Pax Indiana's opacity
by Inderjit Badhwar

President Mahinda Rajapaksa with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh
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A flawed understanding of President Mahinda Rajapakse's politics
keeps India away from playing a crucial role in Sri Lanka. Needed, a
policy corrective
Two developments have brought Sri Lanka back on the Indian regional
radar within the last fortnight: the retaliatory air strikes following
the acceleration of terrorist activities by the LTTE, and the
recently-concluded trip of President Mahinda Rajapakse to Pakistan.
The Pakistan visit so miffed South Block mandarins that they gave a
simultaneous red-carpet welcome to his defeated opponent Ranil
Wickremesinghe whose photographs with the Indian Prime Minister were
flashed all over the press. The South Block story line was that while
Rajapakse was rubbing shoulders with General Pervez Musharraf, Ranil was
on a goodwill mission to India to discuss the finer points of a
"federalist" solution to the strife in Sri Lanka that has over time cost
some 60,000 lives.
Rajapakse has been portrayed as a domestic hawk and a geopolitical
doubledater reaching out to China and Pakistan as a counterpoise to
Indian hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Actually the opposite is true.
Almost immediately after he was elected to the highest office in Sri
Lanka, Rajapakse has taken several key decisions designed to reverse
concessions made by the Chandrika Kumaratunga government to other
foreign powers that may have been detrimental to Indian interests.
Consider the following facts that have never before been made public:
The Norwegian government that has been brokering the fragile peace
process in Sri Lanka following the 2002 CeaseFire Agreement (CFA) with
the LTTE, is headed for a showdown with Rajapakse over Sri Lanka's
insistence on inviting India - without competitive bids - to carry out
oil exploration in one of the most productive offshore seismic blocks.
Why Norway? The contract for Sri Lanka's entire offshore exploration
was given to a Norwegian company by Ranil Wickremesinghe when he was
Prime Minister. It was signed on February 13, 2002 between TGS-NOPEC
Geophysical Company and Daham Wimalasena on behalf of the Ceylon
Petroleum Corporation. The relevant minister at the time was Karu
Jayasuriya who is now Deputy Leader of the Opposition United National
Party (UNP).
Objections
The Norwegian government has lodged strong objections to Rajapakse's
initiative to give oil exploration rights to India. The Norwegians claim
that under the contract, they alone have the right to decide which
countries will do the actual exploration in the different seismic
blocks. From the Indian point of view, this is an obnoxious agreement
that allows Norway to become a gateway through which other countries are
brought in as a counterweight to India's interests in the Indian Ocean.
But for the Sri Lankan President to take on Norway is not as simple
as it sounds. The Norwegians, as peacekeepers, play a significant role
in influencing world opinion, especially the European Union where the
LTTE has fund-raising offices, and the IMF donor countries, about the
nature of the conflict and attitudes toward the LTTE. But Rajapakse is a
stubborn man who, according to sources close to him "is not about to
back down on this issue."
When Rajapakse took charge as the fifth Executive President of Sri
Lanka, he found the Indian government complaining bitterly about two
other agreements that India believed to be detrimental to its security
interests.
One was an agreement to contract China to provide 3-Dimensional radar
coverage for the capital city of Colombo. India saw this as a security
risk. One of Rajapakse's first acts was to cancel the Chinese agreement
and invite India to provide the radar cover. India does not have access
to 3-D radar technology, so Rajapakse settled for the purchase of a less
sophisticated 2-D radar cover from India.
The other Indian complaint was about a contract with a Danish company
for dredging the strategically important port of Kankasanthurai, not far
from Jaffna, and developing the port's infrastructure. Despite the legal
implications that may follow, Rajapakse has cancelled the agreement with
the Danish company and invited the Indian government to undertake the
task of dredging and developing the KKS port only a few miles away from
India's eastern coast.
Both these agreements, too, had been signed by the Chandrika
Kumaratunga government. Yet, when Sri Lanka went to the polls, the
Ministry of External Affairs appeared to project Rajapakse as
pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistan, and a man who would break the CFA and
plunge his country into war. This is partly because his ally - the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - is reputed to be pro-China and against
the Ceasefire, and partly because of a lack of homework on Rajapakse's
background.
Pro- Indian
A perusal of his speeches over the last decade when he held positions
as an MP, Fisheries Minister, Leader of the Opposition, shows that he
has indeed, been hawkishly pro-Indian even to the point of publicly
hailing India's nuclear weapons programme as a stabilising force in
Asia.
He said in a recent speech: "As the country with which our cultural
and religious links are the closest and our emotional bonds are the
strongest we have looked to India for strength and support throughout
our history. We do so today as we confront one of the world's most
sinister terrorist organisations whose activities threaten the stability
of both our countries."
In domestic affairs, he has shown remarkable restraint against the
LTTE. He first snubbed those who thought he would unilaterally abrogate
the Ceasefire. Despite an electoral understanding between him and the
JVP that on coming to power, the government would demand change in the
terms of the reference of the CFA, Rajapakse moderated the stance of the
JVP (that has 13 per cent of the vote) and invited the LTTE for
continuing talks.
Despite the LTTE stepping up violence in the North and the East -
assassinations, bombings, attacks on Sri Lankan naval vessels - Sri
Lankan armed forces were told to show total restraint. And in order not
to jeopardise the second round of the Geneva talks from which the LTTE
has now backed off - Rajapakse even offered safe passage to LTTE leaders
to travel to the east to confer with their counterparts.
Peace process
The suicide bombings, the counter-terror air attacks and their
destabilising consequences are another wake-up call for India.
Significantly, Rajapakse's first foreign visit after he became President
was to India. But because of official prejudice against him, he was
accorded a lukewarm reception.
On his agenda was a request for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to play
a more active and pro-active part in promoting the pease process in Sri
Lanka. Among the security related requests he made were spare parts for
his country's Air Force, and India stepping up naval patrols in the
Trincomalee region. The Indian response was lukewarm, perhaps because of
the sensitivity of the Tamil Nadu elections and South Block's jaundiced
view of Rajapakse.
Pushed to the wall, Sri Lankans sometimes turn to Pakistan as a
temporary friend of last resort. In 2000, when the LTTE had laid siege
to Jaffna, Sri Lanka appealed desperately for help to India but India
did not respond. Ultimately, Pakistan shipped multi-barrelled rocket
launchers to Sri Lanka that proved to be the key weapon that broke the
siege.
Small nations on the borders of large countries can become more than
just pinpricks. Look at Cuba and the US. Today, Sri Lanka supports the
view that India, now recognised by the US as the dominant power in the
region, should enforce the Indian Ocean as a zone of Par Indiana. Any
masterly inactivity by India in the Sri Lankan crisis can only hasten
the process that could turn the island into a battleground of big power
rivalries.
The writer is a senior Delhi-based journalist.
Tehelka The People's Paper.
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