, the aggressive "Sinhala nationalist" politician of yesteryear, proved to be a trusted and generous friend of Tamil moderates, the T.U.L.F. leaders starting with Amirthalingam. His practical contributions to their security in Colombo were deeply appreciated. Of course, there was no guarantee of success at any stage in the business of dealing, in a democratic mode and through democratic instrumentalities, with Prabakaran & Co. - which proved to be a Pol Potist organization with zero regard for human life (Sinhalese, Muslim or Tamil), civil society and democratic values, and with a penchant for making irreversibly disastrous miscalculations. The last three major acts of miscalculation have been; The decision to make the opportunistic peace and entente with President R. Premadasa in 1990, after the LTTE had gained from this bizarre relationship time, money, weapons and deadly communication capabilities, and an unbelievable opportunity to replenish its hardware and manpower severely depleted by the hostilities with the IPKF. Rajiv assassination The cold blooded meticulously planned assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in Sriperumpudur on May 21st, 1991 through employing a fiendish technique. The costly misadventure, from the military and morale stand point, of the Battle of the Elephant Pass camp, which began a new chapter in which the Sri Lankan forces seemed to go from strength to strength. If certain short-sighted obstacles had not been wantonly placed in the path of the implementation of the July 1987 framework for demilitarizing the ethnic conflict, we would be in a qualitatively different and happier situation now. For one thing, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi would not have taken place and there would be no need for a Northern military campaign by the Sri Lankan arm forces. This is where I would like to focus on the contribution made by the Statesmen we are felicitating and honouring in this book. Gamini, I long know by repute to be one of the central and rising figures of Sri Lankan politics. To informed opinion in india, he was known - prior to the run-up to the Indo - Sri Lanka Peace Accord - chiefly as the man behind the gigantic and multipurpose Mahaweli development venture, the Minister who set tough targets within demanding the time-frames and made it a habit to meet them ahead of schedule. In some way he was also thought of as an alter ego of his country's President. He was known to be efficient, intellectually serious, and interested in long-term policy issues and directions. He and Lalith Athulathmudali were considered, in well informed circles in India, leaders to watch, resourceful and powerful men belonging to a young generation whom President J. R. Jayewardene was clearly grooming for higher responsibilities - and greatly relied on. Even then, they seem to be the opposite of what a politician like Premadasa represented. Cricket lover Incidentally, as someone who loved cricket, I also knew of course, that Gamini Dissanayake was the President of the Sri Lankan Cricket Board, who took a surprisingly detailed interest in the well-being and problems of the players (later, I invariably ran into one or another of Sri Lanka's fin and exceptionally talented cricketers in the Dissanayake home in Colombo), and powerfully promoted the rise of Sri Lanka in world cricket. On the negative side I had heard criticism from some Sri Lankan Tamil politicians of Gamini's pursuit of "Sinhala nationalist" goals and methods from the late 1970s. So, when a friend of mine, a former Sri Lankan cricketer who has many friends in cricket circles in India approach me with an intention to meet Gamini, President Jayewardene and others to discuss what could be done to promote a frame work of strengthening Indo-Sri Lanka relations on a democratic basis and face head-on the challenge of the ethnic crisis I readily responded at a personal level. There is a myth that journalists belong to that rare category of beings who observe, report, analyse and evaluate in a neutral, dispassionate, 'objective' mode. At most, this is liberal textbook theory. In practice my experience is that journalists hold strong opinions and value judgments, preferring one politician or set of politicians to others, opting for one course or others, tilting constantly in one socio-political, socio-economic or ideological directions and against another. Journalists also play a role as concerned citizens who can put their advantages and the privilege of access, to democratic progressive and morally sound use-without compromising their professionalism. For instance, when the prospective of securing peace and a civilize state of ethnic relations is within grasp, when human lives are at stake, there is nothing wrong or surprising about some journalists getting involved in the peace process. This is how I saw my own small part in the unfolding Indo-Sri Lanka drama of the Eighties. Personal friendship In the process I came to forge a close and extremely warm personal friendship with Gamini. Whether it was in Colombo or Kandy or New Delhi or Madras. I found that he, his wife Srima and the other members of the family were exceptionally spontaneous and generous in their friendships. "Friendship is such a rare commodity", observes India's finest contemporary writer, R. K. Narayan. "People come together for purpose - it lasts as long as some interest binds them, or motive. But just friendship by itself, people coming together without any purpose. That is an achievement. I value it. That's one thing I feel for, you know ..." Friendship rarely formed "without any purpose" as Narayan so shrewdly observes, but once it is formed it is entirely up to us to live up to the rest of the Narayan ideal. On the other side, Walter Lippman, one of the tallest figures in the modern history of journalism, warned journalists, against the professional trap of 'cronyism', by which he meant excessive closeness to powerful figures, notably American Presidents. It does require a special effort for a journalist or a writer to keep personal closeness separate from business recording analytical and critical assessments. Leading statesmen My assessment of Gamini Dissanayake, the politician and leading statesmen of the near-term future, is essentially as follows: He has developed a consistently democratic perspective on politics and events. There are no short cuts to the solution of knotty and complicated socio-economic and political problems, which operate on a truly large scale. It requires a great deal of political experience, intellectual seriousness, and commitment to the rules of the democratic game, to turn your back on autocratic, arbitrary, chauvinistic and demagogic answers. In this respect, as Gamini once pointed out to me, Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike does provide some kind of model. James Manor begins his biography of "The Expedient Utopian" by remarking on all the relevant contrast, on the life as well as the shade. But the remarkable thing about S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was that there is no evidence whatsoever that he attempted to cut democratic corners even during a time of troubles. Indeed, as Manor observes, "when he finally reached the top he was recklessly over-generous". Clearly, the present campaign for democracy that Gamini, Lalith and their colleagues are waging, is going to a make a qualitative difference to the future of Sri Lankan politics. There may be short-term reversals and disappointments, especially for their followers and sympathizers who naturally expect quick results. But there can be doubts whatsoever that this political journey among the Sri Lankan masses, this intends and highly necessary educative campaigns are important - and all to the good so far as democratic politics in the island is transferred. Democratic alliance Secondly, Gamini and his colleagues have clearly developed a non-chauvinist, secular and fair perspective on the long standing ethnic problem, even if separatists/chauvinists on either side of the fence may entertain observations, suspicions and doubts about this. Carrying forward this perspective requires the broadest possible democratic alliance drawn from the streams of Sri Lankan Society, Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and others. There must not be the slightest vacillation on the need for this non-chauvinist, fair, secular and democratic response to the ethnic problems. We must also recognize that it does not depend merely on democrats, those committed to a fair solution, as opposed to extremist, chauvinists and separatists (conscientious or otherwise). Nevertheless, broad alliance of political forces favouring a just solution to the ethnic conflict - one based on a devolution of power or autonomy package within the frame work of Sri Lanka remaining one, united and sovereign nation must be recognized as a necessary, indeed and indispensable, condition for Sri Lanka's developmental future. |
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