Winning formula
 

War and Peace The Defence Diary by Ranga Jayasuriya

Superior firepower and battleground tactics of the security forces have been noted in many a defence analysis for the recent military success. What was, however, rarely noted, though it was indeed the core of the winning formula is the fact that the political and military leadership acted in unison.

There is an overall agreement between the military commanders and their political bosses as far as dealing with the Tigers is concerned. Political leadership has been responsive to the concerns of the security forces’ commanders and equally important. Not only did it appoint the ablest of the military commanders to the positions of military hierarchy, but also showed respect and appreciation to the achievements of the military leadership.

It was only a fortnight ago when none other than President Mahinda Rajapaksa paid a glowing tribute to the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka at the 55th anniversary of the SLFP, coincided with the capture of the Eastern Tiger enclave, Sampur. The President described the appointment of Gen. Fonseka who was to be sent on retirement as “the secret of the (recent military) success”.

In a reference to the appointment of Air Force chief, Air Marshal Roshan Goonatilleke, the President said many raised objections, some brought files and documents, but he appointed Air Marshal Goonatilleke whom the Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa recommended as the best of the lot.

Such endowment for achievement in the battlefront was, sadly, lacking in the predecessors of President Rajapaksa. That was partly responsible for the past military setbacks. When the top Generals were sidelined and political Generals decide on battle plans, such setbacks were inevitable.

It was the same soldiers who gave up defence lines enmass during the Tigers onslaught in Unceasing Waves III, beat back Tigers decisively in their abortive bid to overrun Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil Forward Defence Lines last month.

The same soldiers, but under a new leadership. History in battling the LTTE is such that when the right military leadership was directing the battle, soldiers fought well.

What was seen in the past couple of months is just the repeat of the same phenomenon. Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka after he was appointed the Commander of the Army made certain crucial changes within the army. He appointed some young, yet battle hardened officers, some of whom spent their entire military life battling terrorism as field commanders - though such appointments drew fury from certain quarters, the rationale of such appointments could be seen in the recent show in the battle front. Political will to take decisive action when the national security is at stake was paramount in the recent achievements. For three years, the military top brass underscored the threat posed by the LTTE military buildup in the Southern perimeters of the Trincomalee harbour. The political leadership in the past was indifferent to such concerns. Looming threat at the security of Trinco harbour, the lifeline of 42,000 troops and police deployed in Jaffna was highlighted when the sea Tiger suicide craft launched from Soodaikudai, west of Foul point, made an attempt on the security personnel carrier Jetliner on August 1. On the same day the China Bay Naval camp under heavy fire directed from Tiger artillery positioned in Sampur.

Political courage

It is in this backdrop that the political green light to recapture Sampur is noteworthy. The same kind of political courage was displayed when the troops were given the green light to advance from their northern Forward Defence Lines in Muhamalai and Eluthuwadduwal. The initial directive was,indeed, for the troops to advance up to Elephant Pass, where a major military garrison was overrun by the Tigers’ Unceasing Wave III.

On Saturday, September 9, troops advanced from their FDL positions towards Pallai. The Czech Built T 55 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and Rusisan BTR armed personnel carriers raced through the sandy terrain ahead of the Muhamalai FDL alongside the foot soldiers. It is an open terrain where the troops had to fend off twin enemies of indirect fire and landmines. The Tigers gave up their FDL bunker line after initial resistance. But the troops soon realised that the areas are heavily mined and booby trapped. The LTTE had heavily used anti personnel mines against the advancing troops.

They dodged the Tiger artillery fire large scale directed on a large scale from the guns in Iyakkachchi, below Pallai.

However, when advancing in the open terrain, they were an easy target for the indirect fire.

Anti-personnel mines had a heavy toll on the troops. On the first day itself 27 soldiers including one officer were killed in action. One hundred and three soldiers including four officers were injured, at least half of them had minor injuries - classified as “walking casualties - due to shrapnel of artillery and mortar fire.

Indirect fire has been the main reason for the security force’s casualties since Operation Riviresa. Since then, 81 mm mortar which can fire up to five kilometres has been the main culprit for most of the security force’s casualties.

Casualty figure downplayed

Security Forces put LTTE casualties at 60 cadres dead and over 200 injured. These figures could not be independently verified. The LTTE downplayed its casualty figure and indeed, the Tiger military spokesman Rasiah Ilanthirayan alias Marshal said no casualties were reported on the first day. The following day troops recovered eleven bodies of LTTE cadres lying ahead of the security force’s defence positions. The bodies were handed over to the Jaffna hospital. The LTTE did not opt for a close combat. Later in the week, troops overran the second bunker line.

