Tigers planning major attack during monsoon season

* Air strikes on K point restore air traffic;  * Soosai commanding Tigers
 

War and Peace - The Defence Diary by Ranga JAyasuriya

The lull in the battlefront this week should not be misunderstood as the LTTE giving up its offensive to lay siege to Jaffna.

The LTTE is only playing for time and patching up its wounds.

The most likely scenario is that the Tiger leadership is replanning the offensive and will wait for the North-East monsoon when the geography of the area would limit operational capability of heavy armour and air and sea operations.

The first week of the battle, which broke out with the attacks on the FDL positions in Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil on the evening of August 11 turned out to be a self-made disaster for the LTTE.

Based on ground intelligence and intercepted LTTE transmissions, the LTTE death toll in the North alone is no less than 600 cadres. Generally the number of injured tends to be much higher than those killed in action.

Security Forces during the last week buried over one hundred bodies of LTTE cadres left behind by the retreating Tigers. Security forces suffered heavy casualties. Though much less than those of the LTTE, security forces casualties in the first week of fighting stood at 131 soldiers and officers killed in action and over 170 Wounded in Action. As for the number of wounded, when added with minor injuries, which are usually not counted in public announcements, the number is much higher than the declared figures.

Fierce resistance

The fierce resistance offered by the security forces against the LTTE's offensive in its first week, coupled by superior fire power and air strikes was devastating to the LTTE. It severely drained the LTTE's fighting strength.

Even under the most generous estimates to the LTTE, at least 1,500 LTTE cadres had been taken out from the battlefront in KIA and WIA. When added with the casualty figures in the East in the first week of this month, it could reach 2,000. It is now confirmed, based on ground intelligence as well as intercepted LTTE transmissions, that at least 300 LTTE cadres were killed in the East in their failed bid to overrun the Mutur jetty and by air strikes including the air attacks on the LTTE camp in Tharavikulam.

If we are to go by conventional estimates of the LTTE's fighting cadres which is estimated at 6,000-7,000, casualties suffered during this month amounts to a significant portion. Hence the lull in fighting. But, this can be a calm before the storm. There is a greater possibility of the Tigers planning a major offensive during the North East monsoon in October- November.

North East monsoon

Most major attacks of the LTTE were conducted during the rainy season. The North East monsoon could limit operational capabilities of the heavy vehicles, tanks and artillery as well as air and naval traffic.

Heavy vehicles could get stuck in Jaffna's rain drenched soil, which could limit or delay the operational capabilities of the superior armed power of the security forces.

This has been a known tactic employed by the Tigers in the past and there are no reasons to suggest that they won't follow the pattern this year unless something dramatic happens on the peace front.

But, going by the past two weeks of fighting, the LTTE offensive had been a self inflicted disaster to the Tigers.

LTTE leadership miscalculations

It was never a defensive strike as portrayed by the Tiger propaganda. It was a painstakingly designed battle plan, which however turned to be a disaster due to several miscalculations on the part of the LTTE leadership as well as timely intelligence coupled with newly acquired superior fire power of the security forces. The bravery of the soldiers and leadership of the field commanders, should be commended.

The battle strategy of the LTTE was to fight a frontal battle with the security forces in Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil FDL, backed by a sea borne assault on the FDL positions in Kilali and Kayts.

If the LTTE succeeded in over-running the FDL positions in Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil and Kilali, as it advances, it could have brought its artillery guns forward, taking the Karainagar Navy base within its artillery range.

At the same time, it could have disrupted air traffic as well as sea transport by directing artillery fire at the Palali Military Airport and KKS harbour. That would cut down supplies to the troops and if the LTTE succeeded in advancing, it would force the troops back to the Palali Security Forces Headquarters.

But the LTTE decision to fight a frontal battle turned to be an overestimation of its capabilities. When planning the offensive, the LTTE depended on the use of heavy fire power, while undervaluing the counter fire power of the security forces.

As a prelude to the offensive the LTTE directed a heavy volume of indirect fire from its artillery guns positioned in Palali and Kalmunai Point (K Point).

The use of heavy fire power was to substitute the LTTE's smaller man power compared to the security forces. That was the very strategy employed by the Tigers in the offensive, Unceasing Waves 111 which overran the Elephant Pass military garrison.

The miscalculation on the part of the LTTE was that it underestimated the fire power of the security forces, which enhanced drastically, taking a clue from what went wrong in the EPS.

