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Political antecedents and exceeding expectations

by Rajan Philips

Erik Solheim put it aptly: the talks went beyond expectations. The previously much maligned Norwegian peace facilitator would have left Geneva a justifiably gratified man. For what began as a confrontation between strident antagonists ended on a note of co-operative antagonism. That is the way it should be in negotiations between such entrenched disputants as the government and the LTTE.

The series of talks spearheaded by the Ranil Wickremasinghe government soon wore themselves out by the cynical and consumerist globe-trotting and the all-too-cosy ambience. G.L. Pieris and Anton Balasingham left their teams behind and became co-operative partners in denial of the deep divisions that they were supposed to bridge for the sake of everyone else. It was for this reason, primarily, that the Oslo declaration affirming a joint-commitment to explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka did not find much acclaim beyond the immediate participants. What should have been a momentous outcome came out as a political damp squib.

Political Antecedents

Mr. Wickremasinghe's singular achievement was the ceasefire agreement that ended an otherwise unstoppable war. But it also created the impression, not unjustifiably however, that the agreement was a sweetheart deal for carving up Sri Lanka for political power sharing between the UNP and the LTTE. While pussy-footing the LTTE around the world, Wickemasinghe in his own Machiavellian way set about creating an international safety net to contain the LTTE. He paid the price for this when the LTTE withdrew its anticipated support for him in the last presidential election.

Wickremasinghe's political failings, on the other hand, cost the peace process and frustrated his presidential ambitions. For one, he was unable to cohabit with President Kumaratunga until the Supreme Court (with its ruling on the length of her second term) turned her into a lame duck. For another, he just could not manifest, or even pretend, any semblance of nationalism in his politics and in his personality. He personified a fictional American viceroy, or an effeminate caricature of Sir John Kotelawala, neither of which carries much currency in contemporary politics. After a succession of electoral setbacks, Mr. Wickremasinghe may now resign himself to reflecting in front of his washroom mirror: "Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the unluckiest of them all?"

Exceeding Expectations

Some of us, who welcomed and even defended his ceasefire initiative for its objective benefits regardless of his subjective motives, also opined that Ranil Wickremasinghe was politically incapable of carrying the peace process beyond the ceasefire. Anyone could have predicted that President Kumaratunga's highhanded dismissal of the Wickremasinghe government and her attempts at constitutional machinations were not going to either help the peace process or extend her tenure. To the credit of both of them, however, it must be said that they kept the ceasefire agreement and the goal of devolution atop the political agenda. Paradoxically, the success of the ceasefire and the unlikelihood of war encouraged the hardliners among Sinhalese, the JVP and the JHU, to oppose the ceasefire agreement and the proposals for reforming the unitary state to accommodate the minorities.

Many of us were therefore disappointed when Mahinda Rajapakse, in positioning himself as the progressive presidential candidate, repudiated both the ceasefire agreement and the agenda of devolution in his pre-election agreements with the JVP and the JHU. We felt that he could have reached an agreement with the JVP without compromising on devolution and that he could have won the election without the two agreements. Others uncharitably called him a warmonger and a hardliner. It is fair to say in retrospect that Mahinda Rajapakse used the agreements with the JVP and the JHU to serve two essential electoral purposes within the Sinhala polity. First, he used them to show that the political formation represented by the SLFP is not the patrimony of the Bandaranaike siblings and that he could win an election for the SLFP without their support.

Second, he showed the UNP that even after thirty years of 'open economy', class-politics in Sri Lanka is not dead. In fact, it is very much alive. Political leaders can ignore only at their peril, the seething resentment of the have-less rural and urban under-classes among the Sinhalese who have hardly benefited from the spoils and profits of the open economy. It is this resentment and the anger over government corruption that eroded the widespread support that the Wickremasinghe peace initiative initially enjoyed, and facilitated the emergence of the JHU and the consolidation of the JVP's opposition to the ceasefire agreement and the devolution proposals.

Despite his agreements with the JVP and the JHU, President Rajapakse has shown the capacity to mend his ways when confronted by local and global realities. The Geneva talks are indicative of his evolving position on the peace process, and he is proving that he is capable of more flexibility than what others expected of him including the JVP and JHU leaders. He is also laying down his own markers, quite different from those of Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe, and what is of interest now is their implication for the future talks and the peace process itself.

First, there is more consultation than before within the Sinhala polity and greater involvement of parliament in the peace process. Second, the preparation for the talks has been more comprehensive and even adversarial. Third, the concerns of the Muslim and human rights issues among the Tamils have been given more prominence in the Geneva talks than at any time in the past. Finally, the talks showed that the government delegation is prepared to play hardball at the talks rather than indulging in vacuous pleasantries.

And so, as I noted at the outset, the Geneva talks started on a note of strident antagonism. With LTTE always used to playing hardball, at the table or in the battlefield, the talks became an even contest. Documented and undocumented accusations were hurled at each other, legal points were raised and refuted, acrimonious parsing over words ensued, and the plight of the children was discussed not only from the political but also from parental standpoint. In the end, the two sides became cooperative antagonists and evened out the gains and losses of the talks.

The government side could not take its hated word 'agreement' out of the final statement, and the LTTE could not insert into it its cherished word 'paramilitary'. The LTTE committed itself to ensuring that there will be no attacks against government security forces and police, while the government gave the commitment that it will not allow armed groups, other than the security forces, to carry arms or conduct armed operations. If indeed the government's case that the recent attacks against its security forces are the work of the LTTE is very plausible, it is also equally plausible that the so called armed, or 'paramilitary', groups have been attacking the LTTE with the help of the security forces.

The real question is not who is attacking whom, and whose actions are legal or defensible, but how and when will the government and the LTTE bring the recurring acts of violence and the violations of human rights and property rights (of the people in the High Security Zones) to an end? The people of Sri Lanka, especially the victims of war and the tsunami, deserve to be left in peace and given the support to restart their normal lives. Without violent distractions, the government, the LTTE and other political stakeholders can proceed to address outstanding political issues and establish a new constitutional foundation for lasting peace.

The February talks in Geneva were only a small step in this direction and all efforts should be to build on the common statement after the talks and move forward.

This is not the time for the two parties to waste their energies on unnecessary legal pettifogging and pointless gamesmanship, that they have been indulging in after leaving Geneva. There is no justification for either side to be arrogant or triumphalistic. The two parties would do well to bear in mind that they are not in a courtroom or before a tribunal, but only in front of each other. In the end they have to persuade each other to an agreeable middle ground if they are to save their armies from having to kill each other and other innocent people. Both sides would also do well to show some humility and even shame while showing off Lanka's bloody linen before the eyes of the world.

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