Muhamalai, the prelude to Nanthikadal victory

By Ranil WIJAYAPALA

Memories that unfold in our mind about Sri Lanka’s struggle to achieve permanent peace give an important place for the month of August which goes down in history as the one in which the LTTE started digging its own grave.

It was in 2006 that the country reached a critical situation when the LTTE fired the first bullet into the air in closing the sluice gates of Mavil Aru. The LTTE started digging its own grave by giving up negotiations with the Government.

Although the LTTE launched its battle against the Security Forces from Muttur and Kattaparichchan on August 1, their real intention was to capture the Jaffna peninsula, their prime focus.

According to the analysts all LTTE operations in the East were a preparation for the major battle waged on August 10, 2006 in the Forward Defence Line in Jaffna, the National Front which is considered the most decisive for the LTTE.

The rigid terrain from Kilali lagoon to Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil, soaked with the blood of our gallant war heroes bears testimony to the tact that the battle was so decisive for the Security forces that the country could hardly entertain hopes for dawn of peace.

This article is dedicated to those who fought fearlessly to defend the National Front in August 2006 and to those who made their supreme sacrifice in defending that territory.

After the tactical withdrawal from the Elephant Pass in 2000, the Security Forces led by late Major General Janaka Perera established a defence line along Kilali, Muhamalai and Nagar Kovil in the south of Kodikamam to protect the Jaffna peninsula.

Even after the establishment of this defence line, the LTTE tried their best to push the Army as much as to the North towards Kodikamam and to Jaffna to bring Palali and Kankesanthurai, which connect the life line with the controlled areas in the south, within their artillery range.

It was fairly a tedious task for the Army to hold this line at any cost, because if by any chance the LTTE pushed the Army further back, all military posts within the peninsula would have become untenable seiged by the enemy. Supplies to the Security Forces and the casualty evacuation would have been cut off in the peninsula.

It could have created serious situation in the country. The 55 Division which was deployed in Nagar Kovil, Kilali and Muhamalai line, had to bear the brunt of defence.

During the Ceasefire the movements began on the A-9 road from the South to North and back Muhamalai became the entry-exit point to the controlled and uncontrolled areas.

Therefore, the food and other logistics channelled via Muhamalai entry-exit point. So Muhamalai became a very strategic point for the south and for over 400,000 civilians living the peninsula at that time.

The Jaffna peninsula then had around 40,000 government troops, the Police and particularly the deployment of the 55 Division to thwart any LTTE attempts of recapturing the peninsula.

From the Kilali lagoon in the West to the Nagar Kovil into the East the area differed from dense jungles to Kadolana and to desert like terrain full of sand dunes.

For the warfare, the training and the equipment that the Security Forces could use from area to area was different. The training and employment aspects were also different.

Armour was mainly concentrated in the Nagar Kovil terrain filled with sand dunes and less in the Kilali side. In Kilali the Naval detachment looked after the lagoon to ensure that no enemy infiltrated through the lagoon. The coastal line was looked after by the Army.

The 55 Division was the strongest Division the Army had in 2006 and it had over 10,000 infantry troops organised into four Brigades. It had 68 per cent of the Sri Lanka Army armour - armoured personnel carriers to the lighter tanks to the heavier tanks and all kinds of artillery comprising around 38 per cent of the Sri Lanka Army artillery guns supported by the signallers and the engineers. The defence which was very formidable was reassessed and upgraded daily according to the threat perception.

And the logistic support was tremendous to this Division and it had food stored to cater for 10,000 people for one month. The manner the Army mobilised resources for 55 Division proved the importance of the terrain they were holding.

On the other side the 55 division had to be kept on alert due to the situation in the country in mid 2006 although the Ceasefire Agreement signed between the Government and the LTTE was in force.

In June, the 55 Division commanded by Major General Sanath Karunaratne killed seven LTTE cadres who had infiltrated into the controlled areas on the Kilali side. Troops recovered two satellite phones including sophisticated weapons, a sniper, and disposable rocket launchers.

The gap between FDLs of the LTTE and the Army varied from 30 meters to 500 to 600 meters along the land front. In Nagar Kovil there was a place called Flash Point and the gap between the LTTE forward bunker and that of the Army was about 30 meters.

