Suppressing the LTTE:

Surveillance on surrendered combatants vital - Lecturer, Macquarie University

By Shanika SRIYANANDA

The Advisor to the Sri Lankan Government delegation for peace talks with the LTTE from 2002-2006, Shanaka Jayasekara said Eric Solheim, who crafted the Ceasefire Agreement, got LTTE approval prior to presenting it to the Government. This had made the Government uneasy on negotiating. The only option left for the Government was to 'take it or leave it'.

"Eric Solheim was very sympathetic to the LTTE and influenced Norwegian foreign policy in favour of the LTTE. However, others like Vidar Helgeson were very forthright and did counter balance the Solheim influence", he said in an exclusive interview with the Sunday Observer. Jayasekara, who is an Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University in Sydney, is doing research on terrorist fund-raising, weapons procurement and support networks.

He spoke of LTTE propaganda, human trafficking, the LTTE's international network and the measures needed to be taken to suppress the LTTE network. Jayasekara said that the Gotabaya strategy based on a 'can do' attitude brought about the military victory.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How strong is the pro-LTTE diaspora and will it remain like the supporters of the pro-Khalistan terrorist group, which still exists in the US, Canada and UK, in small numbers?

A: It is difficult to estimate the strength of the pro-LTTE support overseas. However, it is important to understand the sociological underpinnings of LTTE influence within the Tamil diaspora. If we take out the secessionist ideology of the LTTE and examine the group influence, we find that the LTTE was instrumental in changing the elitist caste system among the Tamil population. The traditional leadership roles played by the high caste were replaced by the military hierarchy of the LTTE as the determinant of the new Tamil order. So no longer were Tamil leaders from the Vellalars, but from fisher folk, smugglers. Anybody that moved up the ranks of the LTTE was the point from which you draw your status within the community.

This was amplified among the Tamil diaspora, the TCC (Tamil Coordinating Committee) which is the LTTE representative in each host country was dominated by the new breed of LTTE elite and they were not from the traditional elite of the Tamil community.

They used the conflict in Sri Lanka to stay relevant and visible actors within the community. After the end of the conflict and elimination of the LTTE, the TCC elite and their apologists are finding it hard to maintain that visibility.

Added to this, there are individuals that hold LTTE assets or have acquired assets on behalf of the LTTE and they have no way out. They cannot sell out as the community will want their fair share, so the only option is to carry on perpetuating the myth of an LTTE revival.

There are many dynamics at play within the Tamil diaspora and unfortunately there is no alternative that has been offered to fill the vacuum of the LTTE. So many Tamils feel disillusioned and confused as to how they can help the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.

Q: There is a marked silence in pro-LTTE diaspora activities after its propaganda on declaring a transnational government in exile. Why?

A: The LTTE international network is extremely asset rich, having said that the assets are dispersed among many factional groups at present without any coherent chain of command. The LTTE invested in real estate, shipping, Hindu temples, spice shops, petrol stations, phone card companies and other ventures and they are generating a regular income. At present much of this money is used for propaganda and lobbying activity. However, it is not the publicity oriented propaganda of the past. Now it is a very sophisticated and nuanced approach to a targeted audience.

The new approach is basically to place a veil of amnesia over the three decades of LTTE terrorism and indiscriminate suicide bombings on civilians and frame all international discourse on the Tamil issue to the last days of the war in May 2009. This has worked with most European governments which are only interested in discussing the last days of the war.

Q: After the arrest of KP, do you think the LTTE is globally defeated?

A: I think we need to understand what happened to KP. Many have criticized the 2002 ceasefire agreement and I agree there were many weaknesses in the ceasefire and it blatantly favoured the LTTE . But very few people have understood the impact of the ceasefire on the KP international network. Upto 2003, the LTTE transacted their weapons procurement operations through KP and his cells in South East Asia, Eastern Europe, Eritrea and in particularly North Korea. However, after the ceasefire many diaspora supporters travelled to Kilinochchi and made direct contact with key leaders of the LTTE. The LTTE leaders then diversified the weapons procurement operation using these new contacts, many of whom were simply amateurs and had little knowledge of the illegal weapons market. Many of them plundered LTTE finances and some got caught in sting operations by foreign security agencies.

