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Operation 'Restore Defence'

By Lt Col Susantha Seneviratne ,RWP,RSP,Psc Msc [ def ]-retd

"The enlightened ruler [politics] and the wise general [military] can subdue the adversary whenever they move and they can achieve superhuman feats because they have foreknowledge" -Sun Tzu This is one of the exemplary military quotations of Chinese origin, compiled by 'Sun Tzu' during an unspecified era.

These quotations as that of basics, fundamentals and principals of military tactics are, still applicable to all types of warfare, even under modern context while some of them do serve as unique 'guidelines' on political science in governance.

Since ancient time, the intimacy between these two contrasting fields - politics and military is reported to have been under constant strain in most of the countries. Evidences prove that extreme cases have ended up in the 'coup de tat'; resulting in emergence of a 'military junta'.

In theoretical context, the cause of such tension may be attributed to the 'difference' between 'democracy' and 'dictatorship', in governance; or the 'democratic' and 'autocratic'/ 'dictatorial' style of the political and military leadership.

Threat

It was in 1966 that Sri Lanka ever experienced an abortive military coup. But, the peculiarity of this attempt was that it is a politically motivated one. However, since then politics began to, gradually infiltrate into the services, particularly the Army. In order to prevent similar happenings, an intelligence cell was raised to look after the interest of the political parties in power.

As a result, those who joined the military service were, too subjected to a thorough screening process, which was done in a 'clandestine' pattern; to ascertain any involvements in rivalry party politics.

Though this procedure appeared to be a process of 'security clearance' against the involvements, such as anti-government, unlawful and criminal activities ensuring the character of those selected, it denied, at the same time the entry of a large number of qualified persons, from time to time on political grounds.

Besides, the said system kept all the serving personnel, particularly the officers under surveillance for the same purpose. Despite all that, it failed to detect/ identify the 'maiden' insurrection of the JVP in 1971 during its 'preparatory stage'.

The failure of intelligence corroborates the fact that parties in power were more concerned about the 'threat' posed by the rival politics than any other activity that was classified as 'detrimental' to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, such as influx of illicit emigrants and smuggling that took place in the north during the past and the present separatists movement of which the 'preparatory' stage goes as far back as 1972.

Yet, this system failed to detect those few, who were said to be of the volunteer force and were alleged to have been involved, indirectly in the 71 insurrection, in advance. The politics was not much conspicuous in the services then, but certain individual top brass kept maintaining political links 'under cover' for getting promotions/appointments/ overseas courses, and to be away from the operational areas/fields.

This is so even at present. Such influences, ultimately affected a certain number of officers, who were, so dedicated and competent; causing frustration among them so as to leave/ retire from the service. Some of them, thus departed through desperation during one regime, however got their 'lost' dues, such as the rank, during the other regime.

Although the circumstances that led these officers to leave/retire prematurely should be a case of 'political victimization' there are few, who did not fall into this category; they, either had been asked to retire on disciplinary grounds or having reached the maximum age or the maximum period in the rank (as per regulations) as a result of being unable to pass relevant tests or due to unsatisfactory performances.

In hind side, what these political manipulations did to the services was denying the valuable service of a certain number of 'professional' military officers, which no political party, in power would be able to redeem, at any cost.

Balance

In general, both the military and politics must work, in conjunction to avoid contention; to ensure effective governance based on politico-military strategy. If any of these two fields attempts to surpass the other, it may bring a situation similar to that of Myanmar where the military is in full control or to a state at which Pakistan has been over the past two decades where politics has been 'outmanoeuvred' by the military.

However, India has always maintained a balanced politico-military posture, in accordance with her national strategic defence initiative programme (NSDIP) since independence. But, in no case has the politics been used for personal advantages, like in Sri Lanka.

This is by no means to say that the military must be kept out of politics. Of course, the military must work, according to a political agenda but politics should not interfere whatsoever with the standard military affairs/procedures/patterns that are the pillars of military discipline- a case similar to when the former US president suggested that "Gay rights" must be allowed in the US military, the former US secretary, who was then Chief of the Defence Staff, vehemently rejected the same as saying that it would affect the discipline.

As a matter of fact, the views/advices of both politics and military must be exchanged, mutually to ensure effective governance.

To be, so the leadership of politics and military both must, equally be strong enough in 'professionalism'; the lost of which by any of the two would create an 'imbalance'; and thereby stronger might override the weak while the weakness in both will make the adversary stronger. This is what Sri Lanka is experiencing at present. What became much obvious in some instances was the political 'unwillingness' to have a strong military leadership to keep par with politics( may be anticipating possible threats similar to that of 1966).

