Liberating Vakarai

The liberation of Vakarai the first challenging mission of the Security Forces Special Forces, Infantrymen and Commandos displayed their gallantry against the inhumanity of the LTTE.

The liberation of Vakarai became a challenging issue for the Security Forces unlike in the Mavil Aru operation and the Sampur operation in which the troops had to confront the LTTE in an environment sans any civilian population.

Even though there were civilians in Sampur by the time the Security Forces started their military thrust, those civilians were able to flee the area considering their safety. However, the LTTE took this situation for their advantage.

The Security Forces had to conduct a separate operation to liberate the civilians forcibly kept by the LTTE in highly vulnerable area like hospitals and schools in Vakarai and Kathirveli.

Therefore, the main architectures of this Vakarai operation, Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka and Special Forces Brigade Commander Colonel Prasanna de Silva had to plan the operation in two phases, first phase to facilitate safe evacuation of the civilians in Vakarai to the government controlled areas and the second phase to capture the entire area from the clutches of the LTTE.

The LTTE kept those civilians forcibly to achieve its military strategies and it was known from the civilians who had managed to escape the terror clutches that the LTTE had vowed to kill anyone who attempts to leave its human shield.

Therefore, Special Forces Brigade Commander who was in charge of the overall operation plan had to deploy the elite Long Range Recee Patrol (LRRP) teams into the area and launch several surprise attacks on the LTTE. So that the LTTE had to concentrate on the entire area as they were not aware from which direction the troops have infiltrated into their areas.

This was first time the LTTE was surprised as Security Forces adopted guerilla warfare instead of sticking into conventional methods of fighting a war. When the LTTE was highly concentrating on the two available access routes to Vakarai, their vehicles and convoys moving within Vakarai and Kathirveli areas constantly came under Security Forces attacks.

Therefore, the use of this military strategy has been highlighted as the major factors behind the success of the Vakarai operation.

The Special Forces played a major role to make the operation a success engaging the enemy positions after operating in jungles for months in four man and eight man groups.

Never before has the Army made use of this new tactic to achieve military success. The commitment of the Special Forces has to be highlighted due to the immense hardships they faced in achieving their targets.

The Special Forces troops had to operate in some areas totally depending on their ration packets and without having a hot meal or a decent bath for more than 45 days. The leadership given to them by Colonel Prasanna de Silva living with them in the jungle gave a tower of strength for the Special Forces troops.

Then 23 Division GOC, Brigadier Daya Ratnayake also gave them moral support having looked into all their needs during this operation.

Their strategy of deploying these four man and eight man teams was aimed at destroying LTTE gun positions and other military hardware and then moving towards a face to face confrontation.

The combined effort made by the Special Forces troops, commandos and the Infantry troops has been one of the highlighting factors in this operation.

After the Security forces liberated Sampur, the LTTE withdrew further southward and concentrated their power in the southern bank of Mavil Aru .

There were around 26 identified LTTE camps located between Kadjuwatta to Upparu. This included two camps in Echchalanpaththuwa, four camps including a training base in Kathiraveli, two camps including a sea tiger base at Palchenai, three camps including a gun position at Kandaladi, seven concentrated camps in the Vakarai town, three camps at Karuvappanchenai, one camp at Panichchankerni , three camps at Kaddamuravikulam and one at Thonithandamadu. Further, the LTTE had three strong defence lines up to Panichchankerni Bridge each stretching about 3-6 Km from the eastern coast.

During the first phase of attack that was conducted from 30th October to 15th January, Army troops made four successive approaches in to the un-liberated areas.

On 4th of December 2006 the troops advanced in three fronts from Trikonamadu , Kirimichchiya and Kadjuwatta and cleared off 15km into the Trikonamadu jungle. During this approach the LTTE targets at Kaddamuravikulam, Karuvappanchenai and Madurankernikulam were destroyed.

Engaged

The second approach was made on 9th December from Mahindapura Southwards and engaged with the LTTE targets in Echchalanpaththuwa area.

The third and the fourth approaches were made on the 10th of December, one from Trikonamadu and the other from Kadjuwatta. The troops infiltrated from Trikonamadu advanced 12km into the LTTE dominated areas and crushed the LTTE camps in Thonithandamadu. The elite troops advanced form Kadjuwatta onwards, carried out four assaults at Panichchankerni and captured up to the second bunker line of the LTTE.

By the end of Phase I the SL Army could cleared off 8-10Km in to the Trikonamadu jungle encompassing the Kaddamuravikulam , Karuvappanchenai , and Madurankerni Kulam areas.

Following the completion of the Stage I, the infantry troops in small groups marched into the newly captured territories and consolidated the achievement of their elite counterparts. By doing so, the life line for the next stage of operations was established.

