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President calls the shots

By Kumar Rupesinghe

Very few expected Geneva to give the results that it did. It seems that the Rajapakse Presidency has flummoxed most by his manoeuvering of the peace process and his ability to gain consensus in the South on some of the most difficult issues which surrounded the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA).

I do not intend to summarize the achievements made in Geneva. It would seem that the commitment by the LTTE to refrain from violence was welcomed by all parties. It is indeed paradoxical that with the assumption of office of the new President the scale of violence in the Northeast increased exponentially. Over 258 people were killed during a brief interlude of three months. Over 81 soldiers were killed and large number of civilians was also killed. The total numbers of people killed by all sides since the CFA was signed were around 748 with the largest number being killed in the internecine war between the LTTE and the Karuna faction.

What is paradoxical was that the violence stopped immediately after there was an agreement by both parties that they should meet in Geneva. The lesson that has to be learnt very vividly is that both sides can stop the violence if they so wish to. Therefore the commitment of the LTTE to refrain from violence shows clearly that they are in a position to control the violence. With regard to state sponsored violence, whether it be the violence perpetrated by the armed groups working with the military or the violence committed by the STF i.e. with regard for example, the brutal killing of five boys in Trincomalee, it is clear that they can be controlled. It is also to the credit of President Rajapakse that he has ordered the arrest of the STF personal who were responsible for the killing of the five boys in Trincomalee and there would an inquiry into this. This is one of the rare occasions in Sri Lanka's civil war that a President has acted to arrest impunity.

Problem solving and positional bargaining

The background to the talks then was that there was an atmosphere of tranquility on the ground when the talks actually began. There were clearly significant differences between the 6 rounds of talks held by the UNF Government and the LTTE and the Geneva talks. The UNF - LTTE talks were conducted in an atmosphere of what is called in conflict resolution parlance "a problem solving approach" An atmosphere of cordiality and conviviality dominated the talks and both had decided to take up the difficult issues for a later date. The UNF negotiation process was also dominated by a hostile President who was waiting for an opportunity to destabilize the process.

The establishment of the CFA by the UNF-LTTE facilitated by Norway provided the basis for relative tranquility in the country and for the two years of talks to continue. The Rajapakse - LTTE talks however was conducted in what is often called "positional bargaining". According to reports of the meeting attrition and confrontation became the hallmark of the first day of the talks. The stiff body language and the lack of humor were obvious in the first morning sessions. Even the opening statement and who should make the opening statement was in dispute. In the first opening statement Erik Solheim laid out the parameters of the negotiations process when he clearly spelt out that the meeting was all about implementing the CFA. The morning and afternoon sessions was what we can call the ventilating of grievances.

The Government chief negotiator presented the numbers of CFA violations committed by the LTTE which was over 5464 and the LTTE chief negotiator then asked if all these violations were actually investigated. It turned out that only a few cases were actually investigated. What is interesting was President Rajapakse had with him in Temple Trees an assortment of people including the leaders of the JVP and representatives of the JHU who received a blow to blow account of the proceedings. It was clear to all that the President was calling the shots.

It was only on the second day that the winter chill of the conference hall was warmed and there was a visible shift in body language and attitude. Both sides had to go home with a win - win solution to their constituencies. As often happens in formal negotiations it is not in the formal sessions that breakthroughs are made. It is often in the corridors, in the private guest rooms of the negotiators that informal discussions take place.

The informal negotiations process has been often tried and been successful in numerous deep seated conflict such as in the Israel- Egyptian conflict facilitated by President Carter, the South African and the Northern Ireland conflict to name a few. It is clear those informal meetings between negotiators and facilitators have made the difference.

The press conference and the joint statement were delayed by almost two hours and it was during this time that particular words and sentences came under sharp discussion and compromise. This is clear in the text. For example the text relating to armed groups is a case in point where the government was reluctant to use the word paramilitaries and instead suggested that armed groups will not be allowed to operate in cleared areas. Other compromises in the wording related to the issue of child soldiers. The press conference showed a major change in body language. Both sides appeared relieved, happy at the outcome. JVP - JHU reaction.

The reception of the joint statement was studied with the large majority of people in the country hailing the statement as a major breakthrough.

The JVP in turn had to make a curious statement saying that the proceedings at the conference was to be welcomed where the Sri Lankan negotiators had been faithful to the agreement reached between the JVP and President Rajapakse but denounced the statement as going against the Mahinda Chintanaya. Obviously the JVP had to make a statement which enabled them to continue with their honeymoon with the President and at the same time keep its ever growing critical central committee and followers happy.

The JHU on the other openly denounced the final statement. What is however interesting is that the JHU has refrained from its usual gimmicks of taking to the streets, threatening fast unto death campaigns, burning the Norwegian flag or placing coffins in front of the embassy. Perhaps they read the signs correctly that the overwhelming majority of people support the joint statement. One small glitch in an otherwise successful process were the attempts by H.L. de Silva to go out of the agreed final statement and suggest that the CFA had been amended, perhaps to his extremist constituency.

This was perhaps the only instance where the team effort was broken. The guns are once again silent. When Sarath Fonseka was in the East recently, his orders were very clear. No dealing with armed groups. The order was heard and obeyed.

President Rajapakse has successfully maneuvered the situation. This is of course a result of the executive power of the Presidency.

But it is also his skills in building consensus and staying the course. He has used his skills effectively to gain all party consensus in the South, to field a team of negotiators representing the Sinhalese majority community including a few "hardliners" and have used the Geneva conference to put forward the concerns of the majority community. It is also to the credit of the LTTE team to have stated their case by providing evidence of the existence of armed groups in the East and their willingness to be flexible on the wording. All credit also goes to the Norwegian team which worked tirelessly to achieve a win - win outcome.

Geneva 2

What of Geneva two? This is the question which is in everybody's mind. Will the CFA continue to hold? Will the parties renege on the agreements reached, and what will be the outcome of Geneva two?

These are difficult to answer. As long as effective communications happens between the two parties, that there is a back channel between the parties and that Norwegians continue to work in the next two months to get an agreement on the agenda, and as long as the Co-Chairs support the process, and where there is large popular support for the process it is unlikely that the situation will deteriorate.

The next round of talks will focus on the High Security Zones, the movement of troops from schools, places of worship and other places where civilians are in large numbers and to explore means of strengthening the CFA. The discussions on the High Security Zones will be contentious where the government will refer to the Nambiar report where it suggests that any relaxation of the HSZ should be accompanied by international monitoring of long range weaponry in designated areas.

The LTTE on the other hand will suggest that the Nambiar report was too militaristic and ignores the plight of civilians living in the HSZ. It is a classic case of balancing state security and human Security. The subject of the HSZ was also a contentious issue during the UNF-LTTE talks and the committee appointed to look into this matter became dysfunctional.

However, creative thinking and good will from both sides may also result in a break through. Further, a careful analysis of the ground situation will enable the GoSL to find ways and means of alleviating the suffering of those who have been deprived of their land within the HSZ.

Another confidence building measure that could be initiated should be that the relief, reconstruction and development efforts are accelerated with the Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) where substantial resources are allocated to the Northeast, I am sure that in an atmosphere of tranquility without violence all this will be possible.

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