At this time as CFA was in force the troops had only to be kept on alert to avert any situation that would arise. But the 55 Division knew that the LTTE was going to attack them, but did not know exactly how and when they would attack.

The Security Forces in Jaffna and General Officer Commanding 55 Division Major General Sanath Karunaratne in anticipating of enemy attack provided training and equipped the troops and rehearsals conducted to face any eventuality.

From time to time LTTE fired mortars at the controlled areas and the troops had retaliate by firing at them and complaining to the ICRC or the SLMM and conveying the incident to the LTTE higher authority through the Security Forces Commander in Jaffna.

The situation was fairly tense and everyone knew that the time ahead was not that favourable. The troops were fairly in good morale and the Brigade Commanders, Battalion commanders knew their job very well.

At this time in the Jaffna peninsula, the Security Forces were connected to the South only through the sea and the air. The ship ‘Jet Liner’ which was transporting troops was attacked in June but the Navy averted that attack.

In July, the LTTE made a major shift in its negotiations with the Government. The battle was then started in the Eastern theatre in the Trincomalee district. The LTTE also tried to cut off the peninsula by attacking the Jet Liner.

The Security Forces understood that the LTTE was going to lay seige to the Jaffna peninsula and take political advantage to bargain with the Sri Lankan Government by trapping 40,000 troops in the peninsula.

On August 10, 2006 the General Officer Commanding 55 Division, Major General Sanath Karunaratne was on leave in Colombo to attend certain domestic matters.

On that evening he received a call on his mobile from his Staff Officer in the operations room that the LTTE started attacking the Muhamalai check point. He asked his staff officer to go ahead with the contingency plan they had prepared to face any eventuality and the communication got cut off suddenly.

However, the Army Headquarters and the Security Forces Headquarters in Palali briefed him that the situation there was not that good. The LTTE had captured the Security Forces defence in Muhamalai and Kilali and few bunkers. They had also captured the Muhamalai check point and it was little more than one square kilo meter.

When he arrived at Ratmalana, Colonel Kamal Gunaratne (now Major General), the Air Mobile Brigade Commander, Wing Commander Ravi Jayasinghe the Air Coordinator, and Commodore Udawatta, who was the Deputy Naval Commander of the Northern Naval Area were also present to go to Palali.

They were first taken to Anuradhapura air base in a helicopter and from there by another to Palali.

On their way to Palali, they realised that the situation was much graver because there were some air force technicians who were carrying parts of helicopters to Palali to repair some helicopters which were damaged due to artillery fire of the LTTE at Palali airbase.

The pilot of the helicopter made a tactical landing at a Kankesanthurai since landing in Palali at that time was little risky. The operations room in Palali was a very busy place as they walked in and they got a briefing from intelligence officer there.

According to him the LTTE would probably withdraw despite capturing some of the areas which were under troop’s control at the initial stage since that was not in their major plan. Major General Karunaratne was informed that five battalions were sent to new force the 55 Division. Security Forces Commander Major General G.A. Chandrasiri wished him all the luck when he left Palali to reach 55 Division headquarters in an armoured personnel carrier.

It was around 8.30 am on August 11, when Major General Karunaratne arrived at his Headquarters that he heard on the radio that Kilali area had been recaptured. The facial expression of Colonel Mano Perera, and Colonel Sarath Weerawardhana suggested that the situation was favourable to the Army.

At the same time Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka came on the phone and said he would send defence stores to reconstruct the defence and told him to ensure that this kind of thing should never happened.

He felt that the situation was ok and gave a directive to prepare for the briefing. From what he heard from the Brigade Commanders, he realised that the situation was different. The LTTE was proceeding with their plan and they were trying to push the defence line back to get Palali and Kankesanthurai within their artillery range. The intelligence officer said that they were going all out to capture the area. Then they realised that it was going to be a prolonged battle for which they had to readjust their plans with Brigade Commanders and regroup the disarrayed Brigades.

