Is there a future for Prabhakaran?
by H. L. D. Mahindapala
After leading the Tamils in a militant hate campaign against the
Sinhalese for at least 32 years, after waging four Eelam wars, after
sabre-rattling in the last annual speech threatening dire consequences
to the nation if the Tiger demands were not met, after killing more
Tamils than any other force put together, after sacrificing the Tamil
children recruited into the depleted Tiger cadres, after investing the
millions subscribed by the Tamil diaspora into the bottomless pit of
purchasing arms, and, above all, after subjecting the Tamil people to
the worst imaginable indignities and sufferings in the name of an
elusive political goal of a separate state, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the
self-styled "sole representative of the Tamils", is nowhere near his
goal of Eelam. Long before he lost the territorial grip on east to Lt.
Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the SL Army Commander whom he failed to
assassinate, he lost his grip on the Tamil people of the east with
Karuna Amman, his best commander, breaking away from him. And in between
the fall out with Karuna and fall of Vakarai Prabhakaran was dealt a
deadly legal blow by the Supreme Court by de-linking the north from the
east.
Plight
Never has Prabhakaran been in a plight like this before, losing
simultaneously on territorial, military, political, legal and
international fronts. Ever since he got the scalp of the first Tamil,
Alfred Duraiyappah 32 years ago - and he has not stopped killing the
Tamils since then - he had been on a winning streak until his political
fortunes peaked with signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) on
February 22, 2002 . In the CFA Ranil Wickremesinghe offered him on a
platter not only control of territory and powers which Prabhakaran could
not have won in the battle field but even the heads of the daring
soldiers in the LRRP who were risking their lives to save the nation
from the perils of separatist terrorism. In clause 2a of the CFA
Wickremesinghe agreed to dismantle the deep penetration units to make
life safe for Prabhakaran. In addition, he virtually surrendered when he
agreed to dismantle the LRRP and de-fang the "para-militaries" (read
anti Tiger Tamil groups).
Though the CFA was a defeat for Wickremesinghe it was Prabhakaran's
glorious moment. Prabhakaran was on top of the world with recognition,
status and power derived from Ranil Wickremesinghe's CFA which spilled
over to consolidate his position in the Tamil community and, of course,
the international community. Quite brashly, his emissary abroad, Anton
Balasingham, was claiming parity of status with the Sri Lankan
government and Erik Solheim, who fell headlong into the blarney of
Balasingham, too treated the sovereign State of Sri Lanka as equal to
that of a terrorist enclave though it had no legal, political or moral
status. Wickremesinghe was on his wobbly knees before Prabhakaran and
Bradman Weerakoon, Wickremesinghe's batman, was ever willing to grant
practically the never-ending demands of the Vanni hierarchy on the
fallacious NGO theories of "confidence-building".
Psychological coup
With Wickremesinghe and Weerakoon falling at his feet it was easy for
Prabhakaran to strike fear into the hearts and minds of the southern
polity. The psychological coup he scored infected Chandrika's regime too
and their political and military responses were determined in this mood
of defeatism and surrender. Both of them not only withdrew from any
confrontation but deliberately weakened the military capabilities of the
forces. Both had accepted that the only way out was to appease under the
euphemism of "confidence-building". The fear psychosis generated by
Prabhakaran also gave the NGO agents the upper hand to rule the roost.
Instead of the Security forces invading the enemy territory the NGOs
(example: the German Berghoff Foundation) were invading the Security
Forces demoralizing them and persuading them to surrender. NGOs were
prescribing formulas of surrender as victories for the people, the
government and peace.
The nation was teetering on the brink of falling into the fatal pit
of separatism. After grabbing supremacist status from Wickremesinghe the
next move of Prabhakaran was to manoeuvre Chandrika Kumaratunga's
regime, through the willing coalition of NGOs, to legalise his political
power in the north and east with the ill-conceived and misguided P-TOMS.
If by any chance Prabhakaran got P-TOMS on top of CFA the history of Sri
Lanka would have gone in an irreversible direction with the
international community accepting it as the way to go for a final
solution. But the unravelling events proved that there were forces
greater than Chandrika, Ranil, Erik Solheim, NGOs, and Prabhakaran put
together. The combined attack of the JVP, JHU and other nationalist
forces scuttled Kumaratunga's proposal to sacrifice the overall rights,
interests and aspirations of the Sinhalese, Muslims and Tamils in
exchange for a peace that would never have come from Eelam-or-nothing
Prabhakaran.