After troops withdrew from the EPS garrison, the then Army Commander Lieutenant Gen Srilal Weerasuriya complained at a press briefing that the Tigers were having superior fire power. That was the prelude to the induction of ruthlessly effective truck mounted Multi- Barrel Rocket Launchers, which can fire 40 rockets in 20 seconds, each weighing 65 kg and carry High Explosives, incendiary or if necessary chemical agents in its warhead.

The parity of fire power changed drastically since the induction of the Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers.

Last week, the superior fire power permitted a greater counter battery fire against LTTE artillery positions.

The LTTE is known to have fired artillery guns, covered by well fortified concrete structures, where only the barrel of the gun is visible. This is a tactic used to mend the guns off airstrikes as well as counter battery fire by the security force's artillery and MBRL.

But the prolonged and overwhelming use of counter battery fire could have an impact on limiting enemy artillery attacks.

The other fatal miscalculation was it underestimated the commitment of the soldiers to hold on to their positions. It also believed many soldiers had been shifted to the East to fight in Mavilaru, even though, it was only 800 security personnel who were sent to the East. It also underestimated the rapid mobility of commandoes.

Lull in fighting

LTTE, given its past track record is unlikely to give up its offensive at the cost of its overblown reputation. Fighting has severely drained LTTE manpower, which according to conventional estimates could be 6,000, of which only 2000 could be viewed as seasoned fighters.

One intercepted LTTE transmission revealed that 490 LTTE cadres including three leaders have been killed in fighting in the FDL. It is now confirmed that at least 300 LTTE cadres had been killed in the Eastern theatre. This includes LTTE fatalities in the simultaneous attacks on security forces camps in Mahindapura, Kattaparichchan, Selvanagar, Palathopur and Mutur, the latter turned to be a self inflicted annihilation as well as LTTE casualties on the air strikes on LTTE camps in Tharavilulam.

Earlier, sources loyal to renegade LTTE Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan better known as Karuna said 120 LTTE cadres were killed in the air strikes on two camps in Tharavilulam, one of which was used as a convergent point for the reinforcement for Mavilaru. These figures could not be independently verified.

Kayts and Mandativu

The other distinctive part of the LTTE strategy was to conduct a sea borne assault on the Naval Forces positions in Kayts and Mandativu.

The attack was repulsed by the Naval Forces. Commandoes were later dispatched to flush out the infiltrators in the two islands.

The Navy last week killed five LTTE cadres who had sneaked in during the attack.

They had been hiding in the ceiling of the house of a GS officer in Kayts. Troops had earlier searched the house which didn't produce results. During the second search, as troops were about to leave the house, they heard a noise coming from the ceiling. Five men had been hiding in the ceiling.

These men were to play a vital role for the LTTE. They were a team of Forward Observers commonly known as FO, a part of a specialised team who provide the locations for artillery and mortar attacks.

The Artillery field team comprises Forward Observers, Fire Direction Centres (FDC) and Guns themselves. FOs communicate with the FDC through a communication set. Based on locations provided by the FOs the FDC calculates the distance and sends a warning order to battery commanders to direct fire at the specific location.

The sailors in the Kayts recovered satellite phones and scientific calculators from the five LTTE cadres killed at the GS's house.

The success of the security forces counter attacks is the accurate intelligence, which cannot be divulged given its sensitive nature.

Had the Tigers succeeded to dismantle FDL positions in Kayts and Mandathivu it would have been only couple of kilometres to Jaffna town.

Indirect fire has been the main cause for casualties for the security forces since Operation Riviresa. The main killer was the 81 mm mortar which can fire up to five km. Security Forces positions in the town could have been targeted with 81 mm mortar if the Tigers established their presence in Mandativu.

LTTE strategy

The LTTE strategy had been to take the two islands and transport arms from Devil's Point on the edge of Mannar for a fresh offensive to capture Jaffna while a frontal battle is fought at the Muhamalai, Nagar Kovil FDL, coupled with a seaborne assault on the FDL positions in Kilali.

The so-called new addition to the LTTE's arsenal, are artillery guns. There are intelligence reports that the Tigers have smuggled several pieces of artillery during the ceasefire. The LTTE is also in possession of several 122 mm and 130 mm field guns captured from Security Forces during the Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and EPS attacks.

The Tiger artillery is the biggest threat to security forces. Last Saturday, the Air Force struck two artillery positions in the K point. It is now confirmed two 130 mm artillery guns have been destroyed in the air strikes carried out by the Israeli built Kaffir fighter jets.

Since the air strikes on artillery positions in K point, artillery fire on the Palali Military Airport has ceased. Fixed wing Aircraft are now flying.