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| Sunday, 4 January 2004 |
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Crisis of Sinhala politics 2004: will the betrayal of civilisation continue? Observations by LAKSHMAN GUNASEKERA In her characteristic lateness Chandrika Kumaratunga is but an unhappy metaphor of the nation she leads. After all, the national airline is fondly known as 'Usually Late' (UL). Most social functions, be they community occasions or cultural events, begin late. And the latest Late Achievement is in the field of tourism: by end 2003, Sri Lanka is supposed to have reached its 500,000-tourists-per-year target - nineteen years late. Actually, this was the Sri Lankan tourism industry target for 1984! What a way to begin 2004. Late as usual. I remember that by mid-1983, there was happy anticipation that the 1984 target of 500,000 annual tourist arrivals would be achieved early and there was concern over the lack of accommodation. Then came the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 and the problem was no longer the lack of accommodation but of maintenance of empty hotels islandwide. World famous Today, as we happily watch Japanese, Aussie and other surfing enthusiasts land at the BIA, hugging surfboards and heading for partially LTTE-held Arugam Bay even in that world famous surf paradise currently war dilapidated state, we forget how late we are in arriving at the half a million 'arrivals' mark. Thanks to our criminal failure to manage ethnic rivalries, The Maldives, previously a secondary destination to Colombo on the world tourism map, quickly overhauled us and, today, receives more than three times the Sri Lankan tourist influx. Whatever her failings, Chandrika Kumaratunga is certainly unlike most other national political leaders in that she shared no responsibility in the failure of the national leadership to resolve the ethnic conflict before it worsened into a civil war. Nearly every other national politician to hold office at the leadership level is guilty of being present in power at times when either legislative or executive (including military) actions were taken that worsened the ethnic conflict or violence or social disturbances that occurred and added to the tragedy. The Prime Minister, as well as many other current Ministers, was holding governmental office at the time of not just the July 1983 pogrom, but also the 1977 (post-election), 1979 and 1981 anti-Tamil riots, as well as the burning of the Jaffna Library, among other tragic and obnoxious incidents. He, and other politicians, were involved in numerous legislative and executive actions including the passing of repressive and discriminatory laws. The less said about previous Presidents and Premiers, the better. Of course, all of these 'national' leaders were (and are) Sinhalas. This is but symptomatic of the roots of the ethnic conflict. It is the insistence of the Sinhala community that it must not only control the post-colonial Sri Lankan State but also persistently and systematically discriminate against all other ethnic communities in enjoyment of national political community that lies at the root of the ethnic conflict. Betrayal The failure of the Sinhalas to obtain a more sophisticated vision of post-colonial, modern, nationhood is a betrayal of their civilisational legacy. From that failure stems the massive political crisis that we are in today. I suspect that the routine (even today), ritualistic reminders about their "2,500 years of civilisation" is but a reflexive resort to self-assurance arising from a subconscious, guilty awareness of that betrayal of civilisation. That there has been a Sinhala civilisation at least from around the 1st Century BC, I do not doubt. I am in agreement with K.N.O. Dharmadasa (as opposed to Leslie Gunawardana's claims) over that general proposition although the temporal definition is mine. But where it has gone and where and how should it proceed today is the question. Tragically, the betrayal of Sinhala civilisation continues. Even today, it is the failure of the Sinhala political leadership that is the principal obstacle to the peace process. As pointed out in one of my earliest commentary columns, in 1997, it is the Sinhala community which has remained bereft of a political consensus over the means to resolve the ethnic conflict. I have long argued that the Tamil community, propelled by the oppression it has suffered as a social group denied a form of political community, has evolved a strong political consensus on collective action. This collective action has driven the Tamil movement for self-determination through a long process of political struggle and secessionist war. It is this consensus and collective endeavour that is responsible for the current success of that struggle in which we see the joyous emergence of South Asia's newest national political community in the North-East region of this country. Whether this new national political community will become a fully seceded, independent, nation-state or whether it agrees to some form of federal or confederal linkage with the Sri Lankan polity remains to be seen and, is a matter of negotiation, both political and military. The reality of the success of the collective Tamil movement is there for all to see. And so it is with the Muslim community. This community too evolved a high degree of consensus under the very able leadership of M.H.M. Ashraff whose SLMC was able to straddle the East-Centre-West divisions of Muslim society. While the death (assassination?) of Ashraff has seen a fragmentation of that consensus somewhat, the essential issue of Muslim representation in the emerging Tamil polity in the North-East, has ensured that the North-Eastern Muslims, at least, remain unified, while Muslims as a whole are also in general consensus over the