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| Sunday, 27 April 2003 |
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Maintaining the Ceasefire 2002 symmetry : Yearning for NATO Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA The panic in Colombo, especially among the upper classes, was such last week that one English language daily thought it necessary to carry Page 1 headlines assuring its readers (the anglicised elite, of course): "PM calm....". All it took to ruin the April holiday bonhomie was the announcement by the LTTE that it was withdrawing from the on-going peace talks. One could picture the ladies in Nuwara Eliya (or, should it be "Newreliya", properly elocuted? Not that any of them would know the difference between a stallion and Shanks pony) dashing for their cars, hats and boas flying in fear of revived Tiger "terror". There was gloom in the "pubs" (what happened to the good old "bars"?) of Colombo and Kandy. I doubt whether Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe actually lost his cool all that much, given his newfound maturity. I am sure that he and his advisers would know that, at some point, either this side or that ("this" depends on which side you are on) was going to adopt threatening postures or, at least, negative attitudes, as in the current LTTE action. "Is the LTTE serious? Will it mean war?" businessmen kept asking me. At least one Leftist analyst also similarly questioned me, although I would have thought that, schooled as he should be in realpolitik and protracted struggle, he would know the answers. Given the recent political developments why should the LTTE's action be a surprise at all? Who is living in fantasy? Who is yet fooled by Western-style imperial posturing about the "legitimacy" of "sovereign" states and the "illegitimacy" of "terrorists"? I can understand if Western or First World populations, yet to be blooded either by the triage of colonialism, the ravages of globalisation or the devastation of wars and insurgencies, fondly cling to the pretensions of liberalism and democracy. After all, even the strikes on New York and Washington are nothing compared to the blood-letting and agony in Hiroshima or Vietnam or Rwanda or Afghanistan or Iraq or Kashmir or Sri Lanka. But we, in the Third and former Second Worlds, should know, full well, the harsh realities. As Mao Ze Dong so correctly said: "Power comes out of the barrel of a gun". Not that all power comes from weaponry (as both the Vietnamese and Eelamist struggles have demonstrated). Much of it often does, though. Temporary suspension In this country we have waged war of various kinds for more than two decades. The current Ceasefire is precisely that and nothing more: a temporary suspension of the most ferocious of wars in centuries on this island. The two principal opposing military forces are but merely rendered temporarily offensively inactive by Ceasefire 2002 and, are yet poised to do battle at any moment (the LTTE has usually been quicker on the draw). In our peace process, the contest for geo-strategic advantage, ultimately, for the maintenance of the current balance of politico-military power, is constant and on-going. Peace-making in Sri Lanka actually means a re-ordering of the structures and relations of power: in the immediate case of relations between certain ethnic groups and between geo-political areas and elements of the State structure. The State itself has already undergone a considerable transformation, although the transformation has not been constitutionalised. Rather, the transformation has remained congealed in the loose provisions of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement. Because these provisions are necessarily loose, this gives considerable room for further contestation over any advantage either side could wrest in this ensuing state of suspended hostilities. As I have reiterated ad nauseam in previous columns, neither the Sri Lanka ruling elite nor the Tamil insurgent leadership benefits from a return to war. There are too many advantages in the status quo of suspended hostilities and un-finished negotiations. Both the UNF/PA leadership as well as the LTTE leadership wish, as Sinhala pop star Sunil Perera declared in last month's Sunday Observer Golden Clef Music Awards ceremony: "May there be many more years of negotiations!" As far as most Sri Lankans are concerned, then, it is NATO ('No Action, Talk Only') all the way. At the moment, both sides do not wish to return to military action; neither do they wish to go beyond 'talks' into constitutional acts. For the Sri Lanka State leadership, any attempt to go beyond just talking requires that the two main Sinhala-led political formations, the United National Front and the People's Alliance, suspend their own hostilities towards each other in their never-ending contest for exclusive political control of the spoils of State. This is not happening and, cannot be expected to happen in that simple manner in the near future, given the inherent dynamic of competition in our much-vaunted Western-style democracy. On the LTTE side, there is no rush toward a permanent political settlement because the LTTE and the larger Tamil self-determination movement is busy actualising their domestic power and political ethos within the proto-autonomous region of the North-East, part of it being virtually a de facto State. Having to physically build up from the ground over the ruins of war, the Tamil society rightly, in my view needs an interim in which no one other than those social groups within that region - and this necessarily includes the Moor and Sinhala communities there - have a say in picking up the pieces and re-building community, polity and social harmony. The only say the outsiders should have is in ensuring that enough resources are poured in to the North-East region. Given the quantum of politico-military power wielded by the LTTE in getting this far, the LTTE expects that this process of internal re-ordering and re-building be allowed to mature in some form. If anyone expects a social movement as that led by the LTTE (and if there had been no social movement, the Eelamist enterprise would certainly have not come this far) with so much investment and endeavour to let go of any of its newly won (if not constitutionalised) autonomy, they should go take a bath in the Beira. Just as much as the Sri Lankan State and its Western imperial backers are grimly determined not to give an inch (or millimetre in weaponry calibre) to the LTTE more than they are compelled to, neither is the LTTE ready to concede anything either. After all, that is exactly what they were fighting about all these years. Now, with the Cease-fire, there is a stalemate and both sides want to consolidate things in their own favour. The configuration of this stalemate does not provide for any asymmetrical legitimacy or asymmetrical power. The symmetry of the stalemate that stood at the start of Cease-fire 2002 must be retained and both sides will (ultimately) be ready to kill (fight) in order to do ensure that symmetry. The immediate objective of the 'peace process' then is not so much a 'permanent political settlement' as a maintenance of the status quo of suspended hostilities. The whole idea of the on-going peace process is that that jockeying for the advantage that took place militarily previously be done via political negotiations or through non-military political resistance. When the United States and the Sri Lankan Government jointly held a meeting in Washington to finalise economic aid in which the LTTE was excluded, this action should be read as a non-military resistance on the part of the Sri Lankan State (and its Western backers) towards giving any further legitimacy and political significance to the LTTE than it had been forced to do so this far. It was an attempt (foolhardy, in my view) to try to tilt the balance of power just a little bit in favour of the Sri Lankan State. If the Sri Lankan State can leave the LTTE out of part of the peace process, so can the LTTE. Even if the LTTE has withdrawn from the negotiating process it has clearly stressed that it was not returning to war. This has been firmly reiterated by the LTTE leadership in a series of reassurances. Instead, the LTTE is proceeding with its own peace process, or should be. In many ways it is doing so: its own internal re-building of the North-East society and polity, including the sustaining of its military capability. In my view, where the LTTE is failing, and failing terribly in its autonomous governance is in its management of ethnic relations in the North-East. The incidents in Muttur and clashes elsewhere between Tamils and Moors demonstrate a major failure on the part of the LTTE in its political management. Even in this, however, the Sri Lankan State cannot claim to be any 'better' in its own internal management in the territory under its control where war has not levelled everything to the ground and things do not have to be built from scratch as they have to be done in the North-East. In the South, political thuggery is common, so is bribery and corruption, and meanwhile, existing socio-economic rights of workers and peasants are being undermined, prompting strikes and protests. Despite the very courageous peace initiative of the UNF Government and its stunning success so far, all these problems in the South demonstrate the huge challenge to proper governance. Some might argue that, given the horrendously difficult conditions in the North-East, the LTTE is doing (and, has done) magnificently in internal governance compared with the Sri Lankan State and its leadership. The Sri Lankan State simply cannot afford to attempt to do by convoluted political manipulations what it could not and cannot do militarily: tilt the post-February 2002 Ceasefire symmetry of power in its favour. Rather than fall prey to the false illusions of 'sovereignty' proffered by the Washington, Colombo should accept the symmetry of power and proceed to negotiate with the LTTE on an equal footing. After all, even while it insists on the symmetry of power within Sri Lanka, the LTTE, in giving up the Eelam secessionist war (even if temporarily) is acknowledging the larger global asymmetry of power (in which the US dominates). This geo-political reality also applies to the issue of military re-supply as well. Just as much as the Sri Lankan State maintains its military readiness through its own re-supply, the LTTE also must do so. Otherwise, the gradual emasculation of the LTTE's combat readiness will upset that post-February 2002 symmetry. The recent military actions on the high seas in which the Sri Lankan Navy interdicted LTTE supply activity has threatened that symmetry. If anyone thinks that a social movement-cum-armed organisation that has come this far in political achievement by means of war will sit back and allow this emasculation, they should really spend several hours in the Beira waters. It's like expecting the US to democratise Iraq after it invested so much in invading and capturing that country! a calibrated approach What is needed is a calibrated approach. The Sri Lankan State, while certainly not conceding any legal loopholes that will enable the LTTE to further build up its offensive military capability, should not actively undertake military interdiction actions that will block the Tigers' basic re-supply for the maintenance of current force levels. Here, the Norwegian (and any other) facilitators have an expanded role to play in monitoring the force maintenance on BOTH sides of the frontlines. Even as the peace process means the continued jockeying for strategic advantage, the process cannot be realistic unless that jockeying is acknowledged for what it is, and the fall-out is avoided. What has happened right now is that the Sri Lankan State, despite its failed adventuristic manoeuvres with the help of Washington, has yet avoided war. But, it has lost out in the process to participate in the re-building of the North-East. Rather than the LTTE withdrawing from the peace process, the Sri Lankan State, and its Western backers, have been pushed back from their re-involvement in the North-East region. The LTTE could claim to be proceeding with the peace process in the North-East on its own. This is the last thing the State wants. Colombo must now save face and proceed to get back into the process of being involved once again in the North-East. Since it cannot do so by resorting to war, Colombo has to resist the seductive but unrealistic antics of Washington (which serve US interests, certainly) and re-connect with realities here in Sri Lanka. Symmetry is the name of the game. If that is acknowledged, the LTTE has no option but to re-connect as well. That is the road to Tokyo. |
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