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Operation 'Pacification' :

'Peace' talks or 'Truce' talks

by Lt. Col. Susantha Seneviratne, RWP, RSP, Psc, Msc (def)-retd


At one of the several rounds of talks between the then government and the LTTE with the Norwegian facilitators.

Should a person commit evil, he should not do it again and again; he should not find a pleasure therein; painful is the accumulation of evil - 117, The Dhammapada. Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn him the other also Bible, Matthew 5: 39

Much talked peace has now turned into less talked violence - a quite usual occurrence according to the history of peace talks in Sri Lanka; because, every peace talk and cassation of hostilities the country has gone through, so far had been interrupted; and collapsed by sporadic violence unleashed by the LTTE.

'Simultaneous' military strikes, posing threats and causing tension has been a 'preamble' to resumption of fighting. Yet, this is unlikely because the LTTE do not want to lose what they have achieved on ground and in the international forum, to-date.

Nevertheless, they treat the presence of military as their 'headache'; though possible 'onslaught' is not practicable against the well prepared large defended zones/areas and 'public' factor.

Strikes on 'mobile targets' and 'isolated' defended localities/posts and possible cutting-off the movements, so as to 'contain' troops cannot be ruled out. Since the inception of armed struggle by separatist militants, four consecutive truces followed by peace talks, were observed.

Separation

None were successful in both observing ceasefire and talking of peace. What discerned out of these fragile talks was that the LTTE were aiming nothing less than separation.

Although parties that came to power, from time to time have been striving to satiate them, by introducing various political systems of governance and mechanisms of power-devolution, nothing could, however reach the aspirations/ambitions of the LTTE's demands that conducive of forming of a separate state.

Most unfortunate thing in all these peace talks was that none could proceed to the extent where 'core issues' of the problem to be discussed. Today, there are many to talk of peace - 'honourable peace' ; 'genuine peace' ; 'false peace' are the types of peace they, usually talk about.

But, no one has understood that mere talks, by compromise and consensus and granting some system of political power, along will not solve the crisis for dawning peace. For talks to proceed, undisturbed truce must be organized in such a manner that LTTE cannot violate.

This will require a sound flexible strategic and tactical plan, keeping in view the 'public', 'land' and 'international involvements'. Similarly, peace talks too must be planned in a way that they cannot deviate from talks due to any uncompromising situation.

All these need is politico-military 'tactfulness' based on 'foresight'. It must be noted that the LTTE had, always come well prepared for talks as they often work on 'strategies'; to 'strike while the iron is hot'.

Homeland

It is important to understand that the concept of separate 'homeland' actually has come from the 'right' of historical living - particularly the north, which is geographically and demographically 'separated' from other ethnic denominations; this has been the 'breeding factor' of separatist germ.

Then, certain discriminative measures taken by the past governments have been instrumental in spreading this germ. Even if, there had been an early political settlement prior to armed struggle, yet it is certain that it would have provided a better foundation for 'secessionism' to form a separate state, later.

As a matter of fact, it was the Tamil politicians, who germinated the 'seed' of separatism in the mind of Tamil community. Nonetheless, the general opinion of majority for a separate state looks remote but they cannot express it, freely; During presidential election in 1982, both the UNP and SLFP, including Communist party and the JVP, who had enticed a large number of Tamil 'youths' around them had a good voting ground in the north.

This showed the desire of Tamil community; to continue to be under one country notwithstanding those discriminative measures taken by successive governments. However, since independence, it was primarily the district of Colombo, which enjoyed 'dividends' of the governance; it never went towards north, east and south.

It was only during the period of D. S. Senanayake, a project such as 'Galoya' developed those areas of Ampara and Batticaloa in the East, and Welioya and Kilinochchi in the north by 'settlement' programs.

Had these settlements continued, the 'prime factor' of geographical separation could have been nullified, It must be interesting to find out whether this program had been done to prevent the likelihood of future 'division' in the country, in the pretext of bringing agricultural prosperity. Had these 'settlements' not taken place, the entire east stretching up to Panama would have gone under the grip of Tigers. Future strategy must, therefore be evolved, and based on these lessons.

The present status of the country is the result of Colombo-centered administration. This is what the Tamil politicians had exploited, and made those living in north and east understand that there is nothing other than separatism. So what really had gone wrong is the governance system.

Armed action

In the decade of 70, 'communism' seemed to have had a control over ethnic sentiments for separatism, in global politics. Disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union and Yugoslavia following fall of 'Communist bloc' is a typical example.

