|
|
 |
 |
| Sunday, 22 September 2002 |
 |
|
 |
Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
|
From rhetoric to a practical peace Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA The Sri Lankan Government can claim a step forward in its peace effort so far from what has emerged from inside the conference room at the officers' complex in the Thai naval base of Sattahip, Thailand last week. Everything that transpired there may never fully be known, since it was all confidential and necessarily so, given the delicacy of the current stage of the Sri Lankan peace process. Typically, what the LTTE Chief Negotiator, Dr. Anton Balasingham, had to say was a little more precise than what the Sri Lankan Government Chief Negotiator, Minister G.L. Peiris said when speaking to the news media in their post negotiations media briefing in the posh resort city of Pattaya (noted more for its varied recreational negotiations rather than for political negotiations), not far from Sattahip. After all, the Government, caught up, as it is, in the intensely competitive civilian politics within the Sri Lankan State, has more to lose by being explicit at this juncture when it has acknowledged the military stalemate and opted to compromise with the one-time mortal enemy of the State. The LTTE is the party that has successfully resisted counter-insurgency and compelled the State to negotiate even while the rebel movement retains control of territory so it has less to lose and everything to gain when making public pronouncements. In fact Sattahip is of enormous propaganda value to the LTTE, providing it with an unprecedented opportunity to reach a world audience and make its case for international legitimacy. I say 'unprecedented' because, firstly, this episode of Government-Tamil militant negotiations has already been recognised as the most significant ever. Secondly, with the new focus on insurgencies globally, courtesy the United States' global-imperial designs, any critical negotiations with an insurgent group (and the LTTE is one of the world's most successful) now commands much international political attention and the global media spotlight. Thirdly, Bangkok is, indeed, a major centre of the global media in the Asia-Pacific region (following Hongkong and Tokyo), and the media crews are conveniently available for the Sattahip event. Furthermore, as I pointed out last Sunday, Thailand is an important strategic ally of the US, and this too will help US leaders to look at Sattahip seriously. So, no wonder that 'Bala', as he is popularly known, was all excited and so keen. No wonder that the Sri Lankan media, as well as the international media, hung more on to his words than that of Minister Peiris. In his hurry to adopt a posture of some significance, though, the LTTE chief spokesman may have caused a stir by his articulation of a seemingly radical LTTE change of stance, but has also contradicted himself as well. In his remarks to the large cohort of international media at the closing media briefing, Dr. Balasingham, often described as the LTTE's 'chief ideologue' (am uncertain about the truth of that, though; aren't there others who theorised much in Tamil?), declared that the Tigers' "ultimate objective" was "self-autonomy as opposed to a separate state, which is a totally different concept". But only a little later, in response to a question, he was insisting that the LTTE would not agree to a de-commissioning of arms until a final political settlement and would, "as a last resort" take to war for an "independent state" if the Tamil demand for "regional autonomy is rejected and conditions of oppression continue". Here, I am careful to quote from the Tamilnet website rather than from the Sri Lankan mass media which is prone to selectivity and interpretation according to Sri Lankan State interests. A careful examination of the Balasingham statements, both at the opening ceremony of the peace talks and at the closing media briefings (he had his own, exclusive, one after the formal media conference) indicate a similar theme, with the words (generally, except for that one statement about 'ultimate objective') carefully chosen. In other words, the LTTE position during and after the much-awaited first round of direct formal political negotiations, held in Sattahip, Thailand, during September 17-19, is basically no different from its general posture these past three to four years. As Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran has clearly stated in successive annual Tiger Martyrs' Day speeches, the LTTE is ready to renounce secession if it is satisfied with the power-sharing arrangement offered by the Sri Lankan state. At the same time, it would retain its capability to wage war for secession in the event of a failure of an 'internal solution'. The difference this year, at Sattahip 1, is clearly in the rhetoric and nuances and not in the substance of the LTTE posture. The Tiger leadership, while not diluting its position, has gone further than ever before in praising a Government in Colombo and in making public pronouncements that would ease the fears of the Sinhala majority community. This is important, and I discuss it further below. Leaving aside the LTTE's posturing, which is more important to it than to the peace process as a whole, the Sattahip First Round, did produce substantive results given the complexity and delicacy of this negotiating process. The substantive result of the Sattahip 1, other than the commitment to a timetable of future talks, is the agreement on a joint Government-LTTE 'Task Force' to oversee the rehabilitation of the war-torn Northern and Eastern Tamil areas. This, again, is barely remarked upon in the big media because of certain public sensitivies. In some ways, such a 'Task Force' could be perceived as being, effectively, a first step towards a Tiger-dominated interim administration, something that many human rights groups as well the Muslim minority in the North-East have worried about given the LTTE's penchant for authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, the proposed 'Task Force' is of immense importance. It is a first institutional arrangement, however ad hoc, that draws the LTTE into a nexus with the Sri Lankan State providing an opening for the (possible, hoped-for) re-integration of the LTTE-controlled sections of the North-Eastern region. It is in this development that the peace process has taken a tangible first step from rhetoric to practice. Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan mass media has, predictably, seized selectively on some of the Tiger delegation leader's remarks: those that seem, firstly, to hint at a renunciation of armed struggle, and secondly, indicate a shift from secessionism to devolution within an unified polity. However, this selective perception is, to some extent, legitimate and necessary. After all, the mass media, being linked to the State (via its ownership by the social elite) and to the majority Sinhala community and other ethnic groups other than the Northeast-based Tamils, (by its market and geographical spread) must cater to the needs and interests of these constituencies. While hard-headed political analysis would make such selectivity seem wishful thinking, the perceptions of the majority community are critical as the country edges towards a possible political solution. The country is today enjoying the longest stretch of peace in over a decade and that alone is a historic achievement acknowledged by all (except the Sinhala supremacists, who want more war). But even if the Government is naturally reluctant to publicly acknowledge it, the cost of this (possibly temporary) respite has been great: the virtual concession of about a quarter of Sri Lankan territory to an insurgent group in an ad hoc cease-fire arrangement that is open-ended and does not define the limits of control. What is worse from the State's point of view - is that the cease-fire agreement renders porous the Sri Lankan State's defences making uncertain the military equilibrium between the State and the LTTE. This leaves open the ominous prospect of an expansion of the rebel group's writ over more territory if negotiations fail and the current military equation is found to have been subverted by Tiger guerilla infiltrations and its cross-border political mobilisation. But no one, except those fanatical Sinhala supremacist groups who insist on a return to war, can point to any alternative than the current process. However, the current truce can only succeed if the larger problems are tackled and tackled quickly so that they do not fester and drag everybody back into violence. On the one hand, a fundamental reform of the Sri Lankan state is required to ensure that structures of regional autonomy are set up, structures that not only meet Tamil nationalist aspirations but also the interests of Muslim and Sinhala communities in the Tamil autonomous region. The regional autonomy issue was the main thrust of Dr. Balasaingham's Sattahip pronouncements. And he clearly talked of new "models" of State. On the other hand, the situation on the ground today, with all its uncertainties, especially in relation to the security of Eastern Muslim and Sinhala communities, needs careful political management. What is required is the political will by the Colombo political establishment to push ahead with formal negotiations to ensure that whatever concessions that must be made to the Tigers are made in such a manner that will ensure a smooth transition to a final settlement. That requirement, however, can only be met if another, on-going, political conflict is settled or at least suspended. This is the conflict at the very centre of Sri Lanka's embattled Sinhala-dominated state: between President Chandrika Kumaratunga, who heads the People's Alliance party now in Parliamentary opposition, and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front government. While the ethnic conflict has the advantage of international mediation, there is none to help resolve the struggle at the centre of the polity. Unless the Sinhala political leadership resolves its internecine, war the larger war cannot be fully ended. |
|
News | Business | Features
| Editorial | Security Produced by Lake House |
