Tigers planning major attack during monsoon season
* Air strikes on K point restore air traffic; *
Soosai commanding Tigers
War and Peace - The Defence Diary by Ranga
JAyasuriya
The lull in the battlefront this week should not be misunderstood as
the LTTE giving up its offensive to lay siege to Jaffna.
The LTTE is only playing for time and patching up its wounds.
The most likely scenario is that the Tiger leadership is replanning
the offensive and will wait for the North-East monsoon when the
geography of the area would limit operational capability of heavy armour
and air and sea operations.
The first week of the battle, which broke out with the attacks on the
FDL positions in Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil on the evening of August 11
turned out to be a self-made disaster for the LTTE.
Based on ground intelligence and intercepted LTTE transmissions, the
LTTE death toll in the North alone is no less than 600 cadres. Generally
the number of injured tends to be much higher than those killed in
action.
Security Forces during the last week buried over one hundred bodies
of LTTE cadres left behind by the retreating Tigers. Security forces
suffered heavy casualties. Though much less than those of the LTTE,
security forces casualties in the first week of fighting stood at 131
soldiers and officers killed in action and over 170 Wounded in Action.
As for the number of wounded, when added with minor injuries, which are
usually not counted in public announcements, the number is much higher
than the declared figures.
Fierce resistance

The 81mm mortar used since operation Rivirasa |
The fierce resistance offered by the security forces against the
LTTE's offensive in its first week, coupled by superior fire power and
air strikes was devastating to the LTTE. It severely drained the LTTE's
fighting strength.
Even under the most generous estimates to the LTTE, at least 1,500
LTTE cadres had been taken out from the battlefront in KIA and WIA. When
added with the casualty figures in the East in the first week of this
month, it could reach 2,000. It is now confirmed, based on ground
intelligence as well as intercepted LTTE transmissions, that at least
300 LTTE cadres were killed in the East in their failed bid to overrun
the Mutur jetty and by air strikes including the air attacks on the LTTE
camp in Tharavikulam.
If we are to go by conventional estimates of the LTTE's fighting
cadres which is estimated at 6,000-7,000, casualties suffered during
this month amounts to a significant portion. Hence the lull in fighting.
But, this can be a calm before the storm. There is a greater possibility
of the Tigers planning a major offensive during the North East monsoon
in October- November.
North East monsoon
Most major attacks of the LTTE were conducted during the rainy
season. The North East monsoon could limit operational capabilities of
the heavy vehicles, tanks and artillery as well as air and naval
traffic.
Heavy vehicles could get stuck in Jaffna's rain drenched soil, which
could limit or delay the operational capabilities of the superior armed
power of the security forces.
This has been a known tactic employed by the Tigers in the past and
there are no reasons to suggest that they won't follow the pattern this
year unless something dramatic happens on the peace front.
But, going by the past two weeks of fighting, the LTTE offensive had
been a self inflicted disaster to the Tigers.
LTTE leadership miscalculations
It was never a defensive strike as portrayed by the Tiger propaganda.
It was a painstakingly designed battle plan, which however turned to be
a disaster due to several miscalculations on the part of the LTTE
leadership as well as timely intelligence coupled with newly acquired
superior fire power of the security forces. The bravery of the soldiers
and leadership of the field commanders, should be commended.
The battle strategy of the LTTE was to fight a frontal battle with
the security forces in Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil FDL, backed by a sea
borne assault on the FDL positions in Kilali and Kayts.
If the LTTE succeeded in over-running the FDL positions in Muhamalai
and Nagar Kovil and Kilali, as it advances, it could have brought its
artillery guns forward, taking the Karainagar Navy base within its
artillery range.
At the same time, it could have disrupted air traffic as well as sea
transport by directing artillery fire at the Palali Military Airport and
KKS harbour. That would cut down supplies to the troops and if the LTTE
succeeded in advancing, it would force the troops back to the Palali
Security Forces Headquarters.
But the LTTE decision to fight a frontal battle turned to be an
overestimation of its capabilities. When planning the offensive, the
LTTE depended on the use of heavy fire power, while undervaluing the
counter fire power of the security forces.
As a prelude to the offensive the LTTE directed a heavy volume of
indirect fire from its artillery guns positioned in Palali and Kalmunai
Point (K Point).
The use of heavy fire power was to substitute the LTTE's smaller man
power compared to the security forces. That was the very strategy
employed by the Tigers in the offensive, Unceasing Waves 111 which
overran the Elephant Pass military garrison.
The miscalculation on the part of the LTTE was that it underestimated
the fire power of the security forces, which enhanced drastically,
taking a clue from what went wrong in the EPS.