Similarly, had JVP been successful in 1971, perhaps an armed uprising for separatism would have not surfaced. But, instead what the JVP seemed to have given was an 'encouragement' to Tamil youths, who began to unleash violence in 1972. The 'Tamil Youth Front' (TYF) was the maiden group that came to existence as a result, and of which Prabhakaran and others, such as Kuttimany and Jegan (later arrested and were killed in the prison in 1983) were young militants.

With this background, one has to understand whether the present conflict is an 'ethnic issue' based on discrimination or a 'demand' attributed to 'bad governance', leaving aside those isolated community clashes that erupted from 'individual' extremism, in the past.

It has become a 'common' statement of both the LTTE and those politicians backing for federal/separate status that Tamils are having problems; but at the same time, they evade, specifying them. In this context, are they referring to the Tamils in the entire country? Or only to those living in the north and east? If they refer to those living in the entire country, then it is an ethnic issue - separation will not solve the problem.

If they refer to, only those living in the north and east - it is not only concerning the Tamils but also other communities, such as Muslim and Sinhala as well. So the separation is not the solution. If they refer to historical living, then it becomes a demand. However, all these have happened due to bad governance.

The problems, they talk about must, surely be the affairs related to justice, education, social, economy, health, etc. - these are the problems, which other communities, sometimes, except those living in certain privileged cities/townships, are faced with, today.

So all it needs is good community representation in the parliamentary forum; geographical disintegration will cause the problem worst. But, it is certain that the LTTE, having being in combat over 20 years will not accept this reality, and won't change their intransigent posture of demanding a separate state particularly, in view of achievements by military means and as that of international recognition and aids.

Past talks

It is prudent to fathom out the LTTE's disguised motives at talks, so that the government can adjust its agenda, accordingly. In 1984, for talks to be held in Thimpu, those Army detachments at VVT, Thondamanar, and Madagal that kept northern coast under surveillance were withdrawn as a precondition imposed by all militant groups operating then.

Having exploited this advantage they managed to get all their 'trained' cadres from India, across the 'Palk' Strait, uninterruptedly.

Had this surveillance been augmented by increasing strength and by number of bases on the coast, in conjunction with Navy and the Air Force, no trained cadres would have got across, back to Sri Lanka and the conflict would have been 'nipped in the bud'. This was a serious blunder committed by both political and military hierarchy, then.

IPKF

Talks in 1990 were the second opportunity that the LTTE seized, with the change of leadership in the country; to evict the IPKF from Sri Lanka, at the time when they were being confined to jungles in Mullaitivu.

Following reorganisation/regrouping, they recoursed to armed action, once again.

Talks in 1994, was the third attempt to be exploited by the LTTE when they had a complete setback in the east.

The Provincial Council election that was held in the east, without interference of the LTTE whatsoever was the testimony to this effect. However, with the change of country's leadership, the LTTE, once again regained control of the east.

The change of government in 2003 gave a better opportunity to LTTE than before since they entered peace process as a military vanquished force.

Though some critics commented that campaign in international terrorism following attack on WTC forced the LTTE to enter peace, it has nothing to do with the LTTE activities in Sri Lanka; what they referred to, using the term 'terrorism' was the action based on Islam 'fundamentalism' that goes against the 'west' and their allies.

Further, the international community, however won't directly involve in anything that would avert the LTTE resorting to violence. 'Condemning' such atrocities and forcing 'both' parties to resort to peaceful means have been the usual reaction, so far by this so-called community while harbouring LTTE political offices and allowing those activities taking place on their soil.

'Tasting'

Do they regard the LTTE as 'freedom fighters' since their is no threat to them by them as that of 'Al-Queda' - So, what is their stand against 'terrorism'? For them; when Asia is under attack, - it is a fight for 'freedom' - but when the same thing happened to the west - it is 'terrorism' - This is a kind of 'double' standard - that is why the LTTE is keen to have talks in Europe than Asia.

As for peace talks, one must not forget that the LTTE are, always in a habit of 'tasting' the new leadership following any election.Hence, what the government, now needs to do is to bring down normalcy.

For this, 'truce talks' must precede peace talks. Unlike the present fragile ceasefire agreement, which seemed to have been made by the facilitator along, without consulting the government and probably with the influence of the LTTE, the conditions of the new one must be made based on consensus reached by both parties present and it must be done as early as possible to prevent the situation from getting out of control.


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