The Rajpal Abeynayake Column

The theory of the proxy wars tested

Is this island the territory for proxy wars between two Asian powers —— one that is undisputedly the regional giant, and the other a good friend to the world’s only superpower? The proxy war theory has long been a closet affair. But, this week saw a coming out of sorts. Outgoing Pakistani High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, Bashir Wali Mohamed let rip. Said he that he suspects an Indian agency in the attempt on his life that took place weeks ago on a busy Colombo street.

This drew guffaws from the Indians. Was it a laughing matter? The Indians belly laughed anyway, and are now quoted on the record saying that Wali Mohamed’s assertion was ‘’laughable as the assassination attempt had all the hallmarks of the Liberation Tigers.’’ It’s also in the open now that the Indian Premier has assured that no arms would be provided to the Sri Lankans in the fight against the LTTE. This assurance was given to a Tamilnadu politician, who is a Sri Lankan nemesis with a name that rhymes with a popular brand of wind shield wiper.

The Pakistanis have no compunctions arming Sri Lanka — but also, take a minute to consider this. Pakistanis have a greater reason to arm Sri Lanka, now that India has washed its hands off the Lankan issue, partly in order to please the man who carries the name that rhymes with the windshield wash.

A proxy war beckons?

Into this thick gravy steps in Mahinda Rajapakse Sri Lankan President, unselfconscious and well ventilated in a Malaysia type sarong and shirt attire, in London. There are two current theories about the Sri Lankan conflict.

One has it that Mahinda Rajapakse has astutely made use of LTTE trigger happiness, to launch a defence that has come in the shape of an attack. This story, which the Colombo chattering class is particularly fond of, is that Rajapakse is poised now to finish off the LTTE, which is why he went to meet Blair who would take his side in a proxy war that’s being fought in his backyard. All theories of course.

It’s held that Blair would take his side because the Americans together with the British and the Pakistanis are fighting a war on terror — which makes the general form or shape of any terrorist group irrelevant, as long as they are terrorists.

The next theory is that Rajapakse is looking for a real opening for peace in a situation of largely unpredictable volatility. He is seeking allies wherever he can, not necessarily to end this ‘’proxy war’’ but to manage a conflict that’s by nature intractable, but yet momentarily manageable. If it’s a proxy war, why is India getting involved? Another theory rapidly gains currency arising from that. India can do with more bifurcated neighbour territories; the more destabilised its border territories, the better it is for India as the regional power that seeks police powers over the region against the global police power, the U.S., which would otherwise do the regional beat.

This theory holds that India could have this desired degree of destabilisation by bifurcating this country, creating an Eeelamdesh as it did a Bangladesh. India, this theory also holds, could achieve the approximate effect, if there is a federated entity in which there is a Tamil North and East that could give India leverage over the affairs of this Southerly neighbour.

This would be anathema to another power, a superpower, which seeks power of its own over the region. Therefore, it’s theorised that Pakistan maybe fighting a proxy war in the region on behalf of the power that it’s a friend of — the United States, which will go some length to prevent power in this region fall exclusively into the hands of the independent large and unmanageable entity of India, which could never be moulded in the American design.

If this is not theory but reality, it would mean that there is a proxy war. Those who are fighting Indian forces in this proxy war would not want any changes in the status quo in north-eastern Sri Lanka. They wouldn’t want Sri Lanka to bend to the Indian design of —- as the theory goes — subjugating any part of Sri Lanka to its power.

If these proxy war theories are correct, what does that hold for the current conjuncture in Sri Lanka? Would it be that either party in the proxy battle would prefer to keep the conflict unresolved, in the state of limbo that obtained prior to this recent breakout of hostilities, by whichever definition these hostilities masquerade? Or would it be that India, now being in the American trade camp and therefore being an ally of sorts, wouldn’t mind the status quo? It’s a status quo in which there is no bifurcation of Sri Lanka —- or a creation of any federated region within Sri Lanka, through which India could exercise indirect power over Sri Lanka ensuring India broader control over regional geopolitics. If the proxy theory holds, would the Americans win in Sri Lanka via Pakistan by preventing bifurcation or federation — and if so, would India mind a whole lot these days? It has to be reiterated, these are all --- all of the above --- theories.

If these theories are right, is it possible that these proxy wars would end by India not insisting on a bifurcation of this country or a federation? Does that mean that the Sri Lankan ‘ethnic issue’’ is at end? Does that mean also that the U.S. might gain leeway via Pakistan in the proxy wars? Unlikely, but possible. But its more likely, the status quo will remain. India will not push for anything, in these times. If the proxy theory is right, this theoretical supposition of outcome, is probably the most accurate to fit the theory.

Ah, if this was a game of chess. But it isn’t. And if theories were reality.

They probably aren’t, but then again, who knows.