Even though Chandrika and Ranil were bending the constitution in
diverse ways to enthrone Prabhakaran, hoping to profit from it at
subsequent elections, the Vanni recipient of their political favours
were on a suicidal course of his own by shooting 95% of the CFA, as
stated by the SLMM. Standing cockily on the peak of the CFA he assumed
that it would be a cake walk for him to get the rest through the gun.
Prabhakaran was pumped up after the CFA, no doubt.. After that it has
been downhill all the way, particularly after the rise of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa as the formidable force of the south halting and
reversing the trend of defeatism.
One of the main contributory factors to Prabhakaran's downfall has
been his intransigent determination not to face the hopelessness
inherent in his fixation of enthroning himself as the Sun God of Eelam.
It is an ideology which has no future. His all-or-nothing gamble has
driven him to a dead end. Eelam is a sword that advanced him in the past
to the peak of the CFA. After he came sliding down from the CFA he has
fallen on his sword. Now he is bleeding profusely from his
self-inflicted wounds. So is there a future for him with his sword
sticking out from both ends?
Prabhakaran's fatal flaw
Velupillai Prabhakaran never lacked arrogance or ruthlessness. But
his fatal flaw was in relying only on two things: 1. himself as a man of
destiny to deliver Eelam and 2. His ideology of separatism based
exclusively on violence - his only tried and tested means of survival in
the jungle of Tamil politics. He has never relied on any strategy other
than violence. That has been his trade mark as symbolised in the Tiger
flag of 33 bullets ringed round the head of snarling tiger under two
crossed guns fixed with bayonets. It was designed by him personally as
an expression of his reliance on violence. Without violence he will be
reduced to nothing. His politics is based on violence. The Tamil
diaspora finances him to keep on fighting. And his future depends on the
success or failure of his violence.
But how far can he advance with his violence now? Though he can
continue to indulge in sporadic spurts of violence he has yet to realise
that he has reached the limits of violence. After Wickremesinghe's CFA
and Kumaratunga's failed P-TOMs he had been sliding down the greasy pole
of power without any realistic appraisal of the events that had fallen
on him like a ton of bricks. His blood-thirsty arrogance made him
believe that he could go beyond the Ceasefire Agreement as long as he
stuck to his past tactics of violence. That was his undoing. The latest
round of violence should make him realise that the future route is not
heading in the direction of Eelam but the other way about - i.e into his
40-foot hole in the Vanni! If the current trends continue then it is
certain that at the end of the day he is destined to end up in a tragic
Saddam Hussein hole with nothing beyond that. Is this his future?
Rapid loser
For him regain to regain his lost stature he needs territory, at
least to be recognized as a force with a future. But the rolling events
pushing him back are not promising him any additional territory or even
the remaining acres under his control. Eelam without the east and Jaffna
- the heartland of the Tamil separatists - is like a torso without a
head and heart. He has also been losing his cadres at a rate that he can
hardly afford if he is to win back the east and the north. He is also
running out of ammunition unless he can replenish it with new stocks.
His finances are also drying up. Contrary to what military experts say,
he is dependent more on supplies of money from the Tamil diaspora than
ammunition. The ammunition comes from the diasporic funding and if that
source dries up he is finished. The Tamil diaspora, the sole source of
external resources to the Tigers, is batting nervously, and sometimes
even reluctantly, on its back foot. Each defeat in Sri Lanka reduces the
flow of funds abroad. But fund-raising activities are monitored and the
leading Tamil agents abroad are under surveillance by foreign
governments which are hostile to the banned Tiger terrorists.
Besides, the A-9 road which was a gold mine to him is no longer open
for him to rake in the shekels. On top of all this, there is a
recommendation before the UN to target his military and political
leadership. India, though dithering, has come out with a statement that
buries all his hopes.
India says that its commitment to the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Sri Lanka is absolute and is not dependent on any
internal development towards a solution.
