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LTTE violence: Show of force

by Lt.Col.Susantha Seneviratne, RWP, RSP, Psc, MSc (def)-retd.

Violence is an inherent feature of a guerilla force. It is used; not only as a part of the campaign but also as a medium of communication during truce - Experience in combat.


Black Sea Tigers march during a parade to mark the Tamil Tiger “Heroes Day” in eastern Mullaithivu in this November 27, 2002 file photo. Black Tigers are suicide bombers. (REUTERS)

The truce, at present has virtually become a 'unilaterally' agreed/signed ceasefire. Violence of one party is tolerance of the other - according to military parlance this is 'covert' offensive vis-…-vis 'overt' defensive.

Since the beginning of ceasefire, the military forces have been on defensive role in toto, in the north and east, in pursuant to the conditions stipulated in the agreement. Violence began to emerge, gradually when both sides started spying each other stealthily, exploiting advantages of truce/conditions of ceasefire. It became so worse, creating a 'cold war' scenario where 'killing fields', once again surfaced following collapse of peace talks.

The current escalation of violation by the LTTE was assessed in many ways; some politicians, analysts including media prophesied that 'open' confrontation/combat was imminent and was inevitable; they expressed fears that the LTTE would besiege the city of Jaffna for the final onslaught and also indicated that all the 'locations of strategic importance' (LSI) in the city of Colombo would be vulnerable to LTTE attacks.

While emphasizing on possible suicidal bomb strikes against VIP statesmen and other politicians; a grand scale 'psychological warfare' was in operation. The LTTE website seized this opportunity to paint a threatening picture of imminent emergence of 'open warfare'; various international media agencies via internet, also expressed concerns over this growing tension as a 'prelude' to outbreak of the 'fourth phase' of the armed struggle for 'Tamil Eelam'.

Certain local media, too played a 'key role', in support of this and the tension mounted so high that it become the 'cynosure' of every one at every nook and corner since the dawn of new year. The opposition too, wanted to 'make hey while the sun shine'; by sending messages of 'zero hour' of the LTTE military machine around the island; thus attributing the escalation of violence to the present standing of the government, including the JVP and JHU on 'unitary state' and the 'delay' in resumption of peace talks.

Besides, the intelligence units were busy in their usual activities, by 'making' and 'distributing' fear (this is the way it is talked in the Army; as this has been the practice used by them to 'save their skin') It seemed that all those, who assessed/asserted that fighting was imminent have, still not been able to understand the LTTE; their 'modus operandi'; the 'cause' of their fighting; what they have and have not achieved, and so on.

As a result, no one has read/identified the actual 'cause'/'hidden' agenda of this sudden change in attitude of the LTTE. It seems that those 'warmongers' had come to the said conclusion as they had been just looking at the past behaviourial pattern of the LTTE.

Election

The LTTE, similar to what they did at the last election, resorted to violence as a well calculated short-term tactic that was taken, in response to the 'indirect' impact upon them by the outcome of the last election.

Nevertheless, the UNP judging from the speech made by the LTTE theoretician, announced that the LTTE, had deliberately boycotted the election, with a view to defeating their candidate, considering the fact that he would trap/force the LTTE to accept the federal system of governance with the support of the security network of the international community.

Although the JVP and JHU during the campaign denounced that the UNP was having a tacit understanding/agreement with the LTTE, the action took by the LTTE at the election proved that there was nothing to that effect.

However, the UNP in any case cannot say that they would have fixed the LTTE; because the status of administrative and judiciary powers already, in possession of the LTTE is, somewhat tantamount to a separate state at present. For the UNP, it might look federal - but what guarantee can the UNP give to prevent the LTTE moving from 'federal' to 'separation'.

Have they, ever forgotten the fact that the LTTE had begun demanding for a separate state from the stand on unitary - and in that the LTTE, having survived the game of 'life and death' that lasted for over two decades or so, and its leader, whose life would be at a great risk, in case he wishes for anything less than a separate homeland, would never change their stance at any cost.

In this context, the UNP's 'over-dependence' on the role to be played by the international community was very high; but this seems to be an illusion because the manner, in which the so-called community responded to the recent LTTE violence, failed to silence the LTTE.

Security

The last presidential election held, virtually seemed to be a contention between the 'economy' and 'security' - As for country's defence, the UNP, particularly the leadership refrained from mentioning anything beyond federalism; and thus made emphasis on the improvement of economy through business community, foreign investments and outside donations; yet, it lacked strategy to stimulate a 'worthwhile' program.

