Editorial

Security

Politics

World

Letters

Sports

Obituaries

Archives

 Operation 'Restore Peace'

by Lt. Col Susantha Seneviratne

Sri Lanka has experienced the bitterness of three internal armed revolutions, consecutively since independence; viz 'Insurgency' in 1971, 'Subversion' in 1987-1990, and the present conflict of 'separatist insurgency', which has, now turned into a 'cold war' scenario; as a result of the 'fragile status' of the ceasefire and peace talks.

It appears the defence apparatus of the country is not yet prepared to counter the identifiable future threats from the lessons learnt from these, costly campaigns.

The current status of our national security is, in a state of jeopardy; and is, highly susceptible to, being undermined by the LTTE at its will.

The LTTE, who, rather wish to see a state of 'instability' in the state affairs would make all the efforts to worsen this situation by creating an atmosphere of 'insecurity' on land, particularly in the areas of their 'influence' of the N&E and the areas of their 'interest', such as the city of Colombo.

'Final Barricade'

A continual situation of this nature would, no doubt, be conducive towards neutralizing or even, liquidating the prevailing military posture of 'defensive status' in the N&E.

The LTTE reckon this as the 'final barricade', which has to be removed, either by 'diplomacy' offering attractive compromises at the talks to be held in the future or by using a 'limited force' and provoking ordinary citizens against the presence of the armed forces in the N&E.

Unless the current situation is improved from the lessons learnt, the government, irrespective of whichever the party in power would be compelled to satisfy the LTTE not only by giving the, so-called 'delicate recipe' of federal status but, also granting 'total autonomic powers' meant for a separate Elam state loosing all the 'jurisdictional powers' over the N&E, in toto.

Anticipating future threats in this manner, sometimes may look 'overestimated' to certain parties, who optimistically believe that the LTTE are, now in the process of being or trying to be transformed, themselves from guerilla status to a political entity as they have, just implied their willingness to lower the original demand for a separates state to a federal state.

Anticipation and analysis of threat perception is a logical and analytical process used by the military to visualize the identifiable threats of the present and the future through a mechanism of 'appreciation'.

It neither does involve optimistic thinking; but is a 'realistic' deliberation. In the past, those, who were responsible for the defence of the country had failed/ ignored to follow this system; perhaps, due to lack of professionalism. But, as a result, the country had to undergo three consecutive insurgencies, which ravaged the island politically, socially and economically.

5/4/71 Insurgency

The 'maiden' armed uprising of the JVP in 1971 emerged as an 'open offensive-onslaught', taking a selected number of isolated police stations, such as 'Wallawaya' as targets. The armed forces and the police were taken by 'surprise' as there had been no anticipation and analysis of the threat perception carried out by the defence at national level.

They were, also not properly armed and equipped with necessary weapons and equipments to carry out their tasks. In response to the appeal for help that was made by then PM, the countries, such as India dispatched emergency consignments of weapons and equipment, including military vehicles for the use of the armed forces.

This was the time, the 303 rifle (used by the British Army during WWII) was replaced with the 7.62 Self Loading Rifle (SLR). This, evidently corroborates the fact that there had been no plan designed for the national defence since independence and so does it, even at present.

'Tafaie Duties'

In the decade of 1960 and until the eruption of 71 insurgency, the services, particularly the Army had been concentrating its duties on the task of preventing the entry for illicit emigrants, which was known as TAFAIE (Task Force Anti-Illicit Emigrants) in the North.

By looking at the nature of duties, the services had performed during this era, the critics and, sometimes even the professionals and politicians often comment that the armed forces were of ceremonial with no experience in combat; and that is why the present conflict has prolonged to date.

This is an incorrect statement, because both the 'ceremonial' and 'operational' duties are a part of the military service. The forces, in peacetime do engage in extensive training to be prepared for war.

Before the separatist militancy came into existence in the N&E, the East had a relative peaceful atmosphere of less illegal activities whereas the Northern costal belt, including some islands of the archipelago in the Jaffna peninsular and the NW coastal belt (District of Mannar) had become notorious for smuggling of contraband to and from India, across the Palk Strait.

Smuggling and separatism

The Army, which had three of its detachments on the coastal belt had to do everything to crack down on smugglers, who were far superior than them, in terms of FGBs (Fiber Glass Boats-Modified version), high-powered OBMs (outboard motors), and especially skilful boat operators.

