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| Sunday, 29 August 2004 |
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Features |  |
| News Business Features Editorial
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Ceasefire monitors under fire by Ranga Jayasuriya The role of the ceasefire monitors comes under increasing criticism after the series of assassinations in the East and Colombo against which the SLMM failed to take any substantive action. But equally the ceasefire monitors were also roundly criticised during the tenure of the Wickremesinghe administration for each time the Tigers breached the ceasefire. There is, however, one aspect that the critics of the SLMM has not noticed. The SLMM is not a peace enforcing force. It is a team of a few dozen men who can only monitor the truce and recommend changes, but who have no military powers to back their action. As former SLMM chief Tryggve Telleffssen once told this writer " our weapon is not rifle, but dialogue". Indeed, when the security situation in the East deteriorated with the factional fighting in the LTTE, SLMM chief Gen. Trond Furuhovde made a series of visits to Kilinochchi to arrest the deteriorating security situation. But the spree of killings go unabated. The question is not the SLMM's commitment or sincerity, but that the truce monitors are powerless to act when one party or the other violates the agreement. The preamble of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) which is the founding agreement of the SLMM is amply illustrative of what is required for the success of the SLMM. While describing that the SLMM would do international verification through on-site monitoring, the agreement states:"It is however understood that the effect of the SLMM will depend on the parties' commitment to abide with the recommendations of the SLMM". Equally, article 3 of the Ceasefire Agreement requires both parties to "fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their respective sides". The question is that neither the ceasefire agreement nor the SOMA has provisions outlining powers which are at the disposal of the monitors when one party or the other violates the agreement.The role of the SLMM, therefore, is based on the good faith of the two parties to the agreement. When one party reneges from its commitment, the only thing the SLMM could do is to enquire into the incident and rule it as a violation and make recommendations, which are non-bindable. The problem is not the lack of sincerity of the SLMM, but the lack of sincerity of the parties to the agreement. Indeed, the Tigers started hunting political opponents within months after the ceasefire agreement. The Tigers have conveniently denied responsibility after every assassination, which however bore hallmarks of the LTTE. This is where police have to do their role. How many times police have implicated the Tigers for such assassinations? Investigating these killings are the responsibility of the police and not the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. The problem is, while police for one or other reason failed in investigations, the public expect the Ceasefire Monitors to be the investigator. Equally important, the problem with the SLMM in the recent times has been its dislike to go public with its verdicts. A number of high profile rulings including the suicide attempt on the life of Minister Devananda were communicated in secrecy only to the two parties. The SLMM once began to issue a monthly evaluation report on the ceasefire. But suddenly, it came to a halt. The public is left in dark over the role of the SLMM. The presence of the SLMM, it was expected, would dissuade both parties from ceasefire violations due to negative local and international publicity. But, when the monitors communicate its rulings in classified documents, asking parties not to go public with them- as with the case of suicide bombing in Kollupitiya- the very rationale of the SLMM's presence is challenged. |
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