The battle in Kattaparichchan, first Tiger offensive against SF:

When the LTTE’s long siege ended in fiasco

Troops display valour to push the LTTE back into their cells:

Although the humanitarian operation to liberate Mavil Aru in July 2006, considered the beginning of the LTTE’s downfall, the real offensives by the LTTE against the Security Forces was launched on August 01, 2006 mid night following the LTTE attack on five Army detachments around Muttur.

As the attention of the Security Forces was totally focused on Mavil Aru battle the LTTE wanted to divert the attention of the Security Forces to elsewhere and to take control of the key locations in Trincomalee which would be of tactical importance for the LTTE for their future offensive operations.

When analyzing the chronology of events after the commencement of Mavil Aru operation, it is very clear the LTTE wanted to take the upper hand since they wanted to prove that their military might was much powerful than the Security Forces.

On the other hand they wanted to stop the military, mobilizing their assets into Trincomalee area, which has become the theatre of the battle by August 2006 as they were observing that battle tanks, artillery guns and MBRLs were being shifted to Trincomalee to face any outbreak of major offensives by the LTTE. As the third day of the Mavil Operation continued the troops operating in Muttur sniffed unusual presence of LTTE cadres within Muttur area.

The 222 Brigade under the command of Lt. Colonel Sarath Wijesinghe was in charge of the security of the Main Supply Route from Kantale to Muttur. The 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry Battalion under the command of Lt. Colonel Mangala Wijesundera was in charge of the security of Muttur area.

However, there was no presence of the Army in Muttur town as Police was maintaining law and order there which was predominantly a Muslim populated town. The Navy was in charge of the security of the Muttur jetty which created the shortest link to Trincomalee town via ferry service.

The 7 SLLI had its headquarters in Pahala Thoppur whilst deploying its Bravo Company under the command of Captain Kumara in Selvanagar, Charlie Company under the command of Captain Amila Perera in 64th Mile Post whilst deploying one element in Pansalwatta. The Delta Company was deployed in Kattaparichchan under the command of its Acting Officer Command Captain Vijith Alexander.Some elements of the battalion have also been deployed in a location famously known as Amba Sevana.

As the Mavil Aru operation was going, Army intelligence units attached to the 7 Sri Lanka Light Infantry battalion observed some noticeable shift of Tamil population from Pahalathoppur area. They sniffed some pending attack by the LTTE.

On August 01,2006 in the absence of 7 SLLI CO Lt. Colonel Mangala Wijesundera, its 2 in Command Major Senaka Wijesuriya (now Lt.

Colonel) was acting on behalf of him. Around noon he got information from Captain Kumara who was at Selvanagar about some LTTE movements across the lagoon. Along with some boat movements, they observed that the LTTE was shifting some of their 122 mm artillery into Sampoor area from Vakarai side. The information was passed to the Air Force.

Repercussions

Hours later they observed the repercussions of the LTTE move as the LTTE fired barrages of artillery into the Naval Base in Trincomalee which killed at least six sailors and wounded many others. The LTTE artillery attack on the Trincomalee Naval Base came after the LTTE’s attempt to launch a suicide attack on the ship which was transporting an entire battalion of Commando Regiment from Jaffna to Trincomalee.

With this move Major Senaka put his entire battalion under red alert and given orders to lay ambushes out of their Company headquarters to face any eventualities. They laid ambushes South of Selvanagar and North East of Selvanagar, across the Red Bridge closer to Kattaparichchan Army camp and Polwatta area which have been identified by the troops as possible approaches of the LTTE into their camps.

In the Kattaparichchan cam except for three all the others were deployed outside the camp. It was 46 minutes pass mid night on August 01, the first incident was reported to the Major Senaka. The Acting OC of the Kattaparichchan Camp Captain Vijith Alexander informed to the Adjutant of the 7 SLLI Lt. Devapriya that the Listening Post in the South of Red Bridge came under attack.

Red Bridge made demarcation line between the LTTE controlled areas and the Government controlled areas and was located on the road leading from Muttur to Sampur and just few hundred metres away from the Muttur detachment.

He reported three soldiers were injured due to the attack.

Instructions were given to take the casualties back into the camp. But after that things were so peaceful and calm. But 20 minutes after the first incident the Bravo Company OC in Selvanagar reported unusual movements around the camp which was located North East of the historic Buddhist temple in Seruwila.