issue. During the first decades after freedom from British colonial domination the Sinhala community expressed its consensus over the need to hold on to the exclusive control of the Sri Lankan State. This was done through its sustained electoral vote in favour of political parties that espoused this 'Sinhala Only' policy and, of course, through the successive spontaneous civilian attacks on Tamils and Muslims throughout these decades (beginning in 1958). The successful political and military resistance by the Tamil community has, in the last decade, seen a clear shift in the Sinhala consensus. Today the bulk of the Sinhalas vote for parties that broadly espouse a less ethnocentric State and some form of power-sharing with the other ethnic groups. In recent elections at Presidential, Parliamentary, Provincial and local government levels, over 90 per cent of the vote, of which the Sinhalas make up over fifty per cent, has been cast in favour of the People's Alliance and the United National Party. Those political parties that espouse traditional Sinhala supremacist policies have not been able to obtain even five per cent of the national vote. However, while there has been a shift in voting patterns that reflect a shift in broad attitude among the Sinhalas, we are yet to see the growth of a consensual political movement among the Sinhalas that seeks to concretely and exhaustively achieve a new political form for Sri Lanka's polity that will ensure a resolution of the war. While the Sinhalas have gone so far as to simultaneously elect to power to the Presidency and Government their two main parties, the PA and the UNP, there is certainly not enough political momentum to drive a collaborative effort between these two parties. While many commentators now blame 'party rivalry' and rivalry between the leaders for the current political crisis of governance, this writer argues that while these elements are also present in the dynamics, the larger dynamic is that of continuing divisions at electorate level where the Sinhala constituencies of the UNP and PA have yet to signal that the competition for the spoils of the Sinhala-controlled State is no longer on. As long as these two parties feel the pressure of their constituencies for exclusive access to the resources of the State (direct or through tenders, contracts, commissions etc.) they are compelled to maintain strongly competitive postures in relation to each other. Pressures Thus Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe feels the pressures of his MPs who, in turn, feel the pressures of their supporters. And so does President Chandrika Kumaratunga. This does not mean that both leaders do not have the responsibility to lead their constituencies away from this political competition for the purpose of achieving peace. Their failure to do so demonstrates their mediocrity. In the current political scenario the greater responsibility to attempt such non-competitive leadership lies with the UNP because it is they who have been in the political limelight with their greater governmental majority. It is that failure on the part of the UNP that brought about the current crisis. Since the UNP steadfastly refused to move towards collaborative governance, at least as far as peace-making is concerned, the PA has attempted to impose some parameters for that collaboration in the form of a sharing of certain cabinet portfolios most relevant to the peace process and closest to the Presidency's constitutional ambit. However, the UNP has yet to respond positively to this situation. There is no question that the situation demands a climb down by the UNP from its original post-election posture of absolute power and absolute benefit. But, in reality, this is not much of a climb down. Because, in accordance with the voters' wishes, both the UNP and PA were expected to share governance in their shared control over the Government and the Presidency. Such a climb down by the UNP will be only the establishing of an equilibrium in which both the PA and UNP share power and political benefits while collaborating, in a structured manner, in the conduct of the peace process. Mediocrity But the mediocrity of the Sinhala national leadership is only a mirror of the mediocrity of the Sinhala nation as a whole. Even if their current leaders fail to lead them out of the perennial contest for the spoils of the State, that does not preclude the Sinhalas, as a whole, from changing their ways. Why is it that no new political leadership has emerged? More importantly, why are there no civic movements, outside the political sphere, that demand a new style of politics suitable for the current situation? If the Tamil community saw the birth of new forces that have taken that community out of bondage, if the Muslim community also saw new forces emerging to deal with their challenges, why is it that the Sinhalas have failed in this respect? It is not that they do not have a legacy of civilisation to draw on. Rather, it is their failure, despite their ranting and ravings about this civilisation, to actually draw on that legacy. Their comfortable self-indulgence while in exclusive control of modern Sri Lanka State has brought them into their current sorry predicament, and that very self-indulgence has left them bereft of the energy to seek new perspectives and new resources. The easy recourse to a readymade, exclusive State, courtesy of the British, seems to have left the Sinhalas at the mercy of the colonial legacy rather than at the feet of their own, indigenous forebears. Having given up parroting 'Sinhala Only', most of the Sinhala elite now do the 'English Only' thing. The Sinhala masses flounder confused, un-led, except by a few 'Sinhala Only' fanatics. Will this betrayal of civilisation continue in 2004? |
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