The overwhelming use of Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers on the LTTE’s FDL positions had left its mark. Pictures showed burnt out blackish line running parallel to the Security Forces’ defence line. The initial directive for the security forces was to advance up to Elephant Pass.

However, with the overtures by the international community to resume peace talks — some pronouncements of the Co-chairs and Norwegian International Development Minister Erik Solheim having raised eyebrows in Colombo— a lull in fighting in the Northern front was seen in the past few days.

The green light to capture the territory up to EPS was compelled by the Tiger artillery strikes on the Pallali security forces Headquarters and military airport. Tigers targeted the airbase with their 130 mm heavy artillery guns positioned in Kalmunai point- known as K Point- on the edge of Pooneryn. This brought fixed wing air traffic in and out of Jaffna to a temporary halt. Air flights resumed only after Israeli built Kafir fighter jets pounded artillery positions in the K Point destroying at least one gun.

The LTTE is believed to have been in possession of at least three 130 mm Howitzers, suspected to be smuggled. Smuggled, because the security forces say they had not lost 130 mm artillery pieces to the Tigers. 130 mm Howitzer has an effective fire range of 27 km. The Tigers are also believed to have smuggled around twenty 122 mm artillery guns during the ceasefire.

Tiger strategy

The shift in Tiger strategy from the battle front to peace talks did not come as a surprise to the security forces. A senior military official, a fortnight ago told this writer that the Tigers were planning a tactical return to the negotiation table, after the rout in the East and the North. That came true early this week when Mr. Solheim over-stepped his mandate to fix the dates and venue for a fresh round of “unconditional” talks. The LTTE strategy has always been a combination of the battlefront and negotiation table. The latter turned out to be a respite for the Tigers, before they return to the battlefront with renewed vigour.

It is equally interesting to note the shift in Thamilselvan, who only last week conditioned the resumption of talks with the security force’s withdrawal from Sampur.

Thamilselvan threatened reprisal attacks on the Sinhalese and declared that the Tigers had considered that the Government had exited from the truce agreement. But, couple of days later, when the Government made its intentions on the EPS capture known, the Tiger political commissar swallowed his words. Still the position of the LTTE is not clear over its offer for unconditional talks. Because, Thamilselvan has demanded that the troops respect ‘demarcation lines’ in other words to pull out from Sampur, Mavil Aru and Pallai, which the government had ruled out. The LTTE returned to the battlefront with a new vigour after every negotiation effort in the past. Last month, when the Tigers returned to the battlefront, troops anticipated a new military strategy from the Tigers. To counter them, troops had their arrangements in place. But, to their surprise, the Tigers fought the same old battle techniques.

“It was a bonus. It made our work easier,” said one senior Military official. Undoubtedly, the LTTE’s fighting strength has been severely drained during the last one and a half months. If we are to go by the conventional estimates, the LTTE’s manpower - even according to most generous estimates- is no more than 6,000 - 7,000 cadres. Of them, at least 1,000 LTTE cadres had been killed in fighting and equal numbers suffered serious injuries which would keep them away for a considerable time. Realities in the battlefront requires a respite for the Tigers.

In disarray

The LTTE’s Eastern sector is in disarray. Last week, the Tigers pulled out from four jungle bases in Karadiyanaru to dodge an attack by the fighters loyal to renegade Eastern Tiger commander Karuna.

According to independent sources, 250 Karuna fighters took part in the operation. Now it is confirmed that six Karuna fighters including a senior figure known as Sindujan were wounded in fighting. Casualties on the LTTE were not known, even though the Karuna faction had seized a cache of weapons abandoned by retreating mainstream LTTE cadres.

According to military sources, the Karuna faction has become a force to be reckoned with in the East. The estimated number of fighting cadres in the Karuna faction is put at 500-600 by the local military sources. However, mobility of the Karuna faction has been severely restrained by the restrictions imposed by the security forces.

According to anti-LTTE political activists in Batticaloa, the LTTE has only 800 fighting cadres in its Batticaloa and Amparai sector. In addition there are 1,200 border guards of the LTTE in the sector.

The LTTE cadres who pulled out from Sampur have now locked in Verugal, Kadiravelu and Vakarai bordering Batticaloa.

However, the history of battling the Tigers is such that the security forces had won some battles and lost some others. It has been a seesaw battle where battlelines were consistently shifted forward and backward. Recent military successes in the East and North have turned the tide in favour of the security forces. Past experience in the battleground is that initial military successes turned sour when the war against the Northern insurgency was detached from the wider national agenda to make it a part of the party’s political agenda.

A lesson from history is that such mistakes should be avoided at all costs if the momentum of the military success is to be sustained.