Troops of the 7th Gamunu Watch (GW) marched 7km to the west of Kadjuwatta and linked up with the 6th Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR) who were marching from Nagasthanna. Both group further marched further 12km up to Kaddamuravikulam where they again linked up with 10th Gajaba Regiment (GR) soldiers who had marched 15Km from Sinhapura via Trikonamadu.

As the phase I of the operation was completed, a total number of 21504 civilians including 9838 children arrived safely to the government controlled areas.

The 23 Division under the command of the Brigadier Daya Ratnayake made arrangements to look after those civilians having erected massive welfare camps in and around Valachchenai town.

Artillery and air assaults resulted in number of civilian deaths and casualties. Tiger artillery on 09th of December 2006 struck the Somadevi school at Somapura, Kallar injuring nine children and two teachers. Another shell fell on a house killing all three members of the family including an army soldier. The funeral of the deceased took place at a nearby temple as the house was completely destroyed.

Prior to infantry movements, Special Forces penetrated Tiger held areas. The method employed by the elite forces was to “seek and target Tiger cadres.” Unofficial claims put the number of Tiger deaths at a staggering 300, including three to four senior cadres.

The LTTE too admitted the killing of one of their regional leaders. According to the Tamilnet website, Lt Col Viduthalai, military coordinator of Vakarai, was killed as a result of a confrontation with the army.

Special Forces infiltrating this region was a crucial operation undertaken by all three regiments of the Special Forces- 1, 2 and 3, commanded by Majors Ihalagama, Peiris and Major Senerath Yapa.

Accompanying these elite forces were infantry formations from the 6 Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR) and the 6/8 Gemunu Watch (GW).

The battle plan was such that the Special Forces were to capture areas and hand over same for the accompanying infantry troops to hold on to.

Special Forces accompanied by infantry troops from the 6th Gemunu Watch advanced into the Panichankerni area, from the South of Vakarai amid intense fire and captured an area of about four and half square kilometres. After initially offering resistance, the Tigers deserted their bunkers and fled along with their wounded cadres. Several Tiger cadres died and three Special Forces and 8 soldiers of the 6 Gemunu Watch Regiment were killed in the confrontation.

Backed by 1 SF Delta Squadron, the infantry troops moved into Kaddamurikulam and killed 19 Tiger cadres. The security forces captured a row of bunkers at Tranctor Junction on Sunday itself.

Meanwhile, the Charlie Squadron of the Special Forces along with infantry troops advanced about 6 kilometeres from Kaddakuruvikulam and was poised to attack LTTE bunkers in an area north of Thirikonamadu.

Immediate

Another immediate task of the security forces was to sever the link between Mavil Aru and the Triconamadu axis. Captain Manju Serasinghe and his battalion which successfully led the Mavil Aru and Sampur operations and Lieutenant Pushpakumara were commanding this part of the operation. They occupied an LTTE camp amid RPG fire by the fleeing LTTE cadres.

A group from the 6 Vijayabahu Regiment also arrived to assist them in this operation. Lieutenant Pushpakumara, who was tasked with the job said, it was not possible as his flank was open and Captain Manju Serasinghe agreed to undertake the assault as his group was positioned lower down. The operation was successfully carried out and the security forces achieved their goal. The two SF teams moved a further six kilometres from Triconamadu and captured several bunkers.

After the operation, the victors assembled around the camp and both Capt. Serasinghe and Lt. Pushpakumara, along with soldiers of the 6 Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR), were around. Placed there was a bomb that apparently could blast in all directions (360 degrees).

Ironically, Captain Serasinghe and four Special Forces were killed in a bomb blast while inspecting one of the deserted LTTE camps. Capt. Serasinghe was killed and along with him three other SF personnel died and two more were injured. In Lt. Pushpakumara’s group one SF personnel died and there were six casualties, while from the 6 Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment five died and there were 15 casualties.

That was the most tragic incident occurred during the first phase of the operation. The LTTE had not left any of their camps free of booby traps and mines.

So the troops had to be mindful about each and every of their moves in the battle front.

Special Forces backed by infantry troops from the 8 Gemunu Watch set out from Mahindapura. They came under artillery fire that killed three of the Special Forces and eight of the infantry soldiers of the 8 Gemunu Watch.

The Tigers were pounding 122mm and 152mm heavy artillery on the military establishments and nearby civilian settlements from the Vakarai area. The LTTE has moved its heavy artillery close to the General Hospital, Vakarai and to the Tamil Central College, Vakarai.