One other factor that should also not be overlooked is the way in
which Velupillai Prabhakaran killed the goose that could have laid the
golden eggs for him. Ranil was his best chance of consolidating his
position now and challenging the State later - better than any lethal
weapon he could hope to acquire in the underworld. But he miscalculated.
He thought he could win by defeating Ranil. He also wanted to impress
that he can be the king-maker of the south. The upshot: he and his
political ally, Ranil, lost.
It is obvious now that in denying the Tamil people their right to
vote he wrote his own death warrant. In short, he has painted himself
into a corner from which he cannot get out. He is totally isolated. He
has no one to support him either abroad or at home. There isn't a single
State that is prepared to back him. There is no intifada rising
internally to give him strength or moral courage. On the contrary, V.
Anandasangaree states that the Tamils of Vanni are eager to welcome the
Sri Lankan Army as the Vanni regime is forced to extract more and more
blood from the Tamils not for the future of the Tamils but for survival
of isolated Prabhakaran. Earlier, he had alienated his best commander,
Karuna, who is now waging his own battle against him in the east. He has
divided the Tamil community not only into two regional blocs of the
north and the east but also within the influential northern community.
There is no doubt that a committed hardcore still continues to
worship him. However, on balance, considering the overall forces ranged
against him, the future seems to be swinging in the direction of the
non-violent Tamil forces raising their heads to lead the Tamil people
back to mainstream again. Besides, the initial inspirational wave that
swept "the boys" on the back of Tamil community to its peak in the CFA
has now flattened out on the political shores almost as a spent force.
The force of that wave is no longer there to take Prabhakaran further.
The disillusioned Tamils generally agree now that he hijacked that force
to advance his inflated ego more than the general welfare of the Tamils.
Since Eelam is not a viable proposition any longer the Tamil violence
is now seen as a brutal force to save Prabhakaran and not the Tamils. In
putting himself before the interests of the Tamils he has lost the
momentum that brought him to to peak of CFA. The early enthusiasm for
"the boys" is now replaced by a weary disillusionment that is yearning
to see an end to his ruthless and unending violence pursued with no hope
of reaching the promised goal of a separate, mono-ethnic State for the
Tamils. Anandasangaree is articulating that frustrations and
hopelessness of the Tamils who, in the pithy words of the poet
Vairamuttu's haiku, went for the silk verti and lost even the loin
cloth.
Few supporters
At best, Prabhakaran is left only with his cadres who are dependent
on his killing machine for their careers and survival. Apart from that,
there is the Tamil wing of the Catholic Church to lend him some support.
Some hired agents in the NGOs too can be thrown into this lot. But their
voices too are ineffective as seen in the latest round of defeats. Both
Churchmen and NGO activists threw their full weight behind him to rescue
him from the impending defeats by raising human rights issues. Catholic
clergy and NGO activists tried to drum up support but their cries fell
on deaf ears. They failed to gain any strong responses, internationally
or nationally, to stop the advancing forces.
The reality is that the Sri Lankan crisis, after going through many
twists and turns of regional (Indian) and international interventions,
has reached a critical point where a solution has to be worked out by
internal imperatives and dynamics and not by external interventions. The
failures of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the Ceasefire Agreement
that came with an "international safety net" should convince
peace-makers/facilitators that the solution should be left in the hand
of the Sri Lankans. Karl Inderfurth, a professor of international
affairs at the George Washington University , and former US Assistant
Secretary of State for S. Asia said a mouthful when he cautioned that
"arm twisting with punitive threats by diplomats, however, will not
force the feuding parties back to the negotiating table." He added: "I
don't believe that any one government - whether it be the United States
of America, the Indian government, the Japanese government or Norway,
that has played such an important mediating, facilitating role, can
force either the Sri Lankan government or the LTTE to do something that
they are not committed to doing themselves." The diplomats who queued up
at the gates of the Tigers in Killinochchi and returned empty handed
will bear witness to Inderfuth's conclusion. In the same breath,
Inderfuth states: "I do not believe that there is a military solution to
what's taking place in Sri Lanka . This has to be resolved through
political means. One side or the other may think that they have the
upper hand at one time or another but that is ephemeral - things will
change."
