Pushing 60: Independence Day manifesto

by Dayan Jayatilleka

'For all its dangers, atrocities, costs, distractions, and moral compromises, the Cold War - like the American Civil War - was a necessary contest that settled fundamental issues once and for all. We have no reason to miss it. But given the alternatives, we have little reason either to regret its having occurred." - 'The Cold War', John Lewis Gaddis.

Sri Lanka is finishing its fifties as an independent country. The age and stage of life determines the tasks ahead. There are things we must attend to, goals we must achieve, mistakes we must rectify, conflicts and entanglements we must end before we turn 60 next year, on February 4th 2008. We must win this war against terrorism; defeat the LTTE that has plagued us and derailed our progress for almost half of our life as an independent country; and put in place a new framework which enables us to catch up on lost time and fulfil our potential as a nation and a people.

A few years back, on another tropical island on the doorstep of a huge power on the other side of the world, a leader whose exercise of violence was characterised by the greatest discrimination and highest ethics and morality, a man whose genius lay in combining in a synthesis, Realism, Reason and Romanticism and doing so better than all others, responded to the discourse of dissent and 'rights' in the new global and historical setting of liberal interventionism. Fidel Castro reiterated that 'the Revolution also has rights, and the first right of the Revolution is to exist!' This echoed his famous remark of 1961, when addressing a forum of intellectuals: "Within the Revolution everything! Outside the Revolution, nothing!"

With a modification, the same is true of our little island. However lofty the rights of individuals and collectives, (from human rights through minority rights to the right of self-determination), it must never be forgotten that Sri Lanka - the Sri Lankan state - too has rights and the first of those is the right to exist, as an independent, sovereign, undivided, indivisible and democratic country! Within the concept of a single sovereign state, everything! Without it, outside it, and against it, nothing!

If we are not to suffer for the next quarter century as we did for the last, then Prabhakaran must be defeated. This is by no means fanciful. As a rather militaristic, security-related Western website, Strategy Page observes, never before has the campaign against the LTTE been as decisive, and if this pressure and pace is kept up for another year, the Tigers may not be able to survive.

Defeating Prabhakaran before we turn sixty means we go for the endgame: the North, by which is meant not only the Northern (Jaffna peninsula) but the rest of the Northern Province, including Kilinochchi. As tough a nut as the latter is, Muhamalai showed that fighting in the unliberated areas of the peninsula itself can be very heavy going. The North is tougher than the East for two interrelated reasons; one obvious and of lesser importance, the other less obvious and of greater importance.

Firstly it is mono-ethnic, but that is the more obvious and less important reason. Our armed forces fought and won in the mono-ethnic North, against an undivided LTTE, in so many encounters, including Elephant Pass in 1991 (under Gen Denzil Kobbekaduwa), Jaffna in 1995 (under Gen Gerry de Silva) and Kilali in 2000 (under Gen Sarath Fonseka). So the main problem is neither the mono-ethnic nature of the area nor the absence of a Karuna faction.

Northern problem

The main problem in fighting in the North is the legacy, primarily of Ranil Wickremesinghe and secondarily of Chandrika Kumaratunga (whose first move upon retaking the Defence portfolio in late 2003 was to remove Gen Sarath Fonseka from Jaffna). While the CFA benefited the LTTE and not the Sri Lankan state, that was neutralised and turned on its head in the East by Karuna the Rebel. In the North however, Prabhakaran reaped the full benefit of the lopsided CFA. While the areas under his dominance were inaccessible to the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE was able to proselytise freely in the areas liberated by the armed forces, recruit, train, smuggle in and store weapons, dig in, extend its influence and in general, strengthen itself. One of the fruits of the CFA is the Makkal Padai or Prabhakaran's civil defence force. Thus in the North, the Tigers have defence-in-depth, though that depth is not geographic in extent, but consists of multi-layered preparation and mobilisation. It is not extensive as much it is intensive - or rather it is both extensive and intensive.