They were ready to face LTTE attack on that particular night on August 11. Once again the Army Commander contended Major General Karunaratne and explained to the commander that situation was not that good. But he had disagreement with Major General Karunaratne and got Air Mobile Brigade Commander Colonel Kamal Gunaratne to talk to him and gave directions to him.

That night also the LTTE started attacking the troops and again they pushed one of the Brigade FDL back. It was a very heavy attack and they tried to capture the ground as much as possible. The soldiers also fought back very bravely and defended their positions despite losing a few bunkers.

Casualties were very high in the both sides. Army casualties were evacuated by road to Palali since helicopters were not operating due to the continued artillery and mortar fire.

August 12 morning was another difficult day where troops had to readjust and recapture the lost areas. A Brigade was tasked to recapture the lost ground. They recaptured the area but their casualties were high. By about 5 in the evening again they had fall back to the second line of defence. On August 13, troops observing the LTTE preparations realised that it was going to be very decisive night for them and the LTTE as well.

They got ready to face all kinds of eventualities and had very hard days of work to thwart the LTTE attacks. The Air Force helped them tremendously after bombing Elephant Pass and Pallai area where the LTTE concentrations were present. The intelligence sources were gathering information and engineers were making all kinds of barriers after laying mines to hinder the enemy mobility.

On August 13, as they expected the LTTE started attacking the troops around 7 in the night. Soosai was leading the boats and he was sending the boats from the Kilali side while Jeyam was on the southern side and directing the attacks.

Troops shifted some of their tanks to Kilali side. The tanks did a tremendous job by attacking the boats which were trying to land from the Kilali lagoon. All boats which tried to land in Kilali were destroyed and ultimately Sea Tiger leader Soosai had to withdraw his troops.

But Bhanu and Jeyam on the southern side who were very ferocious were trying their best to capture the Army controlled areas. But troops did an excellent job and they kept on fighting.

The command of a particular bunker was changed four to five times between the troops and the LTTE because it was on a high ground and from which anyone can dominate the entire area. So both sides understood and knew the gravity of the area.

In that particular fight the Army lost six soldiers. The forces recovered 16 dead bodies.

And by morning the Army which was on the winning side gathered that the LTTE had lost their cadres and equipment and all their effort were stopped. Then they had to prepare the defence, regroup and reorganise the troops, evacuate the casualties and send the dead bodies back to Palali and prepare for the next day.

The next attack was on the Nagar Kovil front and they understood that they cannot come from the A-9 road and it was difficult for them to go to Kodikamam on the A-9 road. They concentrated on the Nagar Kovil front.

In Nagar Kovil they came in boats from Chalai, the area south of Elephant Pass and they tried to infiltrate into the area. Again the tanks did a tremendous job in destroying the boats if they landed. In the open terrain the guns the tanks did a tremendous job and killed all the Tiger cadres who tried to get closer to infantrymen manning the bunkers. Again the evening was thrown back.

Although the troops threw them back, yet they held onto the Muhamalai check point area which they captured initially. By about August 16 the Army recaptured all other areas except the Muhamalai which was more than one square kilo meter.

They had to plan an attack to recapture the area and got armour and artillery support and the infantry mounted attack on August 23. Army recaptured the Muhamalai check point area which they lost to the LTTE on 10th evening.

By August 23, the 55 Division inflicted very heavy casualties on the LTTE. They all were happy but the casualty rate was fairly high. The Division had to be reorganised again. By this time Colonel Shavendra Silva who was deployed elsewhere was sent to take over the Air Mobile Brigade from Colonel Kamal Gunaratne who had completed his period in the field.

It was time for him to return to Colombo but there was delay in his promotion as Brigadier and once received it, he handed over the Brigade to Colonel Shavendra Silva.

Then Major General Karunaratne handed over the duties of the victorious 55 Division to Colonel Kamal Gunaratne and returned to the Army Headquarters after staying in Jaffna Security Forces Headquarters, looking after the duties of the SFJ Command in the absence of Major General G.A. Chandrasiri. That was how the valiant troops defended the National front in Muhamalai, which enabled the Army to tread on to the path of victory until they reached the final victory on the banks of Nanthikadal lagoon in May 2009.