Both party manifestos, however contained more of public affairs, such as lowering commodity prices, concessions, etc than evolving a strategy. The people had to make a choice; especially those of 'neutrals' - the winning factor of the present day politics.

What, actually concerned a majority of those, who voted for the UNP candidate was nothing but the economy - not federalism, which the UNP was harping on, as a solution for separatism. The voters of SLMC and TC, as usual may have been driven by the benefits that come from the alliance.

On the contrary, those, who voted for UPF candidate were more concerned about the 'unitary' status of the country than economy. Further, they witnessed how the LTTE exploited the situation, even under the ceasefire agreement, thus taking control of the north and east and violating the conditions therein; and thereby posing a great danger to national security in the connivance of the, then UNP regime.

The LTTE, however, were not concerned about the victory or defeat of any candidate as the one, who is elected would, in any case have to deal with them, in the end. Nevertheless, they anticipated that the UNP candidate would, however win by a majority; comprising those, who had been frustrated by this longstanding conflict and ever-increasing economic burdens.

It said that the outcome of the election would have been different had the people in the north been allowed to vote. Of course, there is, no doubt a majority would have voted for the UNP - not because they had realized that the UNP had a better political and economic plan to solve the separatist conflict and economic issues; they, somehow wanted an end to this ongoing conflict - because they are the 'most affected' population in Sri Lanka by both the conflict and the economy.

So they don't wish to go back to suffering, once again - the confidence they had placed on ceasefire and peace talks was so high that they would like to see it progress uninterruptedly; so having seen it progressing under the UNP regime for the first time unlike those previous talks, which collapsed in the middle, they would have voted for UNP candidate, for its continual.

Moreover, the UNP during its campaign expressed fears that fighting would resume for once following UPF candidate being elected - fearing that it would, once again push them into suffering, a majority in the north and east, would, by no means have voted for the UPF candidate. Nevertheless, what the majority of this population wants or is interested, is not 'federalism' - not 'united' or 'unitary' - nor even 'Eelam' either - what they, now want is to 'live in peace'.

Boycotting

The LTTE, however knew that people in the north would vote for one of two main candidates; they, also knew that their voting would be prejudicial to the administrative and judiciary systems they had already established, if the people were allowed to patronize/subscribe the electoral system of the country.

At the same time, voting would represent people's desire to, be a part of Sri Lanka under whichever the governing system, irrespective of the victory of any candidate. So, boycotting was the only option - to negate such a situation and to exhibit as hard evidence for a separate state.

Hence, the LTTE were not interested in making any of the candidate win or defeat at the election. And those, who voted for UPF candidate, comprised the votes of the alliance, neutrals (floating votes) and including a substantial amount of UNP votes as well.

This is why the UNP candidate had a decreased percentage of votes, in the district of Colombo, -the historical stronghold of UNP votes.

What signified from such upshot is that the people in the country decided that they should give more priority to the safety of land than individual economical hardships; If the UNP says that the LTTE wanted to defeat its candidate, then the LTTE would have asked the people to vote for UPF candidate so that his victory would have been highly assured as far as the LTTE are concerned.

What really made the LTTE shock was that they never expected that there would be a majority, who would withstand Eelam - although the country had gone through a prolonged conflict. This is the hidden reason as to why the LTTE, all of a sudden resorted to violence; to send the signal of terror to those, who had voted for unitary and against separatism; thus reminding of the consequences that of the past by using 'psychological warfare' as well.

The incidents where the military had overreacted to the situations causing danger to civilian lives both at sea and on land seem to have provided a good background for the LTTE to send this signal, which contained 'warnings' and 'revenge' across, to the masses, who opposed their will.

At the same time, the LTTE had been very shrewd throughout the history of peace record - they always praise the leader with whom they, currently have to deal with - Mr. Premadasa, Mrs CBK and Mr Wickremesinghe had, already been commended by the LTTE at previous talks; certain optimistic remarks came in the air regarding the present President too, recently.

Therefore, one must not get misled by these deceptive talks made by the LTTE hierarchy. Finally, it is important to note that the states, which have gained federal system of governance through peaceful political means, such as India's Tamil Nadu, Kerala and so on, are continuing under one country, without jeopardizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the land.

But, on the contrary, it is most unlikely that a land, which is struggling for such political entity through 'bloodshed', such as 'Kashmir' or even 'Eelam' for that matter, will have the same status.

Hence, the talks along cannot bring peace or a solution to the crisis, unless the LTTE leadership is changed by some means.

Talks must begin to accommodate LTTE demands where possible through rationale while a strategy must be formulated to preclude the land being separated.


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