After troops withdrew from the EPS garrison, the then Army Commander
Lieutenant Gen Srilal Weerasuriya complained at a press briefing that
the Tigers were having superior fire power. That was the prelude to the
induction of ruthlessly effective truck mounted Multi- Barrel Rocket
Launchers, which can fire 40 rockets in 20 seconds, each weighing 65 kg
and carry High Explosives, incendiary or if necessary chemical agents in
its warhead.
The parity of fire power changed drastically since the induction of
the Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers.
Last week, the superior fire power permitted a greater counter
battery fire against LTTE artillery positions.
The LTTE is known to have fired artillery guns, covered by well
fortified concrete structures, where only the barrel of the gun is
visible. This is a tactic used to mend the guns off airstrikes as well
as counter battery fire by the security force's artillery and MBRL.
But the prolonged and overwhelming use of counter battery fire could
have an impact on limiting enemy artillery attacks.
The other fatal miscalculation was it underestimated the commitment
of the soldiers to hold on to their positions. It also believed many
soldiers had been shifted to the East to fight in Mavilaru, even though,
it was only 800 security personnel who were sent to the East. It also
underestimated the rapid mobility of commandoes.
Lull in fighting
LTTE, given its past track record is unlikely to give up its
offensive at the cost of its overblown reputation. Fighting has severely
drained LTTE manpower, which according to conventional estimates could
be 6,000, of which only 2000 could be viewed as seasoned fighters.
One intercepted LTTE transmission revealed that 490 LTTE cadres
including three leaders have been killed in fighting in the FDL. It is
now confirmed that at least 300 LTTE cadres had been killed in the
Eastern theatre. This includes LTTE fatalities in the simultaneous
attacks on security forces camps in Mahindapura, Kattaparichchan,
Selvanagar, Palathopur and Mutur, the latter turned to be a self
inflicted annihilation as well as LTTE casualties on the air strikes on
LTTE camps in Tharavilulam.
Earlier, sources loyal to renegade LTTE Eastern Commander
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan better known as Karuna said 120 LTTE cadres
were killed in the air strikes on two camps in Tharavilulam, one of
which was used as a convergent point for the reinforcement for Mavilaru.
These figures could not be independently verified.
Kayts and Mandativu
The other distinctive part of the LTTE strategy was to conduct a sea
borne assault on the Naval Forces positions in Kayts and Mandativu.
The attack was repulsed by the Naval Forces. Commandoes were later
dispatched to flush out the infiltrators in the two islands.
The Navy last week killed five LTTE cadres who had sneaked in during
the attack.
They had been hiding in the ceiling of the house of a GS officer in
Kayts. Troops had earlier searched the house which didn't produce
results. During the second search, as troops were about to leave the
house, they heard a noise coming from the ceiling. Five men had been
hiding in the ceiling.
These men were to play a vital role for the LTTE. They were a team of
Forward Observers commonly known as FO, a part of a specialised team who
provide the locations for artillery and mortar attacks.
The Artillery field team comprises Forward Observers, Fire Direction
Centres (FDC) and Guns themselves. FOs communicate with the FDC through
a communication set. Based on locations provided by the FOs the FDC
calculates the distance and sends a warning order to battery commanders
to direct fire at the specific location.
The sailors in the Kayts recovered satellite phones and scientific
calculators from the five LTTE cadres killed at the GS's house.
The success of the security forces counter attacks is the accurate
intelligence, which cannot be divulged given its sensitive nature.
Had the Tigers succeeded to dismantle FDL positions in Kayts and
Mandathivu it would have been only couple of kilometres to Jaffna town.
Indirect fire has been the main cause for casualties for the security
forces since Operation Riviresa. The main killer was the 81 mm mortar
which can fire up to five km. Security Forces positions in the town
could have been targeted with 81 mm mortar if the Tigers established
their presence in Mandativu.
LTTE strategy
The LTTE strategy had been to take the two islands and transport arms
from Devil's Point on the edge of Mannar for a fresh offensive to
capture Jaffna while a frontal battle is fought at the Muhamalai, Nagar
Kovil FDL, coupled with a seaborne assault on the FDL positions in
Kilali.
The so-called new addition to the LTTE's arsenal, are artillery guns.
There are intelligence reports that the Tigers have smuggled several
pieces of artillery during the ceasefire. The LTTE is also in possession
of several 122 mm and 130 mm field guns captured from Security Forces
during the Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and EPS attacks.
The Tiger artillery is the biggest threat to security forces. Last
Saturday, the Air Force struck two artillery positions in the K point.
It is now confirmed two 130 mm artillery guns have been destroyed in the
air strikes carried out by the Israeli built Kaffir fighter jets.
Since the air strikes on artillery positions in K point, artillery
fire on the Palali Military Airport has ceased. Fixed wing Aircraft are
now flying. |