The Rajpal Abeynayake Column:

How the donors play it - and how we play it

There is no doubt that the European Union ban on the LTTE spells out a position that has been well considered by the EU member states. The donor co chairs basically extrapolate on the EUs documents and then goes onto say - 'those who do not abide by Oslo, they are apostates to the cause.' Which cause is this? Its the cause of establishing a peace without war, by the recipe that has been prepared by the Western donors for Sri Lanka.

There could be various assessments of this recipe. Some would say that it is one that imposes a convenient solution.

But, it appears that there is nothing that is unpredictable at least in the Co chairs statement. There is the castigation of the LTTE, and it is in the least surprising.

It is also no exoneration of the Sri Lankan government.

The question is, how much are the donor nations willing to go - what distance - in giving the Sri Lankan government the right to defend itself against Tiger provocations? .

('Tiger provocation' was the word repeatedly used by the US state department official Richard Boucher at his press conference in Colombo.) If the Tiger provokes, is it not the prerogative of the Sri Lankan government to retaliate? When asked this question by the writer, Richard Boucher played it safe and hedged, and we say it would have been suicidal for him not to do so, But what is the unstated position of the co chairs? Can the Sri Lankan government defend itself, without appearing to maintain the Karuna group as an aggressor.

It seems it can, as long as the Karuna group's covert activities are minimal. The donors position is that if they (the donors) wanted in this process, the parties have to decide that they are making peace. If they decide however that they are to resolve their differences by fighting, the donors want emphatically to opt out of the process.

Is the equation as simple as that? It is and it isn't. It is not, probably to the extent that, within these parameters the Sri Lankan government could seek maximum leeway in terms of defending its sovereign rights as long as the Tiger keeps provoking the state's forces.

In other words in this low intensity war of attrition, the Sri Lankan state has certain prerogatives which are unstated, as long as the LTTE is the aggressor and is the party that provokes. But, the Sri Lankan governments activities in defense are supposed to be on to the realm of conventional defense.

Overt operations are frowned upon. But, can a covert armed operation be met by simple tactics of conventional war? Its not possible by a long shot. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government is either being given no choice at all in the disguise of a choice, or it is being consciously left to its own devices.

Unless, that is, the donor governments are willing to go much beyond the expressly stated, in terms of what is allowed for a sovereign state in terms of meeting onslaughts on it on its various flanks.