Radical Islam mutates to political populism

After the Hezbollah victory

Kumar David

The defeat of the Israeli bombardment and invasion of Lebanon at the hands of Hezbollah is the most important event in the Middle East since the American lead aggression against Iraq. Although the devastation visited on hapless Lebanon by US armed Israel and the loss of civilian life and property far outweigh any pain that Hezbollah rockets could inflict on Northern Israel, Hezbollah’s victory in political terms is decisive. Its two pronged tactic of militarily restricting the Israeli army on the ground while targeting Israeli towns in retaliation for the merciless bombing of Lebanese civilian targets proved a winner.

The most important measures of this triumph include the political crisis in the Israeli government and armed forces where several commissions of inquiry have started investigating the fiasco, the jubilation among the Lebanese people, especially but not only the Shiites, and the strengthening of Iran’s geopolitical hand in its standoff on the nuclear issue.

However, a more indirect but more important consequence is the reinforcement of Radical Islam as a populist mass movement at the expense of both pro-Western client regimes (Egypt, Jordan) and anti-modernists. The latter come in two genres - traditional-conservatism (Wahabi and the Brotherhood for example) or more recent extremist-Fundamentalism (al-Qaeda and many others). Instead populism has now been galvanised as evidenced by the Hezbollah led large scale reconstruction of Southern Lebanon and Beirut and by forcing Fatah’s hand into the formation of a coalition with Hamas in Palestine. This will accelerate in the coming period; but there are also serious obstacles.

Origins and background

Historians tend to trace the origin of everything in the complicated history of the Middle East, Asia Minor and North Africa to the crusades which lasted, intermittently, for two centuries in the late Middle Ages.

It is more useful, however, to understand the region in terms of a more recent period; the rise of capitalism in the West and the reversal of power relationships with the region leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1926 and the artificial redrawing of the map by Britain and France, the victors of World War I; the creation of Israel and the subsequent wars; and after World War II the hegemonic role of the US and the relationship to oil.

Two strands of Arab and Islamic (not everything is Arab, for example the North African Magreb and Persia) reaction emerged. One has its source in Kemalist secularism and not withstanding superficial differences is linked at root to latter day Bath Socialism and the Nasserite flirtation with the USSR in the then prevailing cold war context. The other, reactionary and sometimes feudalistic conservatism and fundamentalism, has been the historical ally of the US in the region. The former suffered setbacks while the latter flourished except for one event of great import - the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Standing the Islamic Revolution on its head

The great mistake of superficial scholarship is to see the 1979 revolution as a triumph of fundamentalism. Nothing of the sort is true because from the beginning there were two strands buried in its bosom - radical anti-imperialism and the desire for a theocratic state based on Sharia law. The centre of gravity swung between the two depending on ground reality - the storming of the US Embassy, the US inspired Iraq-Iran war, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq threatening neighbouring Iran, and of course in recent years, oil prices.

In the initial years the fundamentalist tendency held the upper hand because imperialism presented itself through an anti-Islamic prism. Cultural hubris and the belief that the sole superpower could do as it willed contributed to this convolution. But social forces were driving deep in the bowels of society, not just in Iran but in the region - vide Palestine and Hamas, vide Hezbollah and Lebanon - and finally the election of the outright populist Ahmadinejad (Iran’s Chavez) as President showed how far the process had gone. Actually one has to thank George W. Bush for the dervish push, for when historians of the future comes to take a long view they will rue the day Bush and Blair marched into Baghdad as one of the great mistakes of Western foreign policy.

Anyway, thanks to Bush, Iran is irretrievably lost to the West. Consequently Iran had to prioritise its own security from obvious American encirclement in the aftermath of 9-11 and from an ever present Israeli menace.

Nuclear arms and missile delivery systems became imperative. Whatever fairytale it chooses to tell the inspectors it is indispensable that Iran should develop a nuclear arsenal not second to Israel and delivery systems which deter American and Israeli forces. The Israeli defeat at the hands of Hezbollah has come as a godsend at this time; Ahmadinejad can stand a lot firmer than otherwise.

This symbiosis has encouraged Iran to pour hundreds of millions of dollars (thank you oil) into Hezbollah for the reconstruction of war savaged Lebanon.

The principal reconstruction agency in Lebanon is not its government but Hezbollah; not just money, it has the dedicated cadres who are getting on with the job while the regular government is as impotent in reconstruction as its effeminate army was in combat.

From long before the invasion Hezbollah was an active agency deeply involved social problems and every day issues; it was always more an agent of social action than Islamic posturing.

Its populist side is now being vastly reinforced. It will be a major force in democratic Lebanese politics hereafter and not just among the Shiites if it plays its cards right.

This same symbiosis is also driving Iran in a radical populist direction and away from religious fundamentalism.

Threats and weaknesses

Iran needs the support of anti-imperialist entities in the Middle East and popular sentiment in those countries which some call stooge states of Washington. The nuclear issue is engaging the vitality of scientific and technological world-views.

There is a self-sustaining virtuous circle of left populism which has more in common with secular populism than theocracy.
This rosy picture is only half the story; there are dangers, internal and external. The religious schisms within the region are ferocious. The people of the Middle East will achieve nothing in their stand off with imperialism unless they (above all the Shiia and Sunni) get their act together. Within Iraq, the test case, the only entity with some residual authority is the regime in Iran.

However we know from the constraints that India faces in trying to drive a modicum of intelligence into the numb skulls of both the Sinhala and Tamil political leaders in this country that the influence of external actors is limited. As the drama unfolds in Iraq and as the US coalition is bled and driven out it is of the utmost importance that the people enact their own power sharing federal or confederate structure. This will help by example in dealing with similar tensions elsewhere, especially multi-faith Lebanon.

The external threat to peace in the Middle is better known - the lust for oil and the US-Israeli strategic axis. Not much more needs to be said as our readers are well informed.

[Submitted by Kumar David to the Sunday Observer on 31 August 2006]