Tigers open new front in the North:

Tiger artillery hits Palaly military airport

War and Peace - The Defence Diary by Ranga JAyasuriya

On Thursday, security forces received an intelligence warning to the effect that the Tigers were moving closer to the Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil Forward Defence Lines (FDL).

Nagar Kovil had, indeed, been a flash point in the recent past where the parties exchanged artillery fire almost daily only to see a lull after fighting shifted to the Eastern theatre.

However, intelligence warnings hinted a greater threat than usual skirmishes. It suggested that the Tigers could open another front in the North. It would be a diversionary attack after their rout in Mutur. Troops were kept on high alert.

Warnings came true on Friday evening. At 5.45 pm Tigers directed heavy artillery and mortar fire at the security forces Forward Defence Lines in Muhamalai, Nagar Kovil and Thanankilappu while wave after wave of Tiger cadres tried to overrun the FDL positions.

While, this was taking place on the ground, the Tigers attempted a seaborne landing in Kilali. A movement of sea tiger boats was seen off Pooneryn, but were confronted by a Dvora Fast Attack Craft. In the subsequent confrontation, four sea Tiger boats were destroyed.

In the night, troops vacated the FDL in Kilali, which the military officials described as a tactical withdrawal only to retake them on the following day morning.

The FDL between Eluthumattuwal to Muhamaalai had been destroyed in the extensive shelling.

On the same night, the Tigers also attempted a seaborne landing in Kayts and were confronted by the Navy. Four Sea Tiger boats were destroyed off Kayts and three Naval ratings were killed in the confrontation. According to Naval sources at least 25 Tiger cadres were killed in the confrontation. On the same night, Tigers fired heavy artillery and mortar at Kayts.

Meanwhile, for the first time since the LTTE's Unceasing Waves III, which overran the Elephant Pass military garrison, the Palaly military airport came under Tiger artillery fire.

Ten rounds of 122 mm long range artillery hit the Palaly military airport. Tigers artillery guns had been positioned in the Pooneryn point, from where they could target the Palaly airport disrupting air traffic. Air movements, however, continued unabated yesterday and Major General Sanath Karunaratne, General Officer Command, 55 Division flew to Jaffna last morning.

The artillery barrage on the airport forced MI 24 attack helicopters based there to move to Karainagar.

During the confrontations of Friday night and the following morning, eight security force personnel were killed and over 70 injured.

Though the Tiger offensive was blended with rhetorical moves of the sort of artillery attacks on the Palaly military airport- which could drive a point to the security forces that this vital installation is still within the LTTE artillery range- in the final analysis the LTTE offensive proved to be too ambiguous and costly.

According to reports from the troops in the battlefront, over 50 bodies of the LTTE cadres were seen in front of the Muhamalai FDL. Troops said around 200 LTTE cadres could have been killed in the fighting. This included fifty cadres targeted by Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers fire (MBRL) while they were about to be sent as reinforcements.

Was Friday's attack a diversionary tactic by the Tigers whose Eastern sector is now paralysed following the rout of Mutur and Friday's air strikes on Tharavikulam and D-9 bases of the LTTE.

The latter attack was carried out by the Israeli built Kafir fighter jets, which carried out five sorties on the two camps following a tip off by the intelligence of the presence of a large number of cadres in the camp.

This could also be a tit for tat for the air strikes on the two LTTE bases. Soon after the ariel bombing, LTTE peace secretariat chief S. Pulithevan complained of heavy casualties to the LTTE, but declined to elaborate. He described it as an declaration of war by the Security Forces. The air force target in Tharavikulam was an LTTE training base. Prior to the air strikes, an intelligence operative alerted the army that regional LTTE leaders were present in the camp. There were reports of a large presence of LTTE cadres in the camp, which suggested that the LTTE was building up troops for an imminent attack. Whether it was an attack on security forces in Batticaloa, or whether Tiger cadres were to be sent as reinforcement in Mavilaru was not immediately clear. Air strikes were carried out as a preemptive action to deter any further attacks.

LTTE casualties were not immediately clear. However, at least 120 LTTE cadres had been killed in the air strikes, according to renegade fighters of former Eastern Leader, Karuna. These figures could not be independently verified.

Despite recent setbacks, the Tigers do not want to be seen as weak. That is the only rationale for their bid to hold Mavilaru and to overrun Muttur jetty and Muhamalai FDL despite heavy casualties.

As for Mavilaru, the simple tactic of the LTTE was to hold the anicut as long as possible and inflict the maximum possible damage to the security forces. More the number of bodies sent to the South greater the fear psychosis of the people.

The LTTE had initial success when ten soldiers, more than half of them commandoes were killed in the attempt to capture Mavilaru. Tiger cadres fired taking cover from heavily fortified concrete structures in the dam making the forward march of the troops a deadly endeavour. Snipers were positioned in the dam to target the troops.

This initial setback resulted in the security forces to re-plan the operation. While troops were replanning and consolidating the area, the Tigers launched a series of diversionary attacks, to capture the Mutur town. This was the turning point of the whole episode. The LTTE attempt to overrun several security forces camps in Kattaparichchan, Pahala Thoppur, Mahindapura and Mutur was a disaster. The last battle in Mutur amounted to a self inflicted annihilation. According to independently verified information and intercepted LTTE transmissions, at least 330 Tiger cadres were killed in the four days of fighting in the East last week.

The LTTE later said that it would open the sluice gates of the anicut following the meeting between LTTE political commissar S. P. Thamilselvan and visiting Norwegian peace envoy Jon Hanssen Bauer this Monday.

The government rejected the conditions put forward by the LTTE for the opening of the sluice gates and Bauer and Elilan who visited the site without prior notice to the security forces had to hastily withdraw when a few round of mortar shells fell in the vicinity.

Commandoes who advanced towards the anicut restored the water supply on Tuesday. However, it was on Thursday that the troops consolidated their presence in the Mavilaru amidst heavy artillery and mortar fire by the LTTE. LTTE fired 120 mm heavy mortars and 122 artillery from Ichchalampattu, Sampoor and Muttur East towards the advancing troops in the early hours of Thursday.

Six soldiers were killed and 40 injured. This was a heavy casualty figure reported since the lull of fighting after the rout of the LTTE in its abortive bid to capture the Mutur town.