However, it would not be possible for the military to stage a coup or an 'uprising' under the present conditions because it is an act against 'democracy', which will not have the support both locally and internationally and because of the inability of the military to 'stand' for long as the LTTE would go on the offensive. The prevailing service discipline and, above all the individual political 'inclinations' and personal 'differences' in the top brass would have adverse consequences. (The failure of the coup in 1966 may be attributed to some of these factors.)

Military effort

The unsolved separatist conflict has posed serious political and military chaos in the country today.

Though military used its fullest strength to bring the situation under control, modifying the strategy and tactics, in pursuant to a political agenda that kept, itself changing from time to time with the arrival of new governments, it failed to achieve the military 'objective' of weakening the LTTE; In this context, the military hierarchy never deliberated the 'absence' of a sound plan of national defence strategy, which was the key to the failure, despite certain political blunders, such as the withdrawal of military detachments in the north during 'Thimpu' talks, thus 'abandoning' 'vital' ground/ 'ground of tactical importance'(GTI), in terms of military tactics, confining troops only to 'admin' operations in 1985, sending IPKF back to India and subsequent handing over of weapons to LTTE to fight TNA, etc.

Of these, the worst would have happened in 1990; had the weapons been surrendered to LTTE by the Army (GW troops) as per orders given by then Joint operation command (JOC) following collapse of the peace talks.

The troops, notwithstanding such orders defended their detachments at Kiran Kalladi and Kalawanchikudi (SLLI), destroying over 50 LTTE cardres and recovering their weapons while running short of food and ammo for 07 days. Although this seems to be a political decision; based on the assurance given by the LTTE to provide 'safe passage' for troops to come down to Ampara following weapons handing over, the top brass at JOC should have deterred such a decision for the interest of troops on ground, knowing the 'behavioural pattern' of the LTTE, well.

The Police those, who adhered to such orders then are no more today.

Till now, nobody knows who took such a political decision, which came as an order.

Political effort

It is worthy mentioning the unabated political leadership-backup given to the military by both leading parties when in power from time to time to carry out all major offensives against the LTTE.

Both leading political parties, undoubtedly wanted to solve this crisis militarily; though the military failed to do so. Since work of the military is a "concerted" effort where everyone has a particular role to play the leadership, along cannot not be held responsible for failures /lapses, so does credits/gains.

The opinion of the public is that both leading political parties are responsible for preventing the military from 'terminating' the LTTE. This is a 'misconception' that must be dispelled by proper education on the subject.

The military had a strong political backup right along, until the ceasefire; the support given to the military to conduct the two major campaigns, which isolated the LTTE from the 'Important ground' and the 'public' - Operation 'Liberation' [Vadamarachchi] and the Operation 'Riviresa', was unprecedented.

In 2000, following the fall of Elephant pass and Killinochchi, it was the political decision that overruled/overrode the military thinking and halted the continual LTTE offensives at Chavakachcheri. However, in the recent past, with the ceasefire coming into effect, politicians seem to be using the military as a 'commodity' by 'valuing' and 'marketing' for political advantages. Death of Gen Kobbakaduwa, LTTE overrunning defences at Mulativ and Mankulam; LTTE assassinating intelligence personel, raid at millennium city, etc are being fully exploited with politics undermining the intellectual professional military understanding.

They all happened due to violating the basics, principles, concepts etc. and not adhering to military standing orders (SO) and not following a 'national strategic defence' plan. Over these incidents, the whole country is seems to be on a footing of misunderstanding owing to the manner, in which they are being commented upon by the politicians and the media. 'Professional truth' behind these events is, still in the dark.

The two controversial statements - the 'disbandment' and the 'reduction' of military as spelt out by two leading parties are now being debated using the electronic media to cause much psychological impact on the public for political advantage at the election.

Interestingly there are retired high ranking senior officers who are, also seen in 'attention' to comment on the same 'for' and 'against' to satisfy their individual parties. It must be mentioned that military basics, principles, etc cannot be changed to suit the likes and dislikes of political parties. Such commenting by these retired officers implies that either they do not know the subject, which might be the most case or they are being manipulated as 'pawns' by politicians.

The country must, therefore be very cautious when perceiving matters related to the military being discussed, even with the participation of so called military professionals.

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