As for KP, he was sidelined from the core operation since 2003. Then in January 2009, in desperation Prabakaran reinstated KP as the international head of the LTTE to garner international support in a final bid to halt the military assault by the Sri Lankan forces.

KP is a big fish in the LTTE weapons network, but he is not the biggest fish. It's a person by the name of Ponniah Anandarajah that masterminded LTTE weapons networks in the post-KP period. In my estimation Ponniah Anandarajah is still a serious threat to the security of Sri Lanka as he has access to the global weapons networks.

Q: Do you think the arrest of KP is the biggest blow to the LTTE's international network?

A: The arrest of KP, the arrest of Rajan and the acquisition of the LTTE vessel MV Chrishantha are remarkable achievements for Sri Lanka security agencies.

After Prabakaran anointed KP as the international head of the LTTE in January 2009, the LTTE found a single undisputed personality to rally around. KP was coming back into the thick of things and was reorganizing the international network with his confidants. The extraction operation of KP disrupted this process and fractionalised the network. If he was not arrested, the international network would have had a unifying personality.

Q: After KP, who do you think will have a say internationally to lead the LTTE?

A: I think we are still thinking of the LTTE as a centrally organized structure. If you look at the evolution of terrorism globally, centrally structured groups are vulnerable to counter terrorism operations. Most groups have evolved into network terrorism in which there is no central structure, rather an informal network of likeminded cells undertake different operations with a common objective.

It is likely that the next phase of the LTTE may mirror the concept of network terrorism. However, for network terrorism to succeed there has to be a unifying narrative. At this stage, the LTTE factions are unable to agree on a common narrative to mobilize support.

Q: Can they make an impact internationally and make a comeback?

A: In my view, LTTE assets are now being used for propaganda and lobbying purposes targeting specific audiences and that's gaining traction. I feel the Government has been playing catch-up responding to LTTE initiatives internationally.

The war on the ground was won after the Security Forces understood the LTTE and changed strategy to fight using guerilla tactics. The international battle is the same, the LTTE has changed its propaganda strategy and the Government needs to understand and adapt fast.

Q: Do they have a base in Sri Lanka?

A: The LTTE members will have access to weapons that were buried in safe places during the military defeat. The question is when will these weapons be unearthed.

I would believe that the risk factor will progressively increase when the 9,000 surrendered LTTE combatants are released over a period of time.

It only takes two or three to unearth buried explosives and set off a claymore mine on a military convoy. One incident can undo all the progress and normalisation efforts undertaken. The release of the surrendered LTTE combatants and their surveillance has to be managed very efficiently.

Q: Is it true that the LTTE after the demise of Prabhakaran had internal problems and KP and Nadiyavan fought for the ownership of the outfit's assets?

A: As I understand KP attempted to reorganize the international network and put his men in control of the assets. The control of LTTE overseas assets has been a major problem for the network and will continue to be a problem into the future.

Q: Does the MV Sun Sea which docked in Canada belong to the LTTE and will it continue to be a part of the LTTE human trafficking network?

A: MV Sea Sun (former name Harin Panich 19) was not part of the original LTTE shipping fleet. It was purchased by LTTE operatives led by Captain Vinod around three months ago for the specific purpose of human smuggling.

Q: What do you have to say about the LTTE's human smuggling network and what action is needed to be taken globally?

A: Firstly, recipient countries such as Canada and Australia need to base its asylum seeker criteria on the UNHCR recommendations. The UNHCR clearly indicated that Tamil persons from Northern Sri Lanka are not in any danger and political asylum should only be considered for an individual that has a specific threat in Sri Lanka. Therefore, based on the UNHCR recommendation all Tamil boat people should be sent back. This will be a clear message to potential asylum seekers.

