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| Sunday, 30 November 2003 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Containing inter-party rivalry at the Centre Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA 'General agreement or opinion' is the Oxford Dictionary's short definition of the meaning of 'consensus'. In this country, 'consensus' is the buzz word today; the mantra for the kind of proper governance to meet urgent national requirements. These requirements, of course, are perceived differently by different sections of society. For most people the priority is a consensus between the UNP Government and the PA-controlled Presidency for the successful conduct of negotiations with the LTTE. For some people 'national consensus' is needed for pushing through economic policy measures some of which are likely to heap further social and economic burdens on the poor and socially marginalised. For others a 'Sinhala consensus' is needed to confront and defeat the machinations of the other ethnic communities here which are already consolidated in their own consensus in the ethnic contest for control of the polity, territory and geographical resources. For yet other people a 'Sinhala consensus' is needed to empower the Sinhala community not only to take courageous measures to share power with other communities in order to end the ethnic conflict, but also to build a new, truly post-colonial, self identity that has shed the neo-colonial cultural subservience that currently causes the collective angst that, in turn, breeds ultra nationalism. The angst right now for the elite seems to be the need for 'consensus' between the two main political parties for the purpose of collaborative governance. The principal objectives are the smooth conduct of negotiations with the LTTE and the smooth consolidation of neo-liberal capitalism and class hegemony. In my view, however, this emphasis on 'consensus' obfuscates the issue. It is a simplistic misreading of the current problem at the political centre of the Sri Lankan State. The most frequent use of 'consensus' here is about the need for a bipartisan understanding of the urgent task peace negotiations and a bipartisan, common, policy for this purpose. But this emphasis misses the real target. It is not that the UNP and the PA have differing views on their approach to the ethnic conflict and to peace-making. Both these parties have slowly, but surely (thanks to their common experience of the militancy of Tamil nationalism) arrived at similar positions on the ethnic conflict, their policies and actions in the past decade differing only in style and not in substance. Both advocate a negotiated political settlement, both advocate very substantial power sharing including extensive regional autonomy, both advocate modernist/secularist conceptions of Sri Lanka State and society that emphasise cultural pluralism as against ethno-centrism, and both now distance themselves from the Sinhala ultra nationalism of old. Current problem The current problem at the political centre is not really one of contradictory or even different approaches by the UNP and the PA. If you don't believe me, ask any die-hard Sinhala ultra nationalist and she/he will tell you clearly that both these parties are "betraying the Sinhalas" and are on the path to making such concessions to the LTTE "terrorists" that will destroy the Sinhala Nation and State. The current crisis at the centre is to do with the wielding of political power and the contest for the fruits of this power. It is not a mere irony that the Second Republican Constitution has enabled the two main, usually competing, political parties to be both parallely elected to power in the State, one in Government and one in the Presidency, but the Government with hardly any constitutional power and the President all powerful. This is one of the major flaws of the J.R. Jayewardene Constitution. It is a flaw that betrays not only Jayewardene's own authoritarian tendencies, but also the tendencies of the capitalist class that backed him and now backs Ranil Wickremesinghe's UNP and, to a lesser extent, the SLFP/PA. It is this very flaw that has now backfired on the capitalist class that, in those days of 'dharmista' rule so happily endorsed Jayewardene's preachings about an all powerful President not subject to the 'whims of Parliament'. That is because Jayewardene's rigidly authoritarian mechanism wholly ignores a basic dynamic of capitalist democracy: inter-party rivalry and competition for power. In its narrow-minded obsession with class hegemony, the ruling class has failed to devise a political framework that adequately accommodates, facilitates the very political dynamics (competition) that capitalist democracy engenders. That is because, the Sri Lankan ruling class, being the under-developed capitalist class it is, pays only lip service to capitalist democracy, unlike its infinitely more sophisticated Big Brother north of the Palk Straits. Hence, the Constitution, while providing for parallely elected Government and Presidency, has not provided a balance of power between these two institutions. And the ruling class and its 'think tanks' and lobbyists continues to fail to acknowledge the basic political dynamic that its own political system engenders: inter-party competition. That competition for power is not merely for the gaining of power and retaining of power, but is also aimed at the future regaining of power in elections to come. The current Constitution functioned somewhat adequately as long as the two parties were in clear opposition to each other with one in Parliamentary Opposition and the other in both Governmental and Presidential power. With that alignment governance was possible (even if extremely bloody, under Premadasa). Today, however, both must share State power. But the Constitution, structurally and institutionally, simply does not provide for any such sharing. That is why the current constitutional framework is unable to effectively contain the inter-party rivalry in an institutionalised and constructively channelled form. Once in Government, the UNP thought that it could use its immediate post-electoral popularity to ignore the fact of an equally elected President. Ranil and his associates sought to marginalise the President and thereby the PA from the fruits of power. The most important exercise of governance, the conduct of the peace process, was exclusively held by the UNP. And this is to leave aside all other important aspects of government such as national security, economic development, social welfare etc etc. What the UNP did was to deny the Presidency and the PA which held it from access to any fruits of the power which the PA actually wielded in being in control of the Presidency. In doing so, the UNP was denying the PA (and Chandrika) of that vital political resource of political credit. Every time the UNP is successful in any governmental exercise, it gains credit for it thereby sustaining its ability for retaining political power and regaining power in future elections. Every time the UNP does this while the PA-held Presidency is side-lined, it denies the PA of their rightful share of such political credit. PA entitled to share So long as the PA holds any part of the State institutions, it is entitled to a share in the responsibility of governance and any credit that accrues from governmental success. This, it was denied even in the most crucial aspect of governance of today: the conduct of a peace process, the present form (Norwegian mediation, extensive regional autonomy, interim government) for which the PA, more than any other party, was responsible. Political credit is crucial for competitive party politics. If the PA and Chandrika had continued to ignore their marginalisation they would have been committing political suicide. This is what prompted Chandrika Kumaratunga to use the profoundly authoritarian Presidential powers in exactly the way J.R. Jayewardene boasted they could be used when necessary. If the previous failure of the capitalist political system here could not contain inter-party competition within civilian institutions and pushed the contest into authoritarian repression and political violence, today, yet again, the inability of the framework to contain that competition has caused a crisis at the centre of the State with all the potential for possible repression and violence in the South even as the more powerful anti-state force, the LTTE, remains dormant and secure in the North-East. Thus, it is important to understand that the inter-party consensus on issues is already there and what is lacking is the sharing of the responsibility and political credit in the implementation of that consensus. And what prevents this sharing of power at the centre of the State is the lack of any constitutional framework that provides for and even facilitates such a sharing of governmental responsibility and political credit. If any collaboration between the two parties is to be effective, it is imperative that this constitutional lacuna is acknowledged. Thus we have to go beyond the Constitution. The last thing that is needed is the now familiar chorus both from local bourgeois 'democracy' lobbyists (including former Leftists turned Liberals) as well as from Western governments with a simplistic understanding of the local context (and their usual colonial laziness to bother with local specifics). If we remain stuck within the confines of constitutionalism as per the ridiculously flawed Second Republican Constitution we will not be serving the democratic needs of Sri Lankan society. If any collaboration between the two parties is to succeed, then there will have to be a series of new institutional mechanisms set up that will enforce a sharing of governmental responsibility and, thereby, of political credit in the event of successful governance in any sphere. Rather than simplistically aiming at 'national government', the pragmatic approach would be to learn from the failed Liam Fox Agreement and to develop a scheme that elaborates greatly on that early endeavour. Most immediately, there needs to be a institutional mechanism, such as a hierarchical series of committees, that will enable both the UNP and the PA to jointly oversee both policy and implementation in the peace process. This may include a committee that shares responsibility for defence. More importantly, such a structure should enable both parties to share the political credit for success as well as the blame for any failure. There is no question of transcending the competitive dynamic. What is needed is the facilitation of shared power and shared credit. We need a win-win situation here, in the South between political parties, just as much as in the country as a whole, between communities. |
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