Fighting insurgency vs winning the public

War and Peace - The Defence Diary by Ranga Jayasuriya

It was only last week we highlighted in this column that the LTTE's announcement to abide by the truce agreement, in response to five questions submitted by the Norwegians, should not be a reason to believe that the Tigers would abandon violence.

That was indeed the understanding in the security establishment and also of the public at large. On Monday, they were proved right when a Tiger suicide bomber blew himself killing the third most senior serving officer in the army and three others.

The fragile ceasefire saw further strains on Wednesday when a flotilla of sea Tiger boats attempted to attack the Navy base, Wijaya in Kalpitiya, which caused a fierce sea, clash off Kalpitiya. One Navy Inshore Patrol Craft, better known as Water Jet, was damaged in the sea clash Five sailors aboard it perished, three others injured.

The clash erupted when two IPCs on a routine patrol intercepted a group of LTTE boats in the seas off Kalpitiya, about 10 miles from the Battalangunduwa fishing island. The IPC was damaged when it was hit by an Rocket Propel Grenade (RPG) which set it ablaze. Reinforcements were called in. Two sea Tiger boats were destroyed in the Navy fire and an estimated 10-12 LTTE cadres were killed, according to the Navy. The LTTE, however, said one sea Tiger was killed and two others were injured. The sea Tiger boats embarked on their mission from Kudiramalai Point, near Wilpattu jungle. LTTE movements in this area which according to the ceasefire agreement come under the security forces control has been reported frequently in the past few months.

Fatal trap

Two months ago, we reported about a fatal trap laid by the sea Tigers for two water jets patrolling the area (Defence Diary, May 7, 2006). In this instance, sea Tiger boats fled ashore in Kudiramalai Point after one boat suspected to be a suicide boat was destroyed by the Navy.

From the shallow sea, Tigers lured the Naval craft closer, having brought a truck fixed with a 12.7mm Multi Purpose Machine Gun to the Kudiramalai Point. The Navy didn't walk into the trap. The Airforce later engaged with the truck, but could not hit the target, according to the sailors in the two Navy IPCs. The increase in sea Tiger movements in the North Western waters, especially off Kalpitiya has been a cause for concern. The Navy has beefed up sea patrolling in the North- Western seas.

On Friday, LTTE gunmen shot dead a Navy intelligence officer in Mannar and in the subsequent retaliation, one gunman was killed.

This would have been a different week had the LTTE honoured the very words it gave the Norwegians two weeks ago. But, the LTTE's affirmative answers: there were three of them to the five questions by Oslo, indeed stem from the ground realities that the LTTE could no longer afford a full scale war.

Current strength

The LTTE's current cadre strength is estimated at 7,000 maximum, which includes 2,000 cadres, engaged in administrative work. The maximum number of fighting cadres is no more than 4,500. The split by the former Batticaloa and Amparai Tiger commander, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna cost the LTTE its eastern cadre base. Karuna disarmed strong 4,000 men LTTE eastern military machinery. Added with this the continuing presence of Karuna loyalists in the East is denying the mainstream Tigers, its most fertile recruiting ground. There is a drastic decline in the new recruits to the LTTE in the East.

If the LTTE fights a full-scale war, it would have serious troubles in perpetuating with its already diminishing power in the East. Only in a declared war, that the full potential of Karuna could be used. But, if the Tigers decide to fight in the Northern front, it would have to call whatever cadres in Trincomalee to the North. That means loosing whatever grip it has in the East.

Its real test, however, lies in the battlefront. Any large scale military offensive, either by the LTTE or the Security Forces is bound to be prolonged and would create heavy casualties. If two-thousand cadres are killed and maimed within an year, which is the average LTTE casualties in the post-Riviresa era, this amounts to almost half of the LTTE fighting force. The induction of some ruthlessly effective weapon systems, some of which were procured after the Elephant Pass debacle and not fully utilised, would create heavy casualties. The LTTE would find new replacements to offset its losses impossible.

These ground realities on the battle front, plus shrinking financial contributions by the Tamil Diaspora in the West, following recent prescription in the 25 nation EU bloc and Canada, are reasons to keep Prabhakaran away from a full scale war - Canada has the largest number of Tamils estimated at 250,000 outside South Asia.

This means the LTTE would continue with a low scale war as now being waged in the North East and resort to attacks on key economic and perhaps civilian targets as well as senior military and political figures. This is the key to the Tigers' trademark practice in intimidating the Sri Lankan state into submission. A fear psychosis in public and economic fall out of fear and uncertainty caused by Tiger attacks within the Colombo city limits, the Tigers believe would force the government to cow in.