Besides, these detachments, having located at unfavourable sites, the Army could not perform its task of interception, effectively. With the emergence of insurgency these locations not only become ineffective, also became vulnerable.

The most notorious landing stretch for both smuggling and militant activities, and particularly for the LTTE was, the coastal belt between Polikandy and Thikkam on the KKS-PPD Road. In 1985, this was the landing site where the Army (GW troops) missed a 'golden opportunity' - ambushing, then MWP/M (most wanted person/man) who, later began to receive VIP (very important person) status - he is, none other than the present LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran.

He managed to evade this risk, owing to a 'miscalculation' in the tactical plan that was made by a 'veteran high ranking senior officer', (this senior officer, later died in action) who came with a 'top secret' information received from India about the landing of the LTTE leader, who was expected to come from Tamilnadu. There was, also a period where all the coastal detachments along with some interior ones had been withdrawn as a condition for talks that held at Thimpu.

All these blunders of both political and military that committed by us, from time to time gave the advantage to this self-learned leader of the LTTE to steer his campaign, successfully to date.

Until the JVP began its subversive activities in 1987, those who were responsible, such as the intelligence and the higher echelons of defence were unaware of the preparation of subversives. The JVP, so discreetly got prepared for their second armed revolution, which adopted a 'modus operandi' that was different from the former in 1971, avoiding detection by the intelligence and other agencies of the security forces.

Military Reforms

The intelligence service lacks professionalism being the 'eyes and ears' of our national defence. This, by no means expects to underestimate the onerous role played by the intelligence but to make our 'decision makers' at national level understand the absolute need for 'reorganizing', 'restructuring' and 'reforming' the entire defence system, including the intelligence service, so that those challenges in the future could be encountered, successfully.

In military tactics, the doctrines, concepts, principles etc, generally remain same for all types warfare; it is the 'application' that has to be changed or modified, depending on the ground, terrain, topography, and scenario. Nevertheless, nothing would be productive, if they are not adopted according to a 'strategic plan' at national level; the way, how the defence of our country had to suffer by insurgencies of the past and the present.

The committee appointed by the former government, calling for review to reform the defence organization, commissions to find those responsible for security lapses, following incidents involved by the LTTE and various boards being appointed, time and again to recommend proposals to improve the security have been a common phenomena in the country, today.

But, none have been able to address/focus on the 'actual cause' for the deterioration of the national defence/security.

Advice by foreign experts, who themselves cannot find solutions to the issues of their own defence/security matters or who have never got experiences in the type of warfare we are engaged in, is sought at unbelievable costs. We must be ashamed of ourselves for seeking foreign assistance to make plans of our own, be it defence or education or economy.

Unless for technology, there is no absolute need for such advices/consultations as we know, by ourselves and are familiar with our own conditions better than an outsider. Our habitual inclination to seeking foreign advice, in other words infers that we are not thorough in our respective fields of specialisation.

Even with, so-called advices given by the foreign experts, the achievement gained by the military, so far in combating the LTTE is, n ext to nothing. This clearly, demonstrates the fact that these experts, themselves have not understood the 'actual root cause'.

The LTTE, on the contrary, have achieved its 'military objective' within a well-calculated time frame with, no outside consultation, whatsoever. This is the reality; we, in fact need to learn lessons from the past.

A word for new leader

Planning to take the LTTE out in the 'open' in order to deal with them, 'strategically' in both politics and military is a 'must' in the long run. Hence, calling for the LTTE to surrender arms; stop recruitment, developing airstrips, erecting 'temporary harbours' in 'cleared areas' etc - the issues of 'tactical' nature should be not be mixed up with the issues of 'strategic significance/demands'.

A 'top leadership meeting' (New President, PM and LTTE leader) at a given location in the North is mandatory; for peace talks and the ceasefire to be effective. Introducing a plan of 'grand governing strategy' based on a 'politico-military' national strategic defence initiative program (NSDIP) should be the 'top priority' national need of the 'new leadership' of Sri Lanka following the forthcoming presidential election.

www.ceylincoproperties.com

| News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security |
| Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries | Junior Observer |

Produced by Lake House
Copyright 2001 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager