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Sixth Sense by Raj Gonsalkorale

LTTE's desire to enter in to a negotiated solution to the ethnic conflict should not be taken lightly or dismissed out of hand as the JVP has done. Neither should other minor players like the Sihala Urumaya cry from the rooftops and incite racial hatred, when none exist today despite the acrimony of the war.

Neither should the LTTE assume that legitimate concerns that will be expressed by the government and the PA, are aimed to destabilise the current relative peace that exist in the country, and that genuine grounds that exist to oppose aspects of the LTTE proposals, are based on a revival of Sinhala/Buddhist hegemony or a deviation from a general accepted view (both by the UNF and the PA) on the need for an interim council and a significant role for the LTTE in it. Where there will be a divergence in opinion between different stakeholders, and understandably so, will be in the concept and detail of the proposal, what it means today and what it will mean in the future.

For those on both sides of the divide who think that the war could resume, and this conflict can be solved through that, it is pertinent to remember that the LTTE war is not fought just in the North and the East, but to disastrous effect, in the heart of Colombo.

Those who have temporary amnesia should ask someone to revive their memories of the Central bank bombing, the Katunayaka fiasco and many other unconventional attacks carried out by the LTTE. And for those on the LTTE and Tamil divide, it is worth remembering that the Sri Lankan armed forces were forced to fight many conventional battles and kill not only hundreds of LTTE cadres, but unwittingly many of their innocent people and also caused considerable destruction of the North and the East in the process. Both sides can repeat their battles and cause more harm to their own people, and still remain 'unbeaten'. Resumption of the war is not an option. Both parties need to understand each other's strengths and negotiate, and arrive at a consensus as to how this conflict could be resolved.

The fact that the LTTE has submitted some proposals is a positive step towards achieving a peaceful outcome to this conflict and an acceptance that they have relegated a war solution as a thing of the past. At least one hopes this to be the case.

There are some elements of their proposal that will, and have raised serious concerns about their ultimate objective, however ardent their denials have been since announcing their proposals.

These proposals are based, to a significant degree, on the Indo Lanka Accord principles, and the LTTE has also claimed they did not invent the separate State concept, but that they simply promoted it through an armed struggle once peaceful means of achieving their objective failed.

On the face of it, there appears to be no real shift in the stand taken by the LTTE that their ultimate objective is a separate State (called by whatever). No political scientist is required to interpret the intentions expressed in their proposals.

The government of Sri Lanka has no role whatsoever in the interim administration other than nominating a small number of members to the all powerful LTTE dominated interim council and basically rubber stamping any existing treaties and agreements with foreign governments and agencies, and passing on all proceeds to the Interim Council.

The Sri Lankan governments involvement in a very significant part of its territory, two thirds of the land mass when one looks at the Eelam map, and four fifth of the coast line when one looks at the outer boundary of the combined North East province, and with its citizens in the North and East, is that of a crippled bi stander watching helplessly when its territorial integrity and sovereignty is being taken away by a set of armed bandits. This is in marked contrast to the power, impact and involvement that minor parties have in the rest of the country today, where the much-maligned power of the Sinhala majority has become a thing of the past.

Regrettably, the LTTE proposals, as they have been presented, will not and cannot find acceptance amongst the major political parties and a majority of people in the South. They are fundamentally at odds with the government's own proposals and more importantly, they are at odds with the spirit of consensus and cooperation that one expected of them.

They also show that they are addressed to satisfy a constituency which is still in a time warp going back twenty years or more, and which has not deviated from their original goal of a separate State. The LTTE and the Tamil lobby has failed to realise and recognise the significant changes that have occurred in Sri Lanka since then, and the advances that have been made in recognising the equality of all ethnic groups in the country and the safeguards that are enshrined in the constitution to give protection to all communities. While these developments have been incremental and still have some way to go in certain aspects, they are major advancements to the situation that existed twenty years ago.

If the LTTE proposals are to proceed further, there will have to be an agreement on some very fundamental principles that are non-negotiable. These non-negotiable principles are essential to demonstrate that the interim council is an instrument of the Sri Lankan State, and not one outside it. They are, (a) a very specific and codified role for the Sri Lankan State in the interim council and (b) all provisions of the law of the sea to be vested entirely with the Sri Lankan State and (c) all overseas borrowings be subject to guarantees by the Sri Lankan State and (d) limitations to the powers of the interim council.

It is quite conceivable for the LTTE to be a powerful part of the Sri Lankan State if only they accepted norms of democracy and opted to contest elections in Sri Lanka. If they have the support of a majority of the Tamil population in the country, as they claim they do, they could very easily hold the balance of power in a Sri Lankan Parliament and wield considerable influence and power in the Sri Lankan State. That would have demonstrated to all how serious the LTTE is about maintaining the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan State, and being part of it.

In contrast, the proposals submitted by the LTTE are quite clearly the opposite, and they do not demonstrate any desire on their part to be part of the Sri Lankan State. If this is the stand taken by the LTTE and if, as per their claim, they are the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, then one should not be found fault in asking the Tamil people to say so through their elected representatives in Parliament and other Tamil community leaders. One can then end this farce about discrimination and lack of opportunities as being the reason for seeking emancipation, and perhaps consider this issue on its real merits and explore options that are available for both parties to this conflict.

It is time that the LTTE and the broader Tamil community took a stand on the issue of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Sri Lankan State. Statements with provisos can no longer be accepted as the LTTE has done something quite contrary to what they have said to the international community.

If the LTTE and the broader Tamil community does make an unequivocal statement to the effect that they will seek a solution within the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan State, and are agreeable to discuss an interim council solely for the purpose of resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North and the East in cooperation with the Sri Lankan State, then there is a case to discuss further with the LTTE and not discard their proposals out of hand as some have suggested. They could then be considered as a starting point to resume discussions and to agree on the non-negotiable principles, and also negotiate the negotiable issues.

If the LTTE and the Tamil community is not agreeable to accept the many advancements that have been made over the years to address issues of discrimination, security and access to opportunities, and does not make an unequivocal statement that they are agreeable to discuss a settlement within the scope of a unitary and united Sri Lankan State, it would not make sense to proceed further with discussions with the LTTE.

The current stand taken by the LTTE and tame acceptance of their brute strength by the wider Tamil community, has disappointed many moderate Sinhala people who have supported ongoing discussions with them in the hope that a reasonable settlement acceptable to all communities would have been proposed by the LTTE.

If the LTTE persists with their current strategy and stance, it may not be long before many Sinhala and Muslim moderates become extremists and become compelled to oppose continuation of discussions with the LTTE.

There is still a chance to negotiate, but if the LTTE remains adamant about their intentions, the numbers who will oppose discussions and opt once again for a very destructive and painful war will continue to increase, and both major political parties in the South, the UNF and the PA will be subject to intense pressure to wage another war.

The aftermath of such a horrible eventuality will be even more painful and destructive than the war that ended two years ago, and as usual innocent people will get caught in the cross fire because of power hungry individuals who are governed by idealism and who have no real love for the people they claim to represent.

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