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| Sunday, 8 January 2006 |
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In Sri
Lanka: seeding the clouds of war
by R. Hariharan December was eventful in Sri Lanka, particularly in the North-East. In the Jaffna peninsula, the Sri Lankan Army has been facing a spate of attacks from cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) operating in small numbers in the High Security Zones - key points essential from a military operational point of view. In the second half of the month, there were over 25 such incidents, particularly on December 22 and 23, 2005, in the Jaffna peninsula. The Army has paid a heavy price in these small-scale offensives; its losses have neared the 50 mark. Regular armies The LTTE has also suffered casualties, notably in a firefight in the Jaffna Fort area on December 25, during which troops killed five persons including a woman and recovered some weapons. The LTTE quickly disowned the dead, saying they were civilians, a luxury that is not available to regular armies. Things have come to such a pass that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) has decided to call off its monitors from active duty in Jaffna. There are a few other disturbing developments that need closer scrutiny. On December 21, two dinghies of the Sri Lankan Navy came under attack from LTTE boats in a lagoon off the Mannar coast while on routine patrol. In the gun battle that followed, one Navy boat was put out of action and three sailors were killed. Though the LTTE claimed it was only a defensive action, the SLMM has held it responsible for violating the ceasefire. As though this was not enough, two Navy buses were ambushed near Pesalai in the Mannar area on December 22. The Navy lost 13 men while 14 others were wounded and one bus was burnt. A military spokesmen said the militants used a combination of claymore fragmentation mines as well as rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles. All these happened well within areas under the control of the Government. For sometime now, the youth in Jaffna have, in sizeable numbers, been taking part in well-orchestrated demonstrations against the presence of Army posts in key locations, particularly near the Jaffna University. Agitators The situation turned ugly on December 19, when the agitators started throwing stones and clashed with the security forces. In a bid to quell the mob, the police are reported to have forcibly entered the University premises including the Vice-Chancellor's office. In the resulting melee, 14 demonstrators were injured; one of them had gunshot wounds. Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse has ordered an inquiry into the incident. In the words of SLMM chief Hagrup Haukland, the demonstrators not only pelted stones at the security forces but also tried to enter the SLMM's office forcibly. Events "This could not be called a peaceful demonstration. It was a very dangerous thing," he added. Similarly there were agitations against the rape and murder of a Tamil woman at Punguduthivu by suspected Navy personnel. It would be facile to dismiss this outburst of civil agitations as spontaneous. A significant aspect in all these apparently unconnected events is their timing. On December 19, the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference (the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the U.S.) issued a statement condemning "in the strongest terms the recent escalation in violence in the North and East" and asking the LTTE to put an immediate end to the on-going campaign of violence and to demonstrate its commitment to the ceasefire agreement and the peace process. Behaviour "Failure to demonstrate a willingness to change would not be without serious consequences," they cautioned. Many of the LTTE actions came after this demarche from the co-chairs - that is, in utter disregard of international opinion. This is a serious departure from its behaviour during the three years of ceasefire, when it bent over backwards to appear `clean' in international eyes. Another aspect of the timing of the escalation is that it preceded the departure of President Rajapakse on December 27 on his maiden visit to India after assuming office. Apparently India has a crucial role in his strategy for the peace process. He still hopes to persuade India to play a more active role in it and would like it to join the co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference. It is evident the LTTE attacks were aimed at not only embarrassing the President but also at sending a subtle warning to India not to get involved too closely in the mess the Sri Lankan peace process has become. Why should the LTTE indulge in such large-scale violence, in utter disregard of international opinion? Why are the civilian agitations being pumped up at this time? The answer is that the LTTE believes in sowing the seeds of war well in advance. In this, it has a four-pronged strategy: use civil agitations to restrict free movement of troops; limit army domination of key communication routes and centres; impose a defensive mindset on troops through violent actions, and; retain the initiative to launch big attacks at a time and place of its choosing. Military brain We are seeing the application of the first three strategies. These are force multipliers and offset the advantage conventional forces enjoy in heavy firepower. The LTTE has mastered the unconventional approach to warfare. So all these events need to be studied in the overall matrix of the progressing military aims of the LTTE, because it is essentially ruled by a military brain rather than a political process as organised governments are. So it will be futile to read too much into the LTTE's political statements or initiatives unless the underlying military significance is understood. Based on military logic, the developments indicate the following. The `spontaneous' demonstrations are part of the strategy of keeping the troops confined to barracks. Gherao We in the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) faced similar `agitations' and gherao of our camps in Palali. Though initially we were na‹ve and accepted them as similar to the civilian agitations so common in India, we became wiser when we saw the same ringleaders leading mobs of all kinds. Mr. Haukland of the SLMM also reported seeing the same faces leading different mobs. Of course, with over two decades of experience under its belt, the Sri Lankan Army is aware of these tactics. During the IPKF days, Thileepan's well orchestrated fast-unto-death was a high point of this build-up. The LTTE has set up a number of civilian organisations that will claim responsibility for these agitations, enabling it to disclaim any role. The small scale attacks on security patrols and posts have taken place on key communication axes in the Thenmarachi and Vadamarachi divisions. Similarly, the offensive actions in the Mannar region are aimed at restricting naval patrolling. This would facilitate LTTE boat movements for commando operations and troop build-up to threaten the western flank of the Vavuniya region. Ambushes During a ceasefire, the scope for action by the Army and the Navy is restricted and perforce defensive. But militarily, you cannot have defence without offensive action to dominate the areas around. The combined effect of civilian agitation, skirmishes and ambushes, and offensive use of mines in the long run will be detrimental to the troops. This is what the LTTE is aiming to achieve. The fourth prong of the strategy, of big attacks, is yet to become operational. But it does not seem far off. When the attacks come, they will be strategically aimed at removing the thorn `Karuna' has become in the East. Operating in tandem with the Army, he makes LTTE operations in the East highly vulnerable. Without the East, "Eelam" would be incomplete and meaningless. If and when talks begin on the ceasefire agreement, it is highly likely the LTTE will attempt to strike a bargain with the Sri Lankan Government on `Karuna'. Vociferous If that proves impossible, the LTTE's northern offensive would be aimed at drawing troops away from the East to the North and open the links to the East. That would make it easier for LTTE in the East. Seen in the light of this strategy, the killing of Joseph Pararajasingham, a veteran TULF politician and vociferous pro-LTTE MP of the Tamil National Alliance in the eastern city of Batticaloa on December 25, is as meaningless as it is reprehensible. It confers no advantage to anti-LTTE forces, if they are indeed behind the killing. Time is literally running out for the peace process in Sri Lanka. Not only Sri Lanka but all those interested in seeing peace return to the island - that includes India - can no longer be complacent. The peace process, which needs resuscitation, is not going to be helped by a brain-dead ceasefire. Norway and the other co-chairs must bring the LTTE around to observe the ceasefire in letter and spirit. The time for rhetoric is over. There is now an urgent need for them to bring the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government back to the table to talk, whatever the means they employ to achieve this. (Colonel R. Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer, served as the Head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.) (Courtesy: The Hindu) |
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