They too had laid ambush outside the camp and considering the presence of larger number of Tiger cadres instructions were given to platoon commander Lt. Sameera Munasinghe, to come back to the camp. Lt. Sameera Munasinghe a brave officer who played vital role during this offensive, was later killed in Madhu operation.

As they were observing these developments the LTTE fired two rounds of 122 mm artillery into the Selvanagar camp.

With the commencement of this artillery fire LTTE started to engage the Kattaparichchan, Selvanagar by mortar whilst engaging the Pahalathoppur with 122 mm artillery. Although Kattaparichchan camp came under heavy mortar fire, it could not be countered as mortars of the 7 SLLI was located in Pahalathoppur more than 6 Km away from Kattaparichchan.

By this time, Mahindapura Army detachment the manned by the Sri Lanka National Guard battalion and the Naval Detachment Muttur, the police post in Muttur town was also came under LTTE attacked.

Withdraw

Troops operating at several locations were withdrawn by around 2 am in the dawn and the LTTE suffered heavy casualties in Selvanagar. Troops were able to quell the attacks on Selvanagar and Mahindapura camps by pm 02nd August but the attacks on Kattaparichchan Army Camp and Naval Detachment Muttur continued.

The LTTE main effort was focused on the Kattaparichchan Army Camp, where the terrorists launched repeated assaults from the North East (Kattaparichchan Bridge), North and from West ( Muttur Town ).

As the intense battle was going on Major Senaka Wijesuriya had alerted the 222 Brigade Commander and 22 Division GOC Brigadier Mendaka Samarasinghe (now Major General). Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka who had arrived in the country after recovering from his wounds also called Major Senaka Wijesuriya and given instructions to handle the situation.

As the attack on Kattaparichchan was intense, it was decided to send reinforcement to the camp as many of the troops were outside the camp by that time. As Acting OC Vijith Alexander said that only officer mess area was not under attack , it was decided to send reinforcements from the adjoining cemetery and instruction was given not to engage from that side to facilitate the arrival of reinforcement.

Although the reinforcement began at 2 a.m in the morning it was only around 10 am reinforcement reached Kattaparichchan detachment. By 4 am in the morning LTTE had overran 6 points in the Army camp and Sergeant Major Kularatna Banda along with the Captain Vijith Alexander were handling the situation there with morale support given by Major Senaka Wijesuriya.

At first light, troops commenced advance from the South (64 Mile Post) and reached Kattaparichchan Detachment under heavy resistance.

Troops deployed in the Trincomalee Town Sector and Monkey Bridge camp were moved out as reinforcements. Some troops inducted from 222 Brigade Head Quarter in (Kallar) were also sent to Navy Dockyard to be inducted into Muttur Jetty by sea.

However, hundreds of Tiger cadres surrounded the Kattaparichchan camp by 12 noon August 2, making it inaccessible from any direction.

By this time, troops at Selvanagar camp had quelled the situation there and were making arrangements to the remove the casualties to the Muttur hospitals they cannot reach Kantale as the route has been captured by the LTTE at several points.

The casualties were taken disguised as Muslims considering their safety. But as they reach closer to Muttur on August 2, the LTTE had taken control of the Muttur town. However, troops had managed to take the wounded soldiers to the Muttur jetty and take them to Trincomalee hospital for treatment.

The exodus of civilians were leaving Muttur town by that time as LTTE was taking over the town whilst intense fighting was going on closer by Kattaparichchan camp. The Police had withdrawn from Muttur but Navy with the support of the Army managed to secure Muttur jetty under their control. Lt. Meepagama was handling things on behalf of the Navy.

As entire Kattaparichchan camp had been surrounded by the LTTE, the 22 Division GOC Brigadier Mendaka Samarasinghe along with Colonel of the General Staff Lt. Colonel Chula Abeynayake and Artillery CO lt.

Colonel Aruna Ariyasinghe took steps to direct barrages of artillery into the surrounding of the Kattaparichchan camp.

Counter attacks

Meanwhile, around 5 pm, troops moved to Naval Dockyard in Trincomalee by Helicopter from Jaffna and some of them were inducted to Muttur Naval Detachment by sea in order to recapture the fallen eastern flank of the Muttur Navy Detachment.