The problem is that most of the payments to these human smugglers don't come from the asylum seekers. Rather they are paid by relatives in the diaspora. The Canadian authorities should track down payments made by relatives in Canada. Also these human smuggling vessels maintain satellite phone contact during the voyage. These contacts should also be under surveillance.

Q: The military in its search operations in the Wanni, the former LTTE strongholds recover hauls of military equipment, including sophisticated weapons, C-4 explosives. Can this be a plan by the LTTE for revival?

A:As I said before, the next major test will be when the 9000 surrendered LTTE combatants are released.

Q: The resettling process is going at a commendable phase. How best could we resettle the displaced people of the Wanni, not leaving room for the LTTE's revival?

A: In most western countries counter terrorism operations are spearheaded using an intelligence drive strategy. Billions of dollars have been invested in advanced technical intelligence gathering capacity and legislation relating to interception and eavesdropping. Sri Lanka needs to develop an intelligence drive counter terrorism strategy prior to the release of these surrendered combatants.

Q: Norway which was the LTTE's main nerve centre in the EU offered a month-long tour headed by SP Thamilselvam to EU countries to get more support to make the outfit strong in 2004. Why did the Norway-LTTE strong bond fail to save the LTTE?

A: I think we tend to generalize Norway as a single entity that was supportive of the LTTE. In my view Eric Solheim was very sympathetic to the LTTE and influenced Norwegian foreign policy in favour of the LTTE. However, others like Vidar Helgeson were very forthright and did counter balance the Solheim influence.

Q: You were an Advisor to the Government delegation during the peace talks with the LTTE from 2002-2006. Why did the talks fail?

A: There were several reasons. Firstly, Anton Balasingham agreed to the Oslo communique accepting internal self-determination within a united Sri Lanka at the third round of talks.

The LTTE was not ready to give up their demand for a separate State and from the third round onwards the LTTE was attempting to backtrack its commitment to the Oslo communique. The LTTE did not have a plan for a political process, they were unsure if they wanted development first under SIHRN or an interim process as proposed by ISGA.

There was complete confusion in the LTTE camp, I think they used the ceasefire for a respite and wanted to return to fighting.

The Government was not united, there were competing interests between the President and the Prime Minister which could not be reconciled at the time.

Q: It was revealed that the Government signed the CFA hurriedly and was masterminded by Anton Balasingham. How true was this?

A: I am not sure if Anton Balasingham was the mastermind, rather Eric Solheim crafted the CFA and first got LTTE approval before presenting it to the Government. The Government was only given the Ceasefire document after the LTTE agreement was reached, so there was no opportunity for the Sri Lankan Government to negotiate. It was a take it or leave it option for the Government.

Q: It is a popular secret that the LTTE became stronger after each session of peace talks. Do you as an expert who analyzed the LTTE's behavioral pattern, agree to this?

A: The LTTE was building up its military machinery, as I said before the LTTE leaders established direct contacts with visiting diaspora members and commenced a restock of their military supplies. They also invited the diaspora heads to revamp the international network, which included financing and propaganda activity.

Each round of talks was not necessarily a threshold point, but the LTTE continued to build its weapons stocks throughout the ceasefire.

Q: Do you see any difference in the Gotabaya Rajapaksa military strategy than the previous military plans?

The Gotabaya strategy was based on a 'can do' attitude, while all previous approaches were simply attempting to contain the LTTE, not destroy it. Gotabaya had three important pillars to his strategy.

1. Troop surge. He increased the manpower strength of the forces by 40 percent in two years.

2. Cut off supply channels. He got the Navy to destroy 10 LTTE merchant vessels transporting weapons in deep sea near Indonesian waters.

3. The use of guerilla tactics. The Army adopted guerilla tactics which meant the LTTE was facing the enemy from front and the rear.