Credibility
How credible is this proposition when tested against the behaviour
pattern of the Tigers who react with a pathological aversion for a
negotiated settlement? It is unrealistic and illogical to expect an
armed group committed to a separatist ideology to agree to anything less
than a separate state unless they are weakened or defeated militarily.
The ultimate objective of a negotiated settlement is to accommodate the
aspirations of all communities in a constitutional framework that
guarantees multi-ethnic diversity to co-exist within a sovereign state.
But mono-ethnic separatism rejects such formulas for multi-ethnic
co-existence. There is, therefore, no meeting point except in the
battlefield. As opposed to the mono-ethnic Tamil Tiger separatists it is
possible to negotiate a settlement with the Tamils in the democratic
stream. There is a possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Tamil
Tigers only if they drop their separatist goal.
But the Tamil Tigers, who have consistently avoided or sabotaged
peace talks, operate on the basic principle that separatism and violence
are inseparable. They also know that no one will give them their state
of Eelam if they drop the gun. This explain why peace talks have been
mere cosmetic exercises to the Tamil Tigers. The orthodox mantra of a
military solution not working is also wearing thin. Sri Lanka is a
classic case where the war against terrorism can be won if the
international community (including the regional power India ) is
committed wholeheartedly to wipe out this global menace. The Tamil
Tigers can survive primarily on two main factors 1) funds received from
the Tamil diaspora and 2) from covert or overt military, diplomatic,
financial and other resources provided by another State. Example: India
as it did in the initial stages.
After its misadventure, India would be wary of going down the old
track all over again. Besides, the Sri Lankan domestic scene has changed
significantly. Left to their own devices, the Sri Lankan forces have
shown a remarkable capacity to meet the challenges posed by the Tamil
Tiger terrorists, though it's not going to be cake walk as they head
towards the north. The east is the easiest to grab. The north is
difficult. Different dynamics operate in the north and the task ahead is
not going to be easy. That doesn't mean that it is impossible. It is
possible as long as the political will is with the Security Forces. Both
sides will dig in hard in the battles for the north. The Tigers will try
playing up the humanitarian issues arising from the escalating war in
the north. But Tiger attacks on civilians in the south will
counter-balance whatever collateral damage that occurs in the north. The
major obstacle will be the response of the international community. They
are bound to react with their double standards. They will preach that a
military solution will not work in Sri Lanka.
End
This is absolutely hypocritical when they have confronted and
resolved threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity with
nothing but military solutions. However, there is a partial truth in the
statement that a military solution will not work. It applies to
Prabhakaran. Whichever way you look at it, he has come to the end of the
road. He is now trapped in a war of attrition that is draining all his
limited resources. But this is not going to make him come to the
negotiating table with peace offers - not after the recent string of
defeats. It will be too humiliating for him to do that. It will be an
act of admitting defeat. He has to prove to himself at least that he is
alive and kicking and the only way he can do that is by hitting back. He
will try to hit out in the most dramatic fashion. He can only hit at two
main targets: 1) military and 2) civilians - mainly high profile
civilians. There is, no doubt, that the Rajapaksa family will be high on
his list.
But option 2 has been counterproductive. Beginning from Rajiv Gandhi
to Kadirgamar he has failed to achieve his objective by targeting
non-combatant civilians. In fact, option 2 has compounded his problems.
Besides, the more he targets civilians the more he adds to his long list
of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Option 2 will take him to where Saddam Hussein ended. He has
accumulated enough charges on this count to face several criminal
courts. His thinking probably will be that adding a few more crimes
cannot harm him any more than what he is facing right now.
In any case, the last weapon left for him will be to send squads of
suicide bombers to the south, or pick a high profile target like the
attack on Katunayake Airport. But can he force the Sri Lankan army to
withdraw from the north and the east by sending suicide squads to the
south, or staging dramatic attacks? Will it not open the way for the Sri
Lankan government to launch full scale air raids on Killinochchi and
other vital bases of the Tigers? The tit-for-tat war is risky for both
sides. But as the military balance stands now it is the Tigers who will
stand to lose, forcing Prabhakaran to either negotiate or to dig deeper
into his 40-feet Mohole in the Vanni.
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