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| Sunday, 18 April 2004 |
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| News Business Features Editorial
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Why despair over the peace process? Sunday Essay by AJITH SAMARANAYAKE One explanation for the victory of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) (and one not without loaded political meaning either) is that it has almost polarised the electorate on ethnic lines in the sense that while the UPFA has swept the South the UNP received its majorities in districts with a sizeable minority community vote. This has even led to a sense of despair best voiced by the authoritative Tamil columnist Taraki who has asked 'Would any pragmatic Sinhala politician risk making peace with the Tigers in future after witnessing what befell Ranil and his government? Therefore wither the peace process?' But was the verdict of the electorate against the peace process or the particularities of the peace process? It would appear that it is not the process which has been rejected but the way in which it was conducted and handled. As far as the people were concerned there was an absence of conflict but no real or tangible peace. After two years of negotiations with the LTTE (which were anyway stalled) the UNP had not been able to consolidate or solidify the peace process in any meaningful way. Is it possible to believe that the southern electorate is inherently against peace ? After all President Kumaratunga did win a second term and her party the subsequent General Election after having initiated negotiations with the LTTE and having presented a Constitution which for the first time proposed wide-ranging powers to the North and the East, the now almost forgotten Union of Regions. What is more at the 2001 General Election the People's Alliance carried out a virulent campaign suggesting that there was a secret agreement between the UNP and the LTTE but the UNP and its allies were able to win quite comfortably. peace process In power however the UNP conducted a peace process which shuttling between esoteric international venues and receiving the pontifical blessings of foreign luminaries had no bearing on the more mundane realities of life as lived by the average Sri Lankan. Even supporters of that process such as Sunanda Deshapriya were constrained to point out repeatedly that the UNP was unable to build up a peace constituency the way the PA could with its much sneered at Sudu Nelum movement. True there were no check points and the new parvenu middle classes were able to go to the North and to Trincomalee where they littered the beaches but once this initial flush waned there was nothing tangible left except the mantra of a peace which presumably resided in some ethereal realm. There was also the suspicions surrounding the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and the LTTE supremo Prabhakaran to which the President was not privy. It smacked too much of an imperious gesture by a cabal of foreign powers to thrust an agreement from on high on a hapless people. The Prime Minister and other UNP spokesmen put a brave face on it claiming that it made for an international safety net for Sri Lanka but there was a growing sense that the national self-esteem had been wounded. Paradoxically enough it was also viewed with growing suspicion by the LTTE itself which as Taraki has pointed out was beginning to feel that Wickremesinghe was trying to tilt the balance of forces in favour of the Sri Lanka military by defence agreements with the USA and India. Anti-UNP caucus This was why it was easy for the anti-UNP caucus to attack the party as being anti-national and UNP leaders did not help matters either by appearing in public in lounge suits as if such a costume was necessary to cement their ties with their beloved international community. Past UNP leaders, for example Mr. Dudley Senanayake, had worn coat and tie but he was also able spontaneously to slip into a bush shirt and mingle with the people. Mr. Wickremesinghe himself when he made his debut in the 1977 Parliament had preferred the standard tunic suit of the politician but as Prime Minister he had made a lounge suit de rigeur as official wear and most of his Ministers had followed him. It was this suspicion of a peace process imposed by a combination of foreign powers and defended by unlikely politicians in business suits which made the southern electorate vote for the UPFA rather than any inherent dislike of peace. The people of the South have repeatedly demonstrated that they are not against a reasonable solution to the Tamil National Question but it is the politicians who have failed to handle the process properly and persuade them that such a solution is possible. But this does not mean that the peace process of the new Government will not have to face any obstacles of its own. There may be a certain degree of anti-LTTE feeling and xenophobia generated as the result of the way in which the peace process was earlier handled and these feelings will first have to be dissipated before the new process can get on track. But given imagination on the part of the new Government and its leaders this is by no means impossible particularly since it is a Government which has won the confidence of the southern electorate because of its nationalist credentials. The challenge before the Government is how these nationalist credentials can be reconciled with its commitment to a larger Sri Lankan nation. Southern opinion While it is difficult at this stage to say what direction any future negotiations might take it is clear that some preliminary clearing of the ground will have to take place. As far as southern opinion is concerned the new Government will have to spearhead something of an ideological and cultural campaign to prepare the electorate for the new peace process aimed at dispelling some of the suspicion which the previous peace process had engendered. On the part of the LTTE too a degree of flexibility will be called for of the kind demonstrated for example by Anton Balasingham at Sattahip in Thailand when he said that the LTTE was ready to go beyond old categories of thought vis-a-vis concepts such as separatism and federalism. Such a process of mutual preparation will be necessary rather than plunging directly into the choppy waters of discussion of the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposed by the LTTE. It will certainly be dispiriting to the Tamil people that every time a new Government comes to power in Colombo negotiations have to start afresh but the sunny side is that for perhaps the first time since 1977 in the present Parliament we find a legislature in which all the active political parties are represented including the new formation of the JHU composed entirely of the Maha Sangha. This should be a crucial factor in the resolution of the Tamil National Question for the ostensible reason which President Jayewardene gave for not calling a Roundtable Conference on the question (as promised in the UNP election manifesto in 1977) was that Parliament had not been adequately representative. With the JVP forming an important part of the Government and the Parliament reflecting the entire political spectrum one would think that the prospects for a reasoned consideration and the ultimate resolution of the National Question are brighter than ever before. This is what makes one feel that Taraki's conclusion (in the article mentioned already) that the 'political will of the Sri Lankan state to take the peace talks forward has been drastically eroded by the resounding success of the JVP and the JHU' appears misplaced and makes one hope for a happier outcome to our sad national drama. |
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