It is in this context that the assassination of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major Gen. Parami Kulatunga, posthumously promoted Lt. General didn't come unexpected.

A suicide bomber riding a motorcycle laden with explosives rammed it on Gen. Kulatunga's entourage, its impact set the car ablaze killing the General, his driver and two security officers. There had been intelligence warnings to the effect that the Tigers were targeting senior military officials. They had been advised to regularly change their travel schedules, vehicles and limit their movements as much as possible.

In the pro- Tiger press, there was an attempt to rationalise the assassination of Gen. Kulatunga. One such report said the assassination took place as the army Deep Penetration Units target senior Tiger commanders, in a veiled suggestion that this was a tit for tat by the Tigers. But, for sure, the assassination of the General required months of monitoring of his movements. If that is the case, this is more than a tit for tat for killing of some top Tiger cadre in the jungles the Wanni. The assassination is part of Tiger strategy for the gradual strangulation of the Security Forces, taking its best officers. This was a strategy, which was in place throughout the two decades of Eelam war and also during the truce agreement, but in a more restrained fashion.

The ceasefire, albeit its social and economic achievements and lives saved during the past four years- opened Colombo and its suburbs for the LTTE cadres. In a scale down vigilante by the public as well as security forces, the LTTE intelligence wing has set up links with Sinhalese and bought some underworld elements, which now have enabled the smooth implementation of its operations. For instance, the CID found two accomplices of the assassination of former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar who posed as insurance agents of a leading insurance company.Indeed the two suspects had been issued with company identity cards by the insurance company.

Soon after Gen. Kulathunga's assassination, an anonymous caller tipped off the Kotahena police of a person who is believed to have been entrusted to arrange accommodation for the suicide cadres and under cover LTTE agents in Colombo.

The police arrested the suspect at St. Benedict's Lane, Kotahena, but his involvement in the killing of Gen Kulatunga is not immediately clear. The suspect was produced before the Gangodawila Magistrate and remanded.

LTTE strategy

The LTTE strategy to approach Sinhalese and underworld elements has been highlighted in recent events.

Nineteen of the 22 suspects of the abortive sea Tiger attempt allegedly on a vessel transporting MI 17 helicopters, scheduled to reach Colombo harbour that day have been arrested of them seven are Sinhalese, including a prominent businessman identified in his nome de guere, Koti Christi.

Koti Christi has for a long time enjoyed ties with the LTTE, which has financed him to buy two deep-sea trawlers. It is suspected that the sea Tigers embarked on their mission from one of these trawlers anchored in the deep sea. About three months ago, a Navy Dovra Fast Attack Craft (FAC) was destroyed in the North Western waters when it approached a suspicious trawler. The trawler had a Sinhala name painted on it. The sea Tiger aboard blew it up as the Navy FAC approached the suspected trawler for inspection. This growing trend of alliance between the Tigers and certain sections of the Sinhalese has been a cause for concern. Though security arrangements are in place, most of them turn to be void unless civil conscious citizens keep vigilance and alert the law enforcement authorities of any suspicious elements. It is important for the local community groups to keep an eye on their surroundings. The arrest of four suicide cadres in Pamunugama was largely due to the vigilance of the local fishermen.

But, the panic on the first day of the new term in schools islandwide, caused by rumour-mongers, is representative of the other sorry part of our society. No intelligence warning was received about an LTTE attack on the schools. However, rumours spread after the Jayawardenepura hospital received an anonymous call, similar to the one received by the Colombo General Hospital before the suicide blast targeting Gen. Kulatunga which warned the hospital to be prepared for an eventuality.

However, on Wednesday, more than the LTTE, rumour mongers succeeded in disrupting the ordinary life and throwing cities into panic.

Soon after the assassination of Gen Kulatunga, security forces beefed up security in the city. Heavily armed soldiers set up posts. Random checking of public transport, buses and trains were introduced. Security had been strengthened at economic nerve centres and other institutions believed to be prime targets.

These security arrangements bound to create inconvenience to the public, could minimise the threat of a terror attack in the city.

However, such security measures should not discriminate anyone on ethnic grounds. Security forces personnel and policemen should be given clear instructions to be even minded in their dealings with the public, especially with those from the minority communities, as past conduct of certain officials proved to be discriminatory.

Needless to say such conduct is counter productive in terms of counter insurgency and would only alienate the minority communities from the Sri Lankan state.