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The suicide bomb attack on the Army Commander Gen Sarath Fonseka was a decapitation strike by Velupillai Prabhakaran. We are indeed fortunate that it failed, but there may be more such strikes, aimed at the top political and military leadership of the country (including the surviving Tamil democrats).

President Mahinda Rajapaksa's response, political and military, demonstrated sound judgment in an extreme situation. No state or government worth its name could have done otherwise.

In launching a combined air and sea bombardment, the Sri Lankan government was defending not only its self respect, but indirectly, the interests of all states everywhere: if a terrorist group can assassinate or attempt to assassinate the country's army chief and get away with it without armed response, then all terrorists everywhere would get the wrong message and be emboldened to imitate such action.

However both policy makers and public must not suffer from any illusions. The military counteraction served an intangible and symbolic purpose, mainly to demonstrate that the Lankan state has not lost the will to resist. It would therefore act as a much needed morale booster for the military and the country as a whole.

Deterrence

It is important to grasp, firstly, that tactical air-strikes alone can only achieve so much and the damage to the LTTE would have been fairly limited, hardly constituting a knockout blow.

Secondly, the LTTE is not going to be deterred by this response on the part of the Sri Lankan state. The military under Lalith Athulathmudali, Ranjan Wijeratne and Anuruddha Ratwatte could not deter it, nor could the Indian Peace Keeping Force.

The combination of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the Karuna resistance may - Inshallah - be able to defeat the Tigers or deny them of victory , but no combination of purely internal forces as they exist today can deter Prabhakaran.

If anything can deter the LTTE-and that is in grave doubt as long as Prabhakaran is alive - it would be one of two things:

(i) A substantive show of force by one or more external powers, or

(ii) The qualitative build-up of the Sri Lankan armed forces and/or the Karuna resistance, by one or more foreign powers.

In short, while deterrence is the only pathway to restoring/preserving some semblance of peace, deterrence is not possible on the basis of the existing military balance between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan military plus Karuna.

The preservation of peace through the alteration of the military balance in favour of the democratic Sri Lankan state requires either:

(a) A quick change in perception on the part of the international community or

(b) Diplomatic hyperactivity on the part of the Sri Lankan Government to lever such a change.

The Sri Lankan government, while working for such a change, cannot count solely on it. No country can put its fate in the hands of others. Therefore it is more prudent for Colombo to assume that the Tigers will not be deterred.

Limited War

If the Tigers launch another strike, it may not be sufficient to respond as the state has done this time. The Tigers may not stop at one blast or with one blow; they may land a flurry of deadly hits or may have launched their final offensive.

Whatever the external constraints and counsel, the state cannot base itself on a Limited War strategy because while Sri Lanka fights a Limited War, unwisely assuming the Tigers share a similar logic and will do the same, Prabhakaran fights a Total or Absolute War.

War of National Defence

Whoever demurs and dissents and that includes friends and neighbours, the country will have to defend itself. If friends want to influence the course of action they must help actively. If they are unwilling to, Colombo will have to seek assistance from which ever quarters, defend the state as best as it can and let the chips fall where they may.

I refer to the existential decision of whether or not to fight back by waging a war of national defence. Though in character it will be a defensive war, one that has been imposed by Tiger aggression, it does not mean that either Sri Lanka's strategy or tactics need be defensive.

Indeed they must not be. When the Egyptians obtained the advantage of surprise for the first time, in October 1973, crossed the Suez Canal and attacked the Israelis, the latter prevailed by doing the unexpected and counterattacking at the first best possible opportunity. It was General Ariel Sharon who spotted the gap between the Egyptian armies and broke through, encircling the Egyptians.

The Global Arena

It will be a patriotic war of national survival, but it will be fought out in the global arena. A complicated balance of power act will be necessary which enables the state to secure the weapons, ammunition and assistance it needs from any source that would give or sell them, while keeping on side, or neutral, those other powers who may not like Colombo seeking the help that they themselves are unwilling to give it.

Sri Lanka cannot be the victim of any friend's policy of being a dog in the manger. If domestic electoral complications prevents anyone from helping, the government, whose overriding duty and responsibility is to defend and protect the country will have no option but to secure such support as it can, from wherever it can.

Sri Lanka has to immediately conduct a three pronged offensive in the world arena:

1. At the level of states, building up a broad united front or coalition of support, the basis of which will be the struggle against terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. This coalition will range from the USA through Israel, to India, Russia, Pakistan and China. The late Lakshman Kadirgamar's speech in Warsaw in the year 2000 contains the conceptual policy platform for this endeavour.

2. At the level of global civil society, making Sri Lanka's case in the world media.

3. At the level of the Diaspora, restructuring and mobilising the expatriate Sri Lankan community, both Sinhala and anti-Tiger Tamil, into an effective lobby.

Errors to avoid

This international outreach will be difficult and perhaps even impossible, (and it is Sri Lanka rather than the Tigers who will be isolated), if it makes any one of five mistakes:

(a) A deliberate targeting of unarmed Tamil civilians. It is true that many Sinhalese died in the crackdown on the JVP in '87-90', but no one overseas cares about dead Sinhalese, while they do about dead or displaced Tamils.

(b) Colombo's profile and efforts are 'Sinhala only': this is why Cabinet Minister Douglas Devananda should be a member of any delegation proceeding overseas, and should be a participant at any press conference.

(c)The religious dimension is brought into the picture: if the JHU succeeds in bringing the religious Bill before the House and it gets voted through, the cost would be the forfeiture of any support from the USA and the incurring of Washington's active displeasure. The fact is that the democratic Sri Lankan state has friends worldwide, the Buddhist Sinhalese, lacking co-ethnics, have none; and none of the Sri Lankan state's friends share that religion.

(d) There is no reform component to address Tamil grievances: Justice CG Weeramantry has in an essay written last year, identified 15 functions or aspects that are necessary for sovereignty. These must be retained with the Centre, and all the rest, can and indeed must be devolved so as to ensure substantive regional or provincial autonomy for the Tamils.

(e)There is too much Red in the mix: it is a plus factor to broaden the Government's base and tap youthful dynamism by inducting the JVP into the administration, but international support and investor confidence (foreign and local), may diminish, if the Government has JVPers in strategic Cabinet positions. The world media will also focus, once again on such a coalition Government's inability to grant Tamil autonomy, given the JVP's continued aversion to devolution.

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