If the effort to overcome intense LTTE resistance in the North causes civilians to be killed (albeit inadvertently) in large numbers by the Sri Lankan armed forces, Tamil Nadu and therefore India - and therefore the West - will get activated. On past form it cannot be ruled out that the LTTE will be the recipient of weapons (such as SAMs or Stingers) which can dent us badly.

In the light of this scenario it may be argued that we should simply consolidate in the East and leave the North well alone, limiting ourselves to a defensive mode. The successful defence the Armed Forces mounted on August 11, 2006 contrasts with the high casualties incurred in a pre-emptive offensive operation on Oct 11 and reinforces such a conservative conclusion. However this would be greatly misleading.

Prabhakaran would continue to accumulate strength and strike out not only in that theatre, but also in the South and eventually roll-back our hard won gains in the East.

Therefore the Northern campaign is inevitable and imperative. The question is how to prepare for it; how to create the conditions and set the stage. Given the post-CFA balance of forces in the Northern theatre, the final campaign for the liberation of the rest of our island and the reunification of the country by the time it turns sixty, requires the following precautionary and preparatory measures:

The news of a Pada Yathra commencing from Tangalle, to motivate youths to join the armed forces is not merely laudable, it contrasts sharply with two programmes of CBK's, namely the Sudu Nelum and NIPU (National Integration Policy Unit) with their corrosive effect on motivation and mobilisation.

Numbers are usually and mistakenly thought of as "man power". We must design a campaign that recruits as many young women as possible to the armed forces, so that they can be given rearguard (administrative) and static defensive (checkpoints) duties, releasing significant numbers of men for frontline combat.

A strikingly successful feature of the recent Eastern campaign was its use of manoeuvre and surprise (unlike Jayasikuru, Agnikheela and Muhamalai Oct 11). The Northern campaign must of necessity be similar, even more so.

The Sri Lankan military has already begun to handle Mullaitivu very well, putting it under pressure, combining deep penetration operations (which just killed a Tiger Lt Colonel and none other cadres) with tactical air-strikes.

Sun Tzu says the target of all strategy is the mind of the enemy commander. Col. Karuna should be asked to war-game, anticipate Prabhakaran's moves, while bearing in mind that Prabhakaran will anticipate this and strive to use new, post-Karuna tactics.

Karuna, given his impressive performance against Jayasikuru and at Elephant Pass, and Douglas Devananda, given his knowledge of the North and its people, should be intimately and organically involved in designing the campaign, and invited to make operational, problem-solving inputs as the process unfurls.

In a cover story this January, TIME called it "The Chinese Century". The president's visit to China, followed hopefully by one to Russia, must seek full-spectrum strategic support i.e. satellite intelligence, investment, ship-to-ship rockets (to neutralise the Sea Tigers), electronic countermeasures (ECMs) for our aircraft (in case someone slips the Tigers Stingers), intelligence sharing, military training and advisors, expertise on ethnic autonomy, diplomatic backup in the UN (to block "humanitarian" conspiracies and sanctions).

Economic burden

Iran and Venezuela should be canvassed for cheap oil to ease the economic burden of the war effort and disaffection at home (note the "patriotic" JVP's planned general strike).

The Tigers must be isolated before the decisive offensive. Tamil Nadu, India and the West must be neutralised. Only a reasonable and substantive devolution package can achieve that.

China's model of regional autonomy (enshrined in its Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law) could be emulated and Chinese Communist party experts requested to assist us in drafting legislation. Such a law must be the politico-diplomatic-propaganda and psychological spear and shield that the Sri Lankan forces and its Tamil allies march behind, when they meet Prabhakaran's main-force formations in the decisive battles of this war.

This is how Sri Lanka should prepare to turn 60; how it should act between its 59th and 60th Independence anniversaries, between this Feb 4 and the next. This war blighted our fate in the last quarter of the last century and will cast a shadow over our future unless it is won.

If however we win it, the twenty-first century, the century which has just begun, will see us out of the tunnel and into the light.