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by Prof. Tissa Vitarana

After the initial euphoria that followed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) establishing a ceasefire there is an increasing measure of unease developing among some sections that support the Government's efforts to prepare a suitable climate for peace talks. This is being exploited by extremist elements who are opposed to the peace talks to break down public confidence and spread alarm. The Government must take note of these trends and act in time to prevent the type of backlash that occurred in the South after the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987. It is unfortunate that the government has not yet implemented the measures that might have prevented these developments proposed by a group drawn from the LSSP, CP and the National Alliance for Peace. This included the setting up of a Select Committee in Parliament, a National All Party Commission and local Citizens Committees linked to the police to help in effectively monitoring the ceasefire and interacting with the public.

If the opposition mounts, and the SLFP too is further alienated, it is unlikely that any peace agreement arrived at with the LTTE will receive the two thirds majority in Parliament nor a majority at a national referendum that is required for its legal acceptance and implementation. The catastrophic consequences of a resumption of hostilities in the context of the advantages gained by the LTTE during the ceasefire are too horrible to contemplate. Public confidence in the peace process must be maintained.

Among the factors contributing to the growing unease is the evidence of the LTTE rearming and also recruiting and training more cadres, in the context of not altogether abandoning its original demand for a separate state, backed by the so-called Thimphu principles. The latter, the concept of a Tamil nation having a traditional homeland and being entitled to the right of self-determination, are necessary to justify the LTTE claim for a separate state. Too much must not be made of this issue as it is unrealistic to expect a militant organisation to give up its declared objective before the peace talks commence. For instance in Northern Ireland the IRA, two years down the peace process, are still sticking to the ultimate demand of a re-unification of Ireland. That Prabhakaran has committed himself to direct peace talks within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and modified his stance on self-determination are promising developments that make room for an acceptable solution to be worked out.

Besides taking the extreme position that Prabhakaran is merely using the ceasefire to prepare for war, opponents of the peace talks have gained credibility by stating that he is trying to achieve through the present peace process what he has failed to achieve in the last two decades by war. Both Prabhakaran's April 10th media conference and the concessions given by the Government in the Ceasefire MoU lend credence to this argument.

At the media conference Prabhakaran made it clear that his twin objectives are the removal of the proscription and the establishment of an Interim Administration in the combined Northern and Eastern provinces under the control of the LTTE. Through the MoU the Government has paved the way for the former by permitting unarmed LTTE cadres to engage in political activities in areas outside their control. This step is quite unnecessary to implement the ceasefire and premature in terms of confidence-building measures. In contrast the PA Government was prepared to consider de-proscription only after satisfactory progress is made in the talks and the LTTE has clearly renounced terrorism. Despite the major implications, both nationally and internationally, of de-proscription the Government will now find it difficult to resist the LTTE demand for this as a precondition for peace talks. A powerful bargaining point may have to be conceded without obtaining anything in return.

Absurdity

If what Prabhakaran, through his interpreter Balasingham, stated at the media conference is correct it would appear that the Prime Minister too is prepared to confine the Thailand peace talks to the issue of an Interim Administration. The term 'interim' implies that it is a temporary preliminary step in the course of implementing an agreed complete plan for a political settlement. The absurdity of the position of the LTTE and the Government was brought out by the LSSP when it pointed out that the Interim Administration too should observe the same of norms of human and democratic rights that prevail in the rest of Sri Lanka. To achieve this the LTTE must of necessity give up arms and this question must be resolved as a precondition. If the LTTE continues to retain arms while also controlling the North East Administration all the people resident there and the other political parties, including those representing the minority Muslims and Sinhalese, will be forced to bow to its diktat and be silenced. Would this not also apply to the Sri Lankan police and armed forces. In the absence of a lasting solution to the problem that has addressed the core issues the fear that the LTTE can unilaterally secede may well be realised. Without a doubt there will be massive resistance to the moves to set up an Interim Administration per se both in the South and in the East with grave consequences to the country as a whole.

Sections of UNP opinion together with the business community appear to believe that a no-war situation, without a lasting solution to the ethnic problem, will suffice to draw in the foreign direct investment that they see as the key to Sri Lanka's economic development. In this they are seriously mistaken as without a stable situation established in the country for the foreseeable future foreign investors will not risk their capital. This is specially so in the context of the prevailing worldwide economic crisis. A lasting solution to the ethnic problem that ensures a permanent peace is an essential precondition for the direct foreign investment that the government so badly needs.

Prabhakaran categorically stated, as interpreted by Balasingham, that he does not propose to address the problem of working out a total solution to the problem of the Tamil people, and thereby achieve a lasting solution to the problem. The reason given was that "we do not think that Ranil Wikremesinghe is capable of addressing the core issues and offering us a permanent solution at this stage because the Executive's powers are vested in the President and his powers are limited to Parliament." This position of Prabhakaran is based on a correct assessment of the situation in the country and the nature of the Constitution. To be precise what he is stating is what the LTTE has always maintained, that there must be a consensus in the South to work out a lasting and comprehensive solution to the problem.

Nelson Mandela

The only way in which this can be achieved is by having a bipartisan approach to the peace process. The UNF Government and the PA Opposition must be jointly involved in the process and both must be represented at the conference table, and both the Prime Minister and the President, who is after all a part of the Government, should be kept fully informed and consulted during the entire negotiating process. In fact as the chief advisor to Nelson Mandela during the resolution of the ethnic problem in South Africa, Professor Nick Helshem, keeps stressing one of the most important factors that is necessary for the success of negotiations is to broadbase the participation so that the representatives of all or most of the constituencies involved are drawn into the process so that they come to have a stake in its success. Considering that it was the President and the last PA Government that initiated the ongoing peace process and did the ground work, including the Norwegian participation, and the specific request made in the recent SLFP statement to actively participate in the process, it would reflect very badly on the UNF Government if it did not accommodate this offer, and the entire blame will fall on it in the event of failure.

In the face of a bipartisan approach the LTTE will be compelled to address the core issues and work out a lasting solution to the problem which ensures the unity of the country by sharing power among the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim people both at the periphery and the centre while also ensuring that justice is done to all and human and democratic rights are respected throughout the country. This opportune moment when there is maximum international pressure on the LTTE, specially after the September 11 events, must not be lost. Once the overall solution is worked out, if not in detail at least in outline, the questions of interim measures including that of an Interim Administration can be properly addressed without any suspicion and with the cooperation of the public. The considerable work that went into the draft Constitution of 2000 can provide a useful basis for a new constitution.

It is my fervent hope that at this critical point in our country's history the political leaders will show the level of statesmanship that has hitherto been lacking and which the country needs so badly. There can only be one Mandela but let us hope that his example of commitment with tolerance will inspire us all to find a just and lasting solution to the most serious problem confronting our country and our people.

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