According to intelligence reports, the security forces placed the strength of the LTTE in Vakarai at 700 Tiger cadres, scattered all over a vast area. Since the crucial phase of the operation to liberate the civilian population was completed at the first phase of the operation the Special Forces along with the Infantry battalion planned the next stages of the battle to liberate the entire Vakarai area.

The second stage of the offensive commenced on 16th January, and lasted for four days of intense battle. During this stage the infantry keeping the Special Forces in the forefront spearheaded from two frontiers one from Kadjuwatta, and the other from Mahindapura developing two fold pressures from the North and the South. In the meantime, LRRP teams backed by small groups of infantrymen, marched into the Trikonamadu jungle from the Mavil Aru and Madurankerni Kulam areas in order to ambush possible enemy reinforcement as well as any fleeing LTTE cadres.

Approach

However, this approach was kept undercover as to lure the terrorists on the possible withdrawal route to the Thoppigala jungle. It is a basic tactic of military offensive to keep one escape route open for the enemy when conducting an all around assault. Thereby the enemy would be compelled to choose the option disadvantageous for them.

On January 16, Special Forces troops commenced their march from the earlier captured 2nd LTTE bunker line, south of Panichchankerni and capture the 3rd LTTE bunker line on the same day evening. At the end of the day troops established a 3km defence line across Kovilkuduirippu, south of Panichchankerni.

On the northern front Army Commandos marched in to Echchalanpaththu area clearing dense mine fields and booby traps. Commandos established their catch over 8km stretch south of Echchalanpaththuwa.

On January 17 troops in the Southern thrust advanced further 2-3 Km towards Panichchankerini and consolidated a defence line across 4km stretch between Veranthivu and Challitivumuani at the end of the day.

The Commandos at the Northern front could shift their defence line another 2-3km southward and established their defences between Valalthottam and Sankankuli at the end of D+1

On January 18, 2007 two days after commencing the operation, the troops in the southern front continued their advance further northward up to the southern bank of Panichchankerni lagoon. The LTTE cadres operating there exploded the Panichchankerni Bridge with the intention of slowing down the SL Army’s advance. However, the troops continued to push forward along the narrow stretch of beachhead up to Challitivu , east of the Vakarai town. Meanwhile, the northern thrust shifted its defence line further 2km southward by clearing up to Mavadichchenal area.

On January 19, 2007 troops managed to reach its major success as the advancing troops from the South came as the Special Forces troops captured the Vakari town. The infantry troops who moved further Northward on the narrow beachhead since the previous day night , crossed the shallow lagoon on foot in the middle of the night and entered into Vakarai town. Meanwhile, another approach was made to the Vakarai town from Panichchankerin over the destroyed bridge and the two groups linked up at Vakarai town on January 19 morning. After linking up, the troops continued their assault towards further northwards, clearing off an area of 8km, up to Komattalamadu.

Shifted

The commandos advancing from North shifted their defence line further 2km to the south up to Verugal.

On January 20, 2007 two advancing troops from North and South linked up at the 46th km post on the A-15 road. Immediately after the linking up, the infantry troops were directed to secure the beachheads in the east and the Special Forces and Commandos were spearheaded to the west looking for fleeing terrorists.

However, it was virtually impossible as well as ineffective to cover the huge jungle stretch completely so that the some of the LTTE cadres including their two leaders, Nagesh and Swarnam were believed to have escaped to the Thoppigala area.

The air force in the meantime established an excellent coordination with Army intelligence sources and carried out 11 air attacks at the LTTE bases, gun positions and enemy rendezvous points with precision strikes during the operation. The speculations made by the LTTE propaganda elements that the air force and army artillery attacking hospitals and other civilian targets were proven false as the ground troops found the Vakarai hospital unharmed even by a single pellet.

I had the opportunity to visit Vakarai and Kathirveli on January 23, as the first media group visiting the area after troops completed their task. The Engineering troops hurriedly constructed the Pannichchankerni bridge to facilitate the troops movements. It was during this visit we saw hoe LTTE had engaged in a false propaganda against the Security Forces. Above all the successful air raids on their bases were clearly evident to as Swarnam base was found completely destroyed by the air attacks indicating that the attacks had met their right targets.

Army artillery regiment also provided valuable support to the ground troops even under the severe constraints. According to the intelligence sources over 500 LTTE cadres were killed and at least another 200 suffered injuries during the Battle of Vakarai itself. Forty Five army soldiers made their supreme sacrifice for the country while another 230 sustained injuries.

Further, the security forces could capture the largest ever stock of weapons including four heavy artillery guns from the LTTE terrorists. Although the LTTE claimed that they had tactically withdrawn from the area, what was found on their escape route told a different story. The way the fleeing terrorists had left their weapons indicated the extent of fear and shame of defeat encountered by them.