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by Ranga Jayasuriya

Third party facilitation matters a lot. Even the Norwegian bashers would now agree that without Erik Solheim's shuttle diplomacy last week, the peace process would now be heading to an inevitable collapse.

When the Norwegian Development Minister Erik Solheim arrived here, it was for a make or break visit.

His options were limited. The Tigers had ruled out Japan as a venue along with any other Asian location and insisted on talks in Oslo, also rejecting South Africa as an alternative.

Europe, through the EU travel ban, has closed the door on the LTTE, making most of the European nations, which once hosted LTTE political delegations, out of bounds for the LTTE.

The came Geneva, Switzerland being a non European Union country which keeps non-alignment in global affairs as the core of its foreign policy that it was only in 2002 that it became an official member of the United Nations. Geneva was one among a set of prospective venues proposed by the government to the LTTE.

And Geneva, at last, became the compromise for the two parties, for the government which ruled out talks in Oslo, but offering to go anywhere else in the world and for the LTTE which insisted on Oslo.

Switzerland gladly opened its doors for the talks, which according to some government sources, are likely to take place on February 17 and 18.

When Solheim went to Kilinochchi on Wednesday, his mission was two fold, first to seek an assurance from the LTTE to halt its attacks against the security forces and second to bring the two parties to a compromise on the venue for the peace talks.

He succeeded in both, with Prabhakaran having agreed to cease attacks against the security forces. "... on our part we have pledged that there will be no acts of violence. At the same time, we want the government of Sri Lanka to ensure that its armed forces desist from any violence against civilians," LTTE peace secretariat website quoted Theoretician Anton Balasingham as saying.

On Friday, an LTTE front, High Security Zone Liberation Force in a statement said it would halt violence for a week. According to intelligence reports, after all, this so called group is only a banner for LTTE undercover cadres operating in Jaffna.

Face saving for LTTE

Interesting enough, the proposed talks provide a face saving to the LTTE, which earlier insisted on the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) as the basis for any future talks till it agreed to discuss reviewing the ceasefire, but only to make it a nonstarter by insisting on Oslo as an venue.

Even though initial stage of talks is expected to focus on the implementation of the ceasefire, political issues could be taken up once normalcy is restored through the full implementation of the truce agreement, as Balasingham told the reporters.

No mention on the ISGA, once much acclaimed by the Tigers had been made in Balasingham's talk with the reporters. Since, the Tigers agreed to cease violence, there was a marked drop in acts of violence in the North-East, though LTTE attempted to smuggle over 60,000 detonators which are used for anti-personal mines.

The attempt was foiled, when the Navy intercepted the privately owned Indian vessel and the captain of the vessel confessed that the detonators were from India and intended for the LTTE.

However changes in the heart of the Tiger supremo did not take place in a vacuum. As Solheim has planning his visit to Sri Lanka, there were developments taking place here and abroad which would make his job easier.

The LTTE expected the Mahinda Rajapakse Administration to be naive in international relations, whereas Ranil Wickremesinghe to a greater deal locked the Tigers in an international safety net.

The thinking on the LTTE's part was that President Rajapakse's coalition with Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Jathika Hela Urumaya would lack crucial international backing, thereby relieving the LTTE of any would be international actions should it return to war against a government which would be forced to fight in isolation.

But the first salvo against the Tigers came from the American Ambassador in Colombo Jeffrey Lunstead who two weeks ago made it blatantly clear that if the Tigers chose to return to war, "the LTTE would face stronger, more capable and more determined Sri Lankan military""We want the cost of a return to war to be high."

Then last week as Solheim arrived in Colombo, the US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns reinforced what Ambassador Lunstead told two weeks ago at the American Chamber of Commerce.

"I think it is incumbent upon all the friends of this country to band together and send a message at the co-chairs group that we support peace and will do whatever we can diplomatically to prepare the road for peace."

"At the same time we are trying to show our support to the government by providing our military assistance and training for its officers, military exercises between our troops and the government so that government can be strong and deter future attacks to protect the people of this country," he added.

US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns pronouncements at the press briefing had a damning message for the LTTE, especially for its effort to seek international recognition.

Not only did he rule out any US dealings with the LTTE, he cut the LTTE to its size when he said' "there is no moral equivalency between the LTTE and the government. The government is democratic and responsible." "..the people of this country ought not to have to live a further 15 or 20 years with a reprehensible terrorist group keeping this country perched on the edge of war."

"The full responsibility really lies with the LTTE, that is the organisation that really has to choose peace."

As international concerns mount at the contempt which with the Tigers violate the truce agreement, Prabhakaran also found a miscalculation in his decision to authorise an undeclared war against the Security Forces. By that time, the Tiger Supremo found that the war was not fought the way it wanted.

A political will was evident in the country's political leadership to permit, at least, limited scale of counter insurgency operations for the first time since the signing of the truce agreement.

That was a political will absent in its predecessors due to fears, which are sometimes understandable, that small confrontations could snowball in to a major incident. But, looking back the developments in the past years, it is open to question whether such a restraint exercised by the security forces was an impetus to the ceasefire violations by the LTTE.

Military prepared

Recent changes in the military establishment after the appointment of Gen Sarath Fonseka as the army commander, which saw changes in the top positions in operational areas and subsequent cordon and search operations suggested that the military is prepared to take up the task if it is called in.

The LTTE's game plan was to force the security forces to vacate check points and corner them into the camps and there by take control of substantial areas of the North -East akin to its strategy in the mid 1980's when the Tigers succeeded confining security forces to Jaffna Fort.

The strategy backfired when the military leadership was given green light for limited counter insurgency operations, and instruction to fire in self defence. Though, the LTTE could go ahead with a string of claymore attacks, new security measures had considerably brought down the number of grenade attacks. No longer was it fun for local youth trained by the Tigers to lob a grenade and ride the motorbike.

That was a miscalculation on the part of the LTTE, when it decided to unleash newly trained local youth against the security forces.

International concerns and these ground realities forced the Tigers back to the negotiation table. And when the ceasefire agreement is taken up for discussions, the Tigers will insist on the disarmament of para military cadres and dismantling of High Security Zones.

As the Tigers agreed to halt violence, the Karuna group on Thursday ambushed an LTTE convoy in Verugal, LTTE controlled areas in Batticaloa, killing, according to the group's spokesman, 11 LTTE cadres.

The LTTE said one of its Majors and another LTTE cadre were killed in the ambush.

The LTTE complained that the Army and para military cadres jointly carried out the attack and SLA 23-1 Brigade fired mortars into the LTTe territory to help the attackers to return to the government controlled areas.

The Security Forces denied any involvement and Karuna group spokesman Thooyan said the attack was a response to Balasingham's degrading comments against renegade LTTE commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna.

If the much toiled for relative peace is to continue, it is important that the government should open a dialogue with the Karuna Faction, using local contacts, to request a halt in attacks against the LTTE, at least for the time being.

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