The 72-hour LTTE operation goes down the drain :

Troops shatter LTTE dream to capture Jaffna

The LTTE’s desire to show its military might was non-ending despite its humiliating defeats at the hands of the Security Forces, because they had overestimated themselves about their military strength.

One of the major factors behind their overconfidence about their military capabilities was due to their military preparedness during the so-called peace time as they had acquired enough stocks of arms and ammunition to enhance their fighting capabilities under the pretext of peace talks with the Sri Lankan Government.

That was why they launched their military offensives in such haste despite facing continuous defeats. On the other hand, it was a peculiar period. Even the common masses did not believe what the Security Forces were telling about the humiliating defeats of the LTTE.

At the time these crucial battles erupted, people in the South tended to believe in what was published in the Tamil-net website rather than believing in the statements issued by the Government explaining the true facts.

So, the LTTE was able to cover up their major debacles taking cover under the false propaganda machines of the LTTE. On the other hand, the common masses through their past experience were used to hear only about the military debacles, but not their victories. Military victories were somewhat strange and unbelievable to them.

This scenario helped the LTTE to cover up all their defeats and boast about their military might as LTTE propaganda machineries had unhindered gone used the international media as the machineries to counter their false propaganda at the preliminary stages by the time fighting escalated in the East and in the North.

Closure

Although the closure of Mavil Aru was considered a mistake by the LTTE, due to the circumstances it had to face in the subsequent battles, it was the best strategic location the LTTE could ever chose to accomplish its military strategy to defeat the Security Forces both in the Eastern theatre and in the Northern theatre.

It was one of the classic military plans drawn by a military strategist, to defeat the Security Forces both in the Northern theatre and in the Eastern theatre. But LTTE could not gain the desired result out of its military plan as it had underestimated the Sri Lankan Security Forces’ ability to counter those strategies. Therefore, at last despite having such an extensive military plan it had to bow down to the superior counter strategy of the Sri Lankan military.

As we indicated last week, the objective of the LTTE when it launched the attack on the Army detachments in Kattaparichchan, Mahindapura and Pahalathoppur on August 2 was to take full control of the areas surrounding the Trincomalee Harbour and to create a path for them to have free access to the North through the jungle patches.

The major obstacle to achieve this task was the Sinhalese settlements in the South of Trincomalee especially in Kallar, Somapaura, Serunuwara and other Sinhalese settlements fed by the waters from Mavil Aru. Through the closure of Mavil Aru they could remove those civilians from that area as they had been deprived of their only water resource.

Through intermittent shelling it could achieve that target very easily as civilians, who had been deprived of water, started to flee towards Kantale town to protect their lives. As it reached its first objective, through the closure of the Mavil Aru on July 22, 2006, the LTTE launched the second phase of its military strategy on August 2, with the launch of simultaneous attacks on five Army detachments around Muttur. Major attack was launched on Kattaparichchan Army detachment, which continued for nearly five days.

However, due to the display of valor by the Security Forces in defending these strategically important locations, the LTTE could not reach its objective of dismantling those Army detachments and lay in siege at the mouth of the Trincomalee Harbour and to paralyse all the activities including the troop movements by the Jetliner and cut off supplies to the Jaffna peninsula by ships.

If the Security Forces failed to defend Kattaparichchan and Muttur, the LTTE would have easily had their bases surrounding the Kodyar bay and have had an easy land route upto Habarana-Trincomalee Main Supply route and then towards the North through the jungle terrains in the North of Trincomalee, as Manirasakulam, Gangai and Upparu areas too were under the control of the LTTE by that time.

Although, Swarnam, the Trincoamlee military leader failed to achieve the first desired objective, the LTTE leadership decided on the second part of their military operation after the Security Forces successfully gained control of the Mavil Aru anicut and restored water supply to the Trincomalee South on August 08, 2006.

Strengthened

According to military officials, the second part of their overall military plan was aimed at taking control of the entire Jaffna peninsula in a 72-hour operation. Balraj, who was the military commander in Jaffna and Sea Tiger leader Soosai, took charge of this battle and the Jaffna population had been informed in advance of this operation.

Despite, escalation of battles in the East, the A-9 was opened for the people and for the supply of goods to Jaffna peninsula by land.

So, LTTE cadres in Kilinochchi had free access to the Jaffna peninsula via A-9 road. The LTTE had got accurate targets on the Security Forces’ defences as they have collected all grid references and other data required to direct their long range artillery into the Jaffna FDLs.

However, the situation in the Forwards Defences was much better as, General Sarath Fonseka, the current Chief of Defence Staff, as the Jaffna Security Forces Commander had strengthened all the defence lines in the North to face any eventuality as he was aware that the LTTE was in preparation for such an attack on the Security Forces at any time.

Major General G. A. Chandrasiri was the Jaffna Security Forces Commander by the time LTTE decided on its first major offensive against the Security Forces in Jaffna on August 11, 2006.

It was around 5.45 the International Red Cross operating in the No Man’s land allowed the last civilian bus bound to Jaffna to reach towards the military side of the Muhamalai entry/exit point and Army troops manning the entry/exit point were ready to close the entry/exit point for the day.

As the bus entered into the military controlled areas, the LTTE started firing a rain of artillery and mortar fire towards the Army defence lines and simultaneously Tigers disguised as civilians seated in the last bus, started firing towards the troops manning the entry/exit point.

Bewildered by the unfolding incident, troops ran for cover. As it was during the ceasefire, the Army had kept their arms and ammunition locked up in a separate storeroom and officers and soldiers assigned to the entry/exit point were not carrying weapons, except for those deployed in bunker lines.

At the same time LTTE was attacking the Palaly Hospital, airfield, gun positions and other important installations. The LTTE was firing artillery and mortar from Sorampatthu, Pallai and from Pooneryn - coma point. Simultaeneously, waves of Tiger cadres commenced infiltrating the Security Forces’ defences whilst troops faced the surprise Tiger attack using small arms, artillery, mortar and RPGs on Kilaly, Muhamalai and Nagarkovil Army defences.

There had been more than 1,000 Tiger cadres to launch this attack.

At the time of the enemy attack, troops of the 4th Gemunu Watch battalion were deployed in the immediate North and South of the entry/exit point and further North towards Kadolana 4th Gajaba Regimental battalion was holding the positions and South of A9 (beyond 4GW) was held by troops of the 4th Sri Lanka Light Infantry regiment up to the Kilali lagoon.

Troops were able to hold on to their C-pen line (the line before the 2nd Defence line) without letting the enemy to infiltrate. Troops manning the first defence line were instructed to withdraw to the second defence line as some bunkers had been captured by the LTTE by that time.

Having to face the strong repulse from the Army, Tigers were mainly concerned about the Northern and Southern corners of the FDL and the Muhamalai entry/exit point. Fierce fighting began across the 7 Km stretch between Nagarkovil to Kilaly as troops fought with more than 1000 Tiger cadres in this narrow stretch of land.

Any eventuality

LTTE fired about 75 rounds of artillery to the Jaffna Security Forces Headquarters on the same day and within two to three hours they were out on a major attack.

Although, the LTTE took the upperhand of the battle in the first two to three hours with their surprise attack, troops were ready to face this eventuality as they continuously carried out rehearsals to face any challenging situation and managed to restrict the LTTE advancing further into the military controlled areas.

Around 11.25 in the night Sea Tigers launched an attack towards the Kilaly lagoon. In the wee hours of the next day Army troops started recapturing the lost bunkers.

Few hours later troops were able to capture the abandoned bunkers and the lagoon front South of A9 and started to recapture the defence lines North of A9 and the entry/exit point.

By next day troops found that the LTTE were concentrating only on the entry/exit point on the main road, the Kilali side and the Kadolana side North of A9 road.

By this time, scores of Tiger cadres who had infiltrated into the military controlled areas, were found dead inside the bunkers as Army troops fired high volumes of artillery and mortar into the defence line after troops were withdrawn from the first defence line.

More than 250 Tiger cadres were killed in the intense battle whilst 85 soldiers sacrificed their lives defending the Security Forces defences.

On August 12 Sea Tigers landed at Kayts island and secured a beach head and it is reported that approximately 1000 LTTE cadres were involved.

The Army started firing indirectly at the approaching LTTE boats and their landing points at high intensity. Hence, LTTE boats had to withdraw.

Later on, the Sri Lanka Navy along with the Army Commandos carried out an intense search operation to detect infiltrated Tiger cadres into Kytes to fully secure the peninsula.

Commandos were sent in as reinforcements to Kayts and immediately established blocking positions. Later when the LTTE withdrew, the Army carried, search and clear operations.

Till August 16 indirect attacks continued on the Kilaly front and simultaneously Sea Tigers launched an attack from the lagoon side.

Still troops were holding the rest of the line very strongly.

By August 25 troops started capturing the entry/exit point at Muhamalai. At 08.45 in the morning troops led an assault on the FDLs and by 9.45 completed the recapture of the entry/exit point consolidating its position.

Apart from the battalions mentioned above 5GW, 6GR, 1 and 5 VIR (Vijayaba Infantry Regiment), and 1 SLLI along with Commandos were in the battle front backed up by the Armoured Corp and Artillery troops with their strong and accurate artillery and mortar fire.

Finally, the Security Forces were able to thwart the LTTE’s highly boasted 72-hour operation to capture Jaffna peninsula and shatter their Tamil Eelam dreams as the Government took a firm decision to close the A-9 road from Muhmalai which had been exploited by the LTTE for their military purposes despite many organizations speaking on behalf of the LTTE shedding crocodile tears highlighting a bogus humanitarian crisis.