Around t 7 pm in the night , another contingent moved from Naval Dockyard by sea to reinforce Muttur Naval Detachment. They reached Muttur Jetty at 11.30 pm under heavy resistance. But troops made several counter attacks and repulsed LTTE many assaults.

Troops made another attempt to break out from Muttur Naval Detachment and reinforce Kattaparichchan Detachment around 11.30 p.m. Attempt failed due to heavy resistance from the LTTE who engaged the troops with small arms fire from the South Western direction (Muttur Town) supported by mortars and artillery.

On August 3, the LTTE too was facing stiff resistance and intercepted radio transmission indicated that they were not in a position to hold into the area as hundreds of their cadres got killed in the fierce battle. Their code words said ‘Kapanna be haiyai’.

The troops, who had been surrounded in Kattaparichchan camp were also running out of ammunition by that time. But they were instructed to remain without firing at the Tiger cadres as barrages of artillery and mortars were directed to the surroundings of the camp which had been overrun by the LTTE.

However, things worsened as LTTE started to fire at the camp from two RCL guns located at the Red Bridge.

As intense fighting was going on, troops managed to reach Kattaparichchan camp from the Muttur jetty side. This movement was done under cover of darkness. By this time troops continued to clear terrorist positions and stabilize defences in Muttur Naval Detachment.

Around 12.30 pm on August 3, troops deployed in Trincomalee Town Sector were pulled out and sent to Naval Dockyard to move to Muttur Naval Detachment.

It was around 4 p.m , troops available at Naval Dockyard were inducted by sea to Muttur Naval Detachment. Meanwhile, effective air and artillery strikes were launched to Ralkkkuli area to neutralize identified LTTE heavy machine gun and mortar positions. Artillery fire was also directed to LTTE gatherings in Sampoor and Kattaparichchan.

Foiled

As the third day of the kattaparichchan battle continued more than 3,000 artillery rounds were fell around the Kattaparichchan camp. Some locations just 50 meters outside the camp were engaged by artillery to push back the LTTE who had taken control of some bunkers of the camp.

The attack by the LTTE on the Naval detachment at the Muttur Jetty continued but the LTTE could not advance beyond Bravo Point as troops with the arrival of Naval command officers and the army with more men and ammunition on display began barraging LTTE positions.

Furthermore, proper LTTE position communicated with grid bearings enabled accurate artillery attacks from the bases to be directed to LTTE positions. However, LTTE continued to hold Bravo Point but at a point of the Jetty and accurate artillery fire stilled their attack due to precision attacks by the defense forces.

At around 6.15 p.m , troops inducted into the Navy Detachment, moved out and established a link with Kattaparichchan Army Detachment. Troops managed to carry little replenishment and returned to Naval Detachment Muttur as link could not be maintained due to the heavy interference from the terrorists from the Muttur Town area. LTTE suffered many casualties due to the effective artillery fire directed towards the Red Bridge.

Lost ground

However, troops observed LTTE evacuating many dead bodies and wounded at the bridge site in canter trucks. LTTE had understood that they were in the loosing end of the game as Army was progressing in the battle with speedy reinforcements.

The 7 Gemunu Watch battalion under the command of Lt. Colonel Sena Waduge and 8 Sri Lanka Light Infantry under the Command of Lt. Colonel Rohan Santhanam and 2 Commando Regiment under the Command of Major Ravindra Handunpathirana arrived there as reinforcements in support of the 7 SLLI commanded by its 2 IC Major Senaka Wijesuriya.

Gradually the intensity of the LTTE attacks became weaker as the firepower of the Security Forces became superior due to well directed artillery attacks on strategic LTTE positions and due to the bravery of the soldiers who had been fighting effectively with the Tiger cadres.

As LTTE was in control of Galkanda area too, troops commenced operations clear that area after advancing from Pahalathoppur area on August 4, 2006. However the LTTE continue to attack the Muttur jetty with their artillery and mortars.

It was on August 5 troops managed to end the five days long battle as all links to the kattaparichchan were established from all direction compelling the LTTE to leave the area along with hundreds of their dead cadres. Later on troops managed to take enter Muttur town and take control of the town from the clutches of the LTTE, which was a ghost town by that time.