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| Sunday, 3 April 2005 |
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Features |  |
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Joint funding mechanism : Issues of human rights and legitimacy by Jehan Perera Much attention is focused upon the prospect of setting up a joint government-LTTE mechanism for tsunami aid to flow to the north east. It is reported that the LTTE has accepted the draft version of the joint mechanism put before them by Norwegian facilitators, while the government is also very close to accepting the document. But once again a doubt is emerging about whether the government and LTTE will soon reach agreement about the joint mechanism to deliver tsunami aid to the north east. Just a fortnight ago LTTE's political wing leader S. P. Thamilselvan on tour in Europe, expressed the LTTE's acceptance of a draft mechanism put forward by the Norwegian facilitators. But now it is reported that the government's amendments to this Norwegian draft have not met with the LTTE's approval. If the track record of the government and LTTE in terms of their relationship over the past year is to be given weightage and the present disagreement is factored in an agreement between them on the joint mechanism seems unlikely to emerge. There has to be a modicum of goodwill in a relationship for two parties to reach agreement on working together. But there has been little that has been positive in the government-LTTE relationship over the past year. The most positive feature has been their continued commitment to avert direct warfare in violation of the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002. The Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002 provided mutual gains for both the government and LTTE. This is the primary reason why it has lasted for three years and even outlived the government that signed it. Ceasefire Agreement is more or less taken for granted today. By stopping the war, the Ceasefire Agreement enabled the economy to be rebuilt and investments to take place. It also enabled the A9 highway that links north to south to be opened to traffic which the government had previously tried to do by military means at the cost of thousands of lives. The Ceasefire Agreement also enabled the LTTE to engage with the government and larger society as a legitimate entity rather than as a terrorist organisation. What has made the Ceasefire Agreement different has been the provision of mutual gains combined with the vital element of international monitoring. On the other hand, the weakness of the Ceasefire Agreement has been its inability to secure human rights of the people. Human rights Given the disregard for human rights in the north east, the setting up of an international monitoring system to overlook the workings of the joint mechanism would be an important feature in ensuring its success. Important aspects of improving the lives of the people of the north east would be to ensure that their human rights are protected and also that the ethnic minority groups in the north east are adequately represented. Therefore, it is incumbent on those who seek to safeguard the people's interests, be they political parties, civil society organisations or the international community, to ensure that the government and LTTE operate according to internationally recognised human rights norms and practices. The disbursement of large amounts of foreign aid to the north east through the proposed joint government-LTTE mechanism needs to be subject to human rights conditionalities. The logic that the joint tsunami mechanism is only about financial resources and is not about human rights is both simplistic and opportunistic. The provision of international donor assistance is justified on the grounds that it is meant to improve the lives of the people. The lives of people do not improve simply because they have more roads, more buildings and more jobs. The improvement in the lives of people requires above all the removal of fear of their lives from those with guns who can arbitrarily dictate terms to them and also determine their term of life on earth. Bringing human rights into the negotiations on a joint tsunami mechanism may seem to add another contentious element into an already complicated situation. Therefore, the position might be taken that human rights should not form a part of the negotiations on the issue of a joint tsunami mechanism. Instead, it might be argued, human rights should be kept as part and parcel of the negotiations on the political issues relating to a more all encompassing interim administration for the north east. But the logic that states that financial and economic issues should be dealt with first, and human rights and political issues can come second is terribly flawed. A commitment to human rights must accompany the peace process every step of the way, and this includes the much awaited and critically important joint tsunami financial mechanism. The much needed legitimacy for the new structures of governance for the north east, and the continued flow of international aid to it, would be determined in a large part on the improvement of the human rights situation on the ground. Succesful model So far the only joint mechanism between the government and autonomy-seeking Tamil leaders that has had a degree of success has been the Ceasefire Agreement. Beginning with the abortive Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 to the setting up of various sub-committees (including the Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian Relief Needs, better known by its acronym as SIHRN), no joint mechanism for power sharing between the government and Tamil leaders has been successfully implemented. Thus, the provincial councils system set up under the 13th Amendment in 1987 is not operational in the north east for which it was meant. SIHRN was set up but could never function the way it was intended to. Therefore, merely setting up a joint mechanism to deliver tsunami relief in the north east will not be a sufficient task. Such an achievement might temporarily be seen as a success by donor agencies that will increase their contributions to the country. But unless the joint mechanism actually works, it will not benefit the people. Key to the successful working of the joint mechanism would be to ensure joint gains to the government and LTTE. The Ceasefire Agreement with its provision for international monitoring would be a model that could be utilised in this regard. The challenge for Sri Lanka is to find ways to keep the LTTE from going back to war. Working along with the LTTE in a joint mechanism in which human rights are upheld cannot be too high a price to pay. Instead of seeking to deny the LTTE its share of legitimacy as a partner in some aspects of the governance of the north east, the government should welcome the opportunity that the joint mechanism provides for power sharing with the LTTE in the north east. It should be noted in this connection that the LTTE's proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority for the north east did not make any provision in it for sharing of power with the government. This endows it with a federal element that can be built upon when discussing other issues pertaining to the governance of the north east. In turn the government should not grudge the LTTE gaining a measure of legitimacy by having a stake in a shared tsunami aid delivery mechanism alongside the government. Both the government and LTTE need to match their words with deeds. If they do so, a joint mechanism can be set up and the ethnic conflict would be on a certain path to be solved. Sri Lankans will be able to look at the rest of the world with a compassionate eye. For we will be one of the very few countries in the world to end a protracted civil war without victory or defeat to either side. |
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