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| Sunday, 10 July 2005 |
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LTTE fighting a shadow war by Ranga Jayasuriya This week the police had a prize catch when they raided a house in Bandaragama taking into custody four people involved in the murder of Lt. Colonel Muthaliff. Police said the suspects had confessed to have spied on the movements of the army intelligence officer. The gunman had, however moved out somewhere before the police raid. It is a good job done by the police usually lethargic in its investigations. But, as everybody knew, soon after the murder, it was a work of the Tigers. When Lt. Colonel Muthaliff was gunned down, he was the highest ranking officer to be killed by the Tigers during the ceasefire, some NGO wallahs argued that the stalemate of the peace process was the reason for the increasing ceasefire violations. Of course, it is true, but even the immediate solution, i.e, signing the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure P-TOMS has not helped improve the security situation in the East. Killings of military intelligence operatives go on unabated, P-TOMS or not. A police constable attached to Kalkudah police station was shot dead last Saturday. Two intelligence officers attached to Kalmunai police were shot early this week, one died after he was airlifted to the Colombo General hospital. Continuing killings of military intelligence operatives by the Tiger pistol groups are an indication that the Tigers still believe the country's intelligence arm as a legitimate target. And it will be naive to expect the Tigers to embrace the ceasefire agreement in its total spirit, simply because the Government signed the P-TOMS. Even when rapport was an all time high between the then Wickremesinghe administration and the Tigers, Pottu Amman did not stop. The LTTE pistol men had a free run in the East, over the corpses of non-LTTE Tamil political activists and military intelligence operatives. 40 military intelligence operatives, including 10 army intelligence operatives have been killed by the LTTE during the ceasefire. A further 32 civilian military informants have been killed, plus over 45 activists of non-LTTE Tamil parties which includes the EPDP, EPRLF (Varathan Group), PLOTE and TELO. The LTTE's game plan can be understood. The Tigers need to deprive the security forces of their eyes and ears, thus to deny the security forces of the correct ground analysis. Furthermore, the Tigers' wrath against the military intelligence has not subsidied which along with the Special Task Force fought a successful counter-insurgency in the East. Military success in the East did not come from heavy artillery, but through the access to right information through a network of informants at the grass roots and use of tough counter-insurgency tactics in the early 90s. Of course, the split of the former LTTE Eastern Commander, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan alias Karuna in March last year exacerbated an already volatile situation. But, Karuna's split or the allegations of an alleged army collaboration with the Karuna group is not the primary reason, though some LTTE sympathizers point to it as an excuse. The first killing of the military intelligence men took place even before the two sides agreed on a formal ceasefire- but there was an unofficial truce agreed to by both sides. The first victim was Lance Cpl. Clary gunned down in Chenkalady, Batticaloa on 9, Feb 2002. The Security Forces may sympathize with the Karuna group. But of course they do not wish to be dragged into an unnecessary conflict. Even, the LTTE hierarchy must know this, but claim of an army collaboration with Karuna is good propaganda stuff for the Tigers and their sympathizers. Karuna,before he went underground disbanded the entire Eastern Tiger Force. We saw nearly 2,000 child soldiers going home. But those who remain with Karuna are the hardcore fighters, some were his bodyguards. They are the ones who have now set themselves against Prabhakaran's main Tiger outfit. Even the security Forces genuinely wish to improve the security situation, it is hard to avoid these hard core guerrillas getting a chance at the Wanni LTTE activists. For Karuna's cadres, army approval is not necessary to attack the LTTE; some victims of Karuna's men have indeed turned out to be LTTE pistol men sent to take on Karuna activists and operatives of military intelligence. The Karuna group no longer has a political objective. Nor does it have a military strength to take on the mainstream LTTE. The attempts by the Karuna group to register a political party failed after the killing of Sachi master, then the spokesman of the group, by a LTTE cadre inside the Batticaloa prison. The Karuna group has allied with the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) in the political platform, even then the ENDLF does not hold any significant political clout. In this context, the Karuna group will arm LTTE activists in the East with the sole mission of obstructing LTTE's political activities. Activities of the Karuna group are not a pretext for the LTTE to justify killings of the military intelligence operatives. Nor will the P-TOMS make any commitment on the LTTE's side to respect the truce agreement in its true spirit. The Scandinavian truce monitors have so far failed to stop LTTE killings. But they need to negotiate an unofficial truce among the Tigers, Security Forces and the Karuna activists in the East before the situation deteriorates further. The LTTE would not go back to a full scale war, it has indeed invested heavily on peace time infrastructure like peace secretariat buildings, media secretariat and guest houses. But it is fighting a shadow war. Most importantly, the Security Forces need to reassess their military tactics in order to prevent more intelligence operatives and non-LTTE Tamil political activists falling prey to LTTE gunmen. |
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