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by Sumanasiri Liyanage

When I met a Minister of the UNF government in early September, I told him that the UNF would fail in its attempt in enactment of the proposed 19th Amendment to the Constitution. The Minister, responding, had expressed his optimism and was not very happy with my comment.

In my opinion, the UNF government has made two mistakes by presenting the 19th Amendment to Parliament: one legal and constitutional and, the other, political.

In the legal and political spheres, the legal experts of the government seem to have misread the clauses of the Second Republican Constitution, its own creation in 1978. The members of the Sri Lankan Parliament are not representatives of the people. They are, in the strict sense, nominees of the party. In such a situation, a 'conscience vote' does not make any democratic sense unless a parallel amendment is proposed to change the electoral system.

Secondly, the argument that the people's mandate is now with the UNF government is equally bizarre.

One of the key ideas of the Second Republican Constitution is that it allows people to give two separate mandates, one to elect Parliament and one to elect an Executive President. Constitution-makers have suggested that two elections should be held separately. So it is incorrect to say that one mandate was replaced or invalidated by another mandate. The subsequent election may show a shift of voter's consent. So the two institutions should take such a shift into account. But no more, and no less.

The second mistake of the UNF government is political. The Members of Parliament, in the present constitutional context, are necessarily 'party men' (and women). Their future lies less with the people's acceptance and more with the acceptance of them by the party to which they belong. In this situation they may not leave the party except in a very crucial conjunction that would help them to redefine their political future.

It was a big mistake for the UNF government to assume that such a situation exists at this moment although it won the majority in the December election. What does this failed attempt at constitutional amendment signify? The attempt at constitutional amendment may be viewed as an integral part of the UNF government's strategy, namely, gaining absolute power in the South. This requires clipping the wings of the President and the enhancement of the powers of the Prime Minister - a kind of a reversal of what was attempted in 1978. The constitutional manipulations represent one aspect of this political strategy.

Furthermore, the peace process also seems to be a part of this strategy. The UNF government, in its attempt to consolidate power in the South, seems to be willing to enter into a compromise with the LTTE by offering de facto power to the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

In the UNF's perspective, the consolidation of power in the South needs two programmatic strategies, namely, (a) an improvement of the economic situation and, (b) a weakening of the Opposition by various means.

It appears that the peace process of the UNF government is subordinated to this overall strategy. I argue in this article that this overall strategy, i.e. gaining absolute power within a formal democratic environment, would have an adverse effect on the peace process in the medium run and that the UNF government should change its overall strategy if it is serious in finding a negotiated settlement to the armed ethnic conflict.

As many of us have argued, the present peace process is an elitist one. Its focus is on elite elements: on the high priests, media bosses and editors, and business people. Track 3, that is civil society, is totally neglected assuming that they could be pacified by offering them some crumbs by the name of 'peace dividends'.

This strategy will not work for two reasons. The relationship between elites and masses is dialectical. The masses should not be reduced to a homogeneous entity. If the UNF government makes an attempt to weaken the Opposition by reducing the space within which the opposition parties could operate, the opposition parties could easily turn into ethnic (in this case Sinhalese and Muslim) entrepreneurs. And these ethnic entrepreneurs can talk to the masses over the heads of the high priests, conventional mass media and business people.

In such a context, the need for an olive branch may be stronger than the need for a Lexus. New political formations always use unconventional methods of mobilization deploying small group formations and communication via rumours and 'chits'. This would be more effective in an underdeveloped country like ours in which television is mainly a Western Province phenomenon.

As the LTTE adopts a similar strategy, gaining absolute power in an environment in which no formal democratic institutions exist, minority groups in the North-East would be politically marginalized more and more. This situation provides a breeding ground for new ethnic entrepreneurs there. The masses, unlike political theorists, do not separate issues. Therefore, mass mobilization and support cannot be singled out.

The UNF government's intention to accelerate the liberalization drive may generate discontent among the people. Mr. Ravi Karunanayake last week came out on TV against the behaviour of the multinationals in the gas industry. The extension of privatization in this given context may generate more suspicion and discontent.

Even the trade unions which are not affiliated to political parties have already expressed, in mass rallies and demonstrations, their dissatisfaction with the new wave of privatization. The political witch hunt against political opponents, reduction of space for opposition political activities, marginalization of small minorities, discontent with economic policies, rising inflation and growing political instability all combine to threaten disaster for the peace process.

How could these developments be dealt with? I propose a two-pronged policy.

First, the UNF government should enter into an agreement on limited issues with the main Sinhalese opposition party, the SLFP. It appears that the LTTE may not like this idea, but a bipartisan approach would be crucial especially when peace negotiations begin to focus on the issues relating to the restructuring of the Sri Lankan State (it may include policies that lead to right-sizing or right peopling the State).

I do not see this as being difficult. The differences between the two parties are not programmatic but mainly personal. So if the personal issues can be addressed to find an amicable solution, bipartisan agreement can be arrived at. This needs, as the UNF election manifesto itself suggested, the postponement of constitutional changes.

Secondly, I suggest a moratorium on further privatization for two years (I am personally for privatization of many sectors including banks). Such a moratorium may not create a major problem for the Sri Lankan economy. Our economy today is primarily a private economy. The role of the state sector is comparatively small. The questions that have to be posed are more fundamental ones: Are the privatized state industries more efficient today? Does the Sri Lankan private sector gain a competitive edge vis-a-vis the private sectors of the other countries of this region?

So I believe that the postponement of further privatization may not harm the economy in a significant way. A focus on productivity increase would be more beneficial than the attempt at new privatization. Similarly, a new attempt can be made to increase productivity and reduce waste in the state sector during this two-year period.

To achieve a sustainable peace, the above-mentioned two-pronged policy needs one more complementary aspect in relation to the Northern and Eastern province. The Eastern Province could be the Achilles' Heel of any negotiated settlement.

A group of academics in a recent closed-door discussion came out with a new idea in relation to the interim or rather an interim to the proposed interim administration of the North and East. They have suggested that Ponnambalam's 50-50 formula be adopted in the formation of the interim administration. This novel and innovative idea would reduce the tension in the Eastern Province and eliminate suspicion among the minority communities there. (I was happy to hear this suggestion as I have been proposing this formula for the entire country.) Such a mechanism and a respect for human rights can be placed as a condition by the international community for continuous assistance for reconstruction of the war-torn areas. The emphasis on private sector involvement in reconstruction would also contribute to the process of establishment of democratic governance.

Well, one may criticize my views as its focus is on a single issue and process, namely, peace. I do not make any objections to such a criticism. I am, in fact, trying to reflect on the past 11 months' developments from a justice-based peace perspective in order to find a way out of the possible derailment of the peace process by adverse developments